QuickSearch:   Number of matching entries: 0.

Search Settings

    AuthorTitleYearJournal/ProceedingsReftypeDOI/URL
    Adams, B. & Raubal, M. Conceptual Space Markup Language (CSML): Towards the Cognitive Semantic Web {2009} 2009 IEEE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEMANTIC COMPUTING (ICSC 2009), pp. {253-260}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: CSML is a semantic markup language created for the publishing and sharing of conceptual spaces, which are geometric structures that represent semantics at the conceptual level. CSML can be used to describe semantics that are not captured well by the ontology languages commonly used in the Semantic Web. Measurement of the semantic similarity of concepts as well as the combination of concepts without shared properties are common human cognitive tasks. However, these operations present sources of difficulty for tools reliant upon set-theoretic and syllogistic reasoning on symbolic ontologies. In contrast, these operations can be modeled naturally using conceptual spaces. This paper describes the design decisions behind CSML, introduces the key component elements of a CSML document, and presents examples of its usage.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000276911400037,
      author = {Adams, Benjamin and Raubal, Martin},
      title = {Conceptual Space Markup Language (CSML): Towards the Cognitive Semantic Web},
      booktitle = {2009 IEEE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEMANTIC COMPUTING (ICSC 2009)},
      year = {2009},
      pages = {253-260},
      note = {3rd International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC 2009), Berkeley, CA, SEP 14-16, 2009}
    }
    
    Adams, E. On a proportionality analysis of syllogistic reasoning {2005} SYNTHESE
    Vol. {146}({1-2}), pp. {129-138} 
    article  
    Abstract: Syllogisms like Barbara, ``If all S is M and all M is P, then all S is P'', are here analyzed not in terms of the truth of their categorical constituents, ``all S is M'', etc., but rather in terms of the corresponding proportions, e.g., of Ss that are Ms. This allows us to consider the inferences' approximate validity, and whether the fact that most Ss are Ms and most Ms are Ps guarantees that most Ss are Ps. It turns out that no standard syllogism is universally valid in this sense, but special `default rules' govern approximate reasoning of this kind. Special attention is paid to inferences involving existential propositions of the ``Some S is M'' form, where it is does not make sense to say ``Almost some S is M'', but where it is important that in everyday speech, ``Some'' does not mean ``At least one'', but rather ``A not insignificant number''.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000232139400008,
      author = {Adams, EW},
      title = {On a proportionality analysis of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {SYNTHESE},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {146},
      number = {1-2},
      pages = {129-138}
    }
    
    Alter, A.L., Oppenheimer, D.M., Epley, N. & Eyre, R.N. Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning {2007} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
    Vol. {136}({4}), pp. {569-576} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency-receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments I and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)-reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments I and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000250886700003,
      author = {Alter, Adam L. and Oppenheimer, Daniel M. and Epley, Nicholas and Eyre, Rebecca N.},
      title = {Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {136},
      number = {4},
      pages = {569-576},
      doi = {{10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.569}}
    }
    
    Armisen-Marchetti, M. The level of scientific and philosophical demonstrations in Macrobius' Commentary {2005}
    Vol. {69}Demonstrare Voir et Faire Voir: Forme de la Demonstration a Rome, pp. {207+} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: Macrobius' Commentary enables us to observe demonstration at work in a work characteristic of a time (early 5th c. AD) and of a genre, the commentary, which brings together the various fields of scientific and philosophical knowledge. Three categories of demonstrations can be distinguished: 1) In the first place, to demonstrate means ``to put before one's eyes'' thanks to observation and description. 2) On the opposite side, pure logical demonstration culminating in syllogistic reasoning, safe in principle, except when it is vitiated, Macrobius suggests, by the opponent's dishonesty. 3) Lastly, mixed demonstrations combining observation with reasoning. They are the more numerous, but they are often defective: unconscious or unexplicited postulates, careless observations, far too loose reasonings, and above all the primacy of the neoplatonician dogma over any cognitive procedure. It can be accounted for by Macrobius' conception of knowledge as deployment of a global and timeless truth.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000250329400016,
      author = {Armisen-Marchetti, Mircille},
      title = {The level of scientific and philosophical demonstrations in Macrobius' Commentary},
      booktitle = {Demonstrare Voir et Faire Voir: Forme de la Demonstration a Rome},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {69},
      pages = {207+},
      note = {Interantional Symposium of Toulouse 2004, Toulouse, FRANCE, NOV 18-20, 2004}
    }
    
    Bacon, A., Handley, S. & Newstead, S. Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning {2003} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {9}({2}), pp. {133-168} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000185336100002,
      author = {Bacon, AM and Handley, SJ and Newstead, SE},
      title = {Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {133-168},
      doi = {{10.1080/13564780343000196}}
    }
    
    Bacon, A.M. & Handley, S.J. Dyslexia and reasoning: The importance of visual processes {2010} BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {101}({Part 3}), pp. {433-452} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Recent research has suggested that individuals with dyslexia rely on explicit visuospatial representations for syllogistic reasoning while most non-dyslexics opt for an abstract verbal strategy. This paper investigates the role of visual processes in relational reasoning amongst dyslexic reasoners. Expt 1 presents written and verbal protocol evidence to suggest that reasoners with dyslexia generate detailed representations of relational properties and use these to make a visual comparison of objects. Non-dyslexics use a linear array of objects to make a simple transitive inference. Expt 2 examined evidence for the visual-impedance effect which suggests that visual information detracts from reasoning leading to longer latencies and reduced accuracy. While non-dyslexics showed the impedance effects predicted, dyslexics showed only reduced accuracy on problems designed specifically to elicit imagery. Expt 3 presented problems with less semantically and visually rich content. The non-dyslexic group again showed impedance effects, but dyslexics did not. Furthermore, in both studies, visual memory predicted reasoning accuracy for dyslexic participants, but not for non-dyslexics, particularly on problems with highly visual content. The findings are discussed in terms of the importance of visual and semantic processes in reasoning for individuals with dyslexia, and we argue that these processes play a compensatory role, offsetting phonological and verbal memory deficits.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000279311400005,
      author = {Bacon, Alison M. and Handley, Simon J.},
      title = {Dyslexia and reasoning: The importance of visual processes},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {101},
      number = {Part 3},
      pages = {433-452},
      doi = {{10.1348/000712609X467314}}
    }
    
    Bacon, A.M., Handley, S.J., Dennis, I. & Newstead, S.E. Reasoning strategies: the role of working memory and verbal-spatial ability {2008} EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {20}({6}), pp. {1065-1086} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Evidence increasingly suggests individual differences in strategies adopted on reasoning tasks and that these are either verbal-propositional or visuospatial in nature. However, the cognitive foundations of these strategies remain uncertain. Experiment 1 examined the relationship between the use of working memory resources and strategy selection for syllogistic reasoning. Verbal and spatial strategy users did not differ on working memory capacity, but confirmatory factor analysis indicated that while verbal reasoners draw primarily on verbal working memory, spatial reasoners use both this and spatial resources. Experiment 2 investigated the relationship between strategies and verbal and spatial abilities. Although strategy groups were similar in overall ability, regression analysis showed that performance on a spatial ability measure (Vandenberg mental rotation task) predicted syllogistic reasoning performance, but only for spatial strategy users. The findings provide converging evidence that verbal and spatial strategies are underpinned by related differences in fundamental cognitive factors, drawing differentially on the subcomponents of working memory and on spatial ability.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000260164000005,
      author = {Bacon, Alison M. and Handley, Simon J. and Dennis, Ian and Newstead, Stephen E.},
      title = {Reasoning strategies: the role of working memory and verbal-spatial ability},
      journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {20},
      number = {6},
      pages = {1065-1086},
      doi = {{10.1080/09541440701807559}}
    }
    
    Bacon, A.M., Handley, S.J. & McDonald, E.L. Reasoning and dyslexia: A spatial strategy may impede reasoning with visually rich information {2007} BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {98}({Part 1}), pp. {79-92} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Bacon, Handley, and Newstead (2003, 2004) have presented evidence for individual differences in reasoning strategies, with most people seeming to represent and manipulate problem information using either a verbal or a spatial strategy. There is also evidence that individuals with dyslexia are inclined to conceptualise information in a visuo-spatial, rather than a verbal, way (e.g. von Karolyi et al, 2003). If so, we might expect a higher proportion of individuals with dyslexia to be spatial reasoners, compared with individuals who do not have dyslexia. The study reported here directly compared strategies reported by these two groups of participants on a syllogistic reasoning task. Moreover, problem content was manipulated so that reasoning across concrete and abstract materials could be compared. The findings suggest that whilst most individuals without dyslexia use a verbal strategy, reasoners with dyslexia do tend to adopt a spatial approach, though their performance is impaired with visually concrete materials. However, when reasoning with more abstract content, they perform comparably with non-dyslexic controls. The paper discusses these results in the light of recent research which has suggested that visual images may impede reasoning, and considers how individuals with dyslexia may differ from other reasoners.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000244178500006,
      author = {Bacon, Alison M. and Handley, Simon J. and McDonald, Emma L.},
      title = {Reasoning and dyslexia: A spatial strategy may impede reasoning with visually rich information},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {98},
      number = {Part 1},
      pages = {79-92},
      doi = {{10.1348/000712606X103987}}
    }
    
    Ball, L., Phillips, P., Wade, C. & Quayle, J. Effects of belief and logic on syllogistic reasoning - Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models {2006} EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {53}({1}), pp. {77-86} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Studies of Syllogistic reasoning have demonstrated a nonlogical tendency for people to endorse more believable conclusions than unbelievable ones. This belief bias effect is more dominant on invalid syllogisms than valid ones, giving rise to a logic by belief interaction. We report an experiment in which participants' eye movements were recorded in order to provide insights into the nature and time course of the reasoning processes associated with manipulations of conclusion validity and believability. Our main dependent measure was people's inspection times for syllogistic premises, and we tested predictions deriving from three contemporary mental-models accounts of the logic by belief interaction. Results supported recent ``selective processing'' theories of belief bias (e.g., Evans, 2000; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000), which assume that the believability of a conclusion biases model construction processes, rather than biasing the search for falsifying models (e.g., Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985) or a response stage of reasoning arising from subjective uncertainty (e.g., Quayle & Ball, 2000). We conclude by suggesting that the eye-movement analyses in reasoning research may provide a useful adjunct to other process-tracing techniques such as verbal protocol analysis.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000236138200008,
      author = {Ball, LJ and Phillips, P and Wade, CN and Quayle, JD},
      title = {Effects of belief and logic on syllogistic reasoning - Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models},
      journal = {EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {53},
      number = {1},
      pages = {77-86},
      doi = {{10.1027/1618-3169.53.1.77}}
    }
    
    Ball, L. & Quayle, J. The effects of belief and logic in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence from an eye-tracking analysis {1999} PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {49-54}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Studies of syllogistic reasoning report a strong non-logical tendency to endorse more believable conclusions than unbelievable conclusions. This belief bias effect is found to be stronger with invalid arguments than with valid ones. An experiment is reported in which participants' eye-movements were recorded in order to gain insight, into the nature and time course of the reasoning processes associated with experimental manipulations of logical validity and believability. Results are considered in relation to predictions derivable from contemporary accounts of belief bias. The logical status of conclusions was found to influence the duration of gazes, supporting the view that invalid conclusions are more demanding to evaluate than valid ones and the idea that a valid-invalid processing distinction underpins the interaction that is observed between logic and belief. Predictions concerning effects of believability upon gaze behaviour that were derivable from the mental models account (e.g., Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985) gained little support. The paper argues for the value of eye-movement analyses in reasoning research as an important adjunct to existing process-tracing techniques.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168193900014,
      author = {Ball, LJ and Quayle, JD},
      title = {The effects of belief and logic in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence from an eye-tracking analysis},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1999},
      pages = {49-54},
      note = {21st Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, VANCOUVER, CANADA, AUG 19-21, 1999}
    }
    
    Ball, L.J. & Quayle, J.D. Phonological and visual distinctiveness effects in syllogistic reasoning: Implications for mental models theory {2009} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {37}({6}), pp. {759-768} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Two experiments are reported in which the representational distinctiveness of terms within categorical syllogisms was manipulated in order to examine the assumption of mental models theory that abstract, spatially based representations underpin deduction. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conclusion validity for syllogisms containing either phonologically distinctive terms (e.g., harks, paps, and fids) or phonologically nondistinctive terms (e.g., fuds, fods, and feds). Logical performance was enhanced with the distinctive contents, suggesting that the phonological properties of syllogism terms can play an important role in deduction. In Experiment 2, participants received either the phonological materials from Experiment I or syllogisms involving distinctive or nondistinctive visual contents. Logical inference was again enhanced for the distinctive contents, whether phonological or visual in nature. Our findings suggest a broad involvement of multimodal information in syllogistic reasoning and question the assumed primacy of abstract, spatially organized representations in deduction, as is claimed by mental models theorists.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000269406100004,
      author = {Ball, Linden J. and Quayle, Jeremy D.},
      title = {Phonological and visual distinctiveness effects in syllogistic reasoning: Implications for mental models theory},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {37},
      number = {6},
      pages = {759-768},
      doi = {{10.3758/MC.37.6.759}}
    }
    
    BARA, B., BUCCIARELLI, M. & JOHNSONLAIRD, P. DEVELOPMENT OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1995} AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {108}({2}), pp. {157-193} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RH23900001,
      author = {BARA, BG and BUCCIARELLI, M and JOHNSONLAIRD, PN},
      title = {DEVELOPMENT OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {108},
      number = {2},
      pages = {157-193}
    }
    
    Bara, B., Bucciarelli, M. & Lombardo, V. Model theory of deduction: a unified computational approach {2001} COGNITIVE SCIENCE
    Vol. {25}({6}), pp. {839-901} 
    article  
    Abstract: One of the most debated questions in psychology and cognitive science is the nature and the functioning of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. However, all existing theories refer to a specific deductive domain, like syllogistic, propositional or relational reasoning. Our goal is to unify the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. In particular, we bring together the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory, for which we provide a formal foundation. We validate the theory through a computational model (UNICORE) which allows fine-grained predictions of subjects' performance in different reasoning domains. The performance of the model is tested against the performance of experimental subjects-as reported in the relevant literature-in the three areas of syllogistic, relational and propositional reasoning. The computational model proves to be a satisfactory artificial subject, reproducing both correct and erroneous performance of the human subjects. Moreover, we introduce a developmental trend in the program, in order to simulate the performance of subjects of different ages, ranging from children (3-6) to adolescents (8-12) to adults (>21). The simulation model performs similarly to the subjects of different ages. Our conclusion is that the validity of the mental model approach is confirmed for the deductive reasoning domain, and that it is possible to devise a unique mechanism able to deal with the specific subareas. The proposed computational model (UNICORE) represents such a unifying structure. (C) 2001 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000173164300001,
      author = {Bara, BG and Bucciarelli, M and Lombardo, V},
      title = {Model theory of deduction: a unified computational approach},
      journal = {COGNITIVE SCIENCE},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {839-901}
    }
    
    BARNDEN, J. HIGH-LEVEL REASONING, COMPUTATIONAL CHALLENGES FOR CONNECTIONISM, AND THE CONPOSIT SOLUTION {1995} APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
    Vol. {5}({2}), pp. {103-135} 
    article  
    Abstract: Sophisticated symbol processing in connectionist systems can be supported by two primitive representational techniques called Relative-Position Encoding (RPE) and Pattern-Similarity Association (PSA), and a selection technique called Temporal- Winner-Take-All (TWTA). TWTA effects winner-take-all selection on the basis of fine signal-timing differences as opposed to activation-level differences. Both RPE and PSA are far the encoding of highly temporary associations between representations. RPE is based on the way activation patterns are positioned relative to each other within a network. Under PSA, two patterns are temporarily associated if they have (suitable) subpatterns that are (suitably) similar. The article shows how particular versions of the primitives are used to good effect in a system called Conposit/SYLL. This is a connectionist implementation of a slightly simplified version of a complex existing psychological theory, namely Johnson-Laird's account of syllogistic reasoning. The computational processes in this theory present a major implementational challenge to connectionism. The challenge lies in the mutability, multiplicity, and diversity of the working memory structures, and the elaborateness of the processing needed for them. Conposit/SYLL's techniques allow it to meet the challenge. The implementation of symbolic processing in Conposit/SYLL is an interesting application of connectionism partly because it significantly affects the design of the symbolic processing level itself. In particular, it encourages the use of associative as opposed to pointer-based data structures, and the use of random as opposed to ordered iteration over sets of data structures. In addition, the article discusses Conposit/SYLL's somewhat unusual variable-binding approach.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995QP32500003,
      author = {BARNDEN, JA},
      title = {HIGH-LEVEL REASONING, COMPUTATIONAL CHALLENGES FOR CONNECTIONISM, AND THE CONPOSIT SOLUTION},
      journal = {APPLIED INTELLIGENCE},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {5},
      number = {2},
      pages = {103-135}
    }
    
    Barton, K., Fugelsang, J. & Smilek, D. Inhibiting beliefs demands attention {2009} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {15}({3}), pp. {250-267} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Research across a variety of domains has found that people fail to evaluate statistical information in an atheoretical manner. Rather, people tend to evaluate statistical information in light of their pre-existing beliefs and experiences. The locus of these biases continues to be hotly debated. In two experiments we evaluate the degree to which reasoning when relevant beliefs are readily accessible (i.e., when reasoning with Belief-Laden content) versus when relevant beliefs are not available (i.e., when reasoning with Non-Belief-Laden content) differentially demands attentional resources. In Experiment 1 we found that reasoning with scenarios that contained Belief-Laden content required fewer attentional resources than reasoning with scenarios that contained Non-Belief-Laden content, as evidenced by smaller costs on a secondary memory load task for the former than the latter. This trend was reversed in Experiment 2 when participants were instructed to ignore their beliefs when reasoning with Belief-Laden and Non-Belief-Laden scenarios. These findings provide evidence that beliefs automatically influence reasoning, and attempting to ignore them comes with an attentional cost.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000269344100002,
      author = {Barton, Kevin and Fugelsang, Jonathan and Smilek, Daniel},
      title = {Inhibiting beliefs demands attention},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {250-267},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780902930917}}
    }
    
    Bendixen, L., Schraw, G. & Dunkle, M. Epistemic beliefs and moral reasoning {1998} JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {132}({2}), pp. {187-200} 
    article  
    Abstract: The relationship among age, education, gender, syllogistic reasoning skill, epistemic beliefs, and moral reasoning in adults was examined. It was predicted that five epistemic dimensions would explain unique variance in moral reasoning over and above all other variables. This hypothesis was confirmed. Beliefs corresponding to simple knowledge, certain knowledge, omniscient authority, and quick learning each explained the significant variation in performance on the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979). Results showed that multiple epistemic assumptions play an important role in young adults' moral reasoning over and above other social and personal variables. Implications concerning the development of epistemic beliefs are discussed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000072418700005,
      author = {Bendixen, LD and Schraw, G and Dunkle, ME},
      title = {Epistemic beliefs and moral reasoning},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {132},
      number = {2},
      pages = {187-200}
    }
    
    BICKERSTETH, P. & DAS, J. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AMONG SCHOOL-CHILDREN FROM CANADA AND SIERRA-LEONE {1981} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {16}({1}), pp. {1-11} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981LK11900001,
      author = {BICKERSTETH, P and DAS, JP},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AMONG SCHOOL-CHILDREN FROM CANADA AND SIERRA-LEONE},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {16},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1-11}
    }
    
    Boger, G. Completion, reduction and analysis: Three proof-theoretic processes in Aristotle's prior analytics {1998} HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
    Vol. {19}({4}), pp. {187-226} 
    article  
    Abstract: Three distinctly different interpretations of Aristotle's notion of a sullogismos in Prior Analytics can be traced: (1) a valid or invalid premise-conclusion argument, (2) a single, logically true conditional proposition, and (3) a cogent argumentation or deduction. Remarkably the three interpretations hold similar notions about the logical relationships among the sullogismoi. This is most apparent in their conflating three processes that Aristotle especially distinguishes: completion (A4-6), reduction (A7) and analysis (A45). Interpretive problems result from not sufficiently recognizing Aristotle's remarkable degree of metalogical sophistication to distinguish logical syntax from semantics and, thus, also from not grasping him to refine the deduction system of his underlying logic. While it is obvious that Aristotle most often uses `sullogimos' to denote a valid argument of a certain kind, we show that at Prior Analytics A4-6, 7, 45 Aristotle specifically treats a sullogismos as an elemental argument pattern having only valid instances and that such a pattern then serves as a rule of deduction in his syllogistic logic. By extracting Aristotle's understanding of three proof-theoretic processes, this paper provides new insight into what Aristotle thinks reasoning syllogistically is and, moreover, it resolves three problems in the most recent interpretation that takes a sullogismos to be a deduction.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000078181000001,
      author = {Boger, G},
      title = {Completion, reduction and analysis: Three proof-theoretic processes in Aristotle's prior analytics},
      journal = {HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {19},
      number = {4},
      pages = {187-226}
    }
    
    BONATTI, L. WHY SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MENTAL LOGIC HYPOTHESIS {1994} COGNITION
    Vol. {50}({1-3}), pp. {17-39} 
    article  
    Abstract: Two hypotheses on deductive reasoning are under development: mental logic and mental models. It is often accepted that there are overwhelming arguments to reject the mental logic hypothesis. I revise these arguments and claim that they are either not conclusive, or point at problems which are troublesome for the mental model hypothesis as well.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994NL28500003,
      author = {BONATTI, L},
      title = {WHY SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MENTAL LOGIC HYPOTHESIS},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {50},
      number = {1-3},
      pages = {17-39}
    }
    
    Bucciarelli, M. Reasoning strategies in syllogisms: Evidence for performance errors along with computational limitations {2000} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {23}({5}), pp. {669+} 
    article  
    Abstract: Stanovich & West interpret errors in syllogistic reasoning in terms of computational limitations. I argue that the variety of strategies used by reasoners in solving syllogisms requires us to consider also performance errors. Although reasoners' performance from one trial to another is quite consistent, it can be different, in line with the definition of performance errors. My argument has methodological implications for reasoning theories.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000170102200006,
      author = {Bucciarelli, M},
      title = {Reasoning strategies in syllogisms: Evidence for performance errors along with computational limitations},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {23},
      number = {5},
      pages = {669+}
    }
    
    Bucciarelli, M. & Johnson-Laird, P. Strategies in syllogistic reasoning {1999} COGNITIVE SCIENCE
    Vol. {23}({3}), pp. {247-303} 
    article  
    Abstract: This paper is about syllogistic reasoning, i.e., reasoning from such pairs of premises as, All the chefs are musicians; some of the musicians ore painters. We present a computer model that implements the latest account of syllogisms, which is based on the theory of mental models. We also report four experiments that were designed to test this account. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the strategies revealed by the participants' use of paper and pencil as aids to reasoning. Experiment 3 used a new technique to externalize thinking. The participants had to refute, if possible, putative conclusions by constructing external models that were examples of the premises but counterexamples of the conclusions. Experiment 4 used the some techniques to examine the participants' strategies as they drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises. The results of the experiments showed that individuals not trained in logic con construct counterexamples, that they use similar operations to those implemented in the computer model, but that they rely on a much greater variety of interpretations of premises and of search strategies than the computer model does. We re-evaluates current theories of syllogistic reasoning in the light of these results.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000082872100001,
      author = {Bucciarelli, M and Johnson-Laird, PN},
      title = {Strategies in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {COGNITIVE SCIENCE},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {247-303}
    }
    
    Capon, A., Handley, S. & Dennis, I. Working memory and reasoning: An individual differences perspective {2003} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {9}({3}), pp. {203-244} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: This article reports three experiments that investigated the relationship between working memory capacity and syllogistic and five-term series spatial inference. A series of complex and simple verbal and spatial working memory measures were employed. Correlational analyses showed that verbal and spatial working memory span tasks consistently predicted syllogistic and spatial reasoning performance. A confirmatory factor analysis showed that three factors best accounted for the data-a verbal, a spatial, and a general factor. Syllogistic reasoning performance loaded all three factors, whilst spatial reasoning loaded only the general factor. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of reasoning theories and contemporary accounts of the structure of working memory.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000184713000003,
      author = {Capon, A and Handley, S and Dennis, I},
      title = {Working memory and reasoning: An individual differences perspective},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {203-244},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546781343000222}}
    }
    
    Cardaci, M., Gangemi, A., Pendolino, G. & DiNuovo, S. Mental models vs integrated models: Explanations of syllogistic reasoning {1996} PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS
    Vol. {82}({3, Part 2}), pp. {1377-1378} 
    article  
    Abstract: To compare mental versus integrated models explanations of syllogistic reasoning, we administered a multiple-choice questionnaire containing 19 pairs of syllogistic premises with valid conclusions (given in a C-A order) to 72 psychology undergraduates. Association between our integrated models classification and the empirical difficulty of items was strong.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1996UW15800051,
      author = {Cardaci, M and Gangemi, A and Pendolino, G and DiNuovo, S},
      title = {Mental models vs integrated models: Explanations of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {82},
      number = {3, Part 2},
      pages = {1377-1378}
    }
    
    CARLSON, R., LUNDY, D. & YAURE, R. SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE CHAINS IN MEANINGFUL TEXT {1992} AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {105}({1}), pp. {75-99} 
    article  
    Abstract: Deductive reasoning can be described as a process that constructs and evaluates argument structures in working memory. Specific assumptions about this process generate predictions concerning the processes evoked by syllogistic arguments encountered in reading meaningful text. Four experiments examined these processes. Subjects read meaningful texts that included syllogistic inference chains, then answered questions requiring memory retrieval or deductive inference. The order in which premises appeared in the passages varied, as did the presence of prequestions corresponding to the memory or inference test questions. Experiments 1 and 2 replicate previous findings concerning premise order, and demonstrate that reasoning processes are changed as predicted by prequestions that provide deductive goals. In Experiment 3, manipulating the number of premises required for answering inference questions supported a stepwise view of reasoning. Experiment 4 examined the generality of these findings by using the same manipulations with different presentation and response modes. Implications for the role of deductive reasoning in cognitive theory are discussed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992HH90000004,
      author = {CARLSON, RA and LUNDY, DH and YAURE, RG},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE CHAINS IN MEANINGFUL TEXT},
      journal = {AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {105},
      number = {1},
      pages = {75-99}
    }
    
    CERASO, J. & PROVITER.A SOURCES OF ERROR IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1971} COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {2}({4}), pp. {400-410} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1971L218000005,
      author = {CERASO, J and PROVITER.A},
      title = {SOURCES OF ERROR IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1971},
      volume = {2},
      number = {4},
      pages = {400-410}
    }
    
    CHANNON, S. & BAKER, J. REASONING STRATEGIES IN DEPRESSION - EFFECTS OF DEPRESSED MOOD ON A SYLLOGISM TASK {1994} PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
    Vol. {17}({5}), pp. {707-711} 
    article  
    Abstract: This study compared depressed undergraduate subjects with controls on a syllogistic reasoning task. Each syllogism consisted of two premises, the first relating the subject to a middle term and the second relating the predicate to a middle term. The subject's task was to draw the appropriate conclusion relating the subject to the predicate. The findings revealed a significant difference between the groups in ability to solve the problems correctly, and an examination of the types of errors made showed that the depressed subjects made significantly more errors which involved a failure to integrate information from the two premises to solve the problems. Such errors are thought to be associated with working memory capacity limitations. The findings are discussed in relation to models of depression postulating deficits in effortful processing.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994PM48600018,
      author = {CHANNON, S and BAKER, J},
      title = {REASONING STRATEGIES IN DEPRESSION - EFFECTS OF DEPRESSED MOOD ON A SYLLOGISM TASK},
      journal = {PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {17},
      number = {5},
      pages = {707-711}
    }
    
    Chater, N. & Oaksford, M. The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning {1999} COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {38}({2}), pp. {191-258} 
    article  
    Abstract: A probability heuristic model (PHM) for syllogistic reasoning is proposed. An informational ordering over quantified statements suggests simple probability based heuristics for syllogistic reasoning. The most important is the ``min-heuristic'': choose the type of the least informative premise as the type of the conclusion. The rationality of this heuristic is confirmed by an analysis of the probabilistic validity of syllogistic reasoning which treats logical inference as a limiting case of probabilistic inference. A meta-analysis of past experiments reveals close fits with PHM. PHM also compares favorably with alternative accounts, including mental logics, mental models, and deduction as verbal reasoning. Crucially, PHM extends naturally to generalized quantifiers, such as Most and Few, which have not been characterized logically and are, consequently, beyond the scope of current mental logic and mental model theories. Two experiments confirm the novel predictions of PHM when generalized quantifiers are used in syllogistic arguments. PHM suggests that syllogistic reasoning performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies justified by probability theory rather than by logic. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000079461700001,
      author = {Chater, N and Oaksford, M},
      title = {The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {38},
      number = {2},
      pages = {191-258}
    }
    
    Cherubini, P., Garnham, A., Oakhill, J. & Morley, E. Can any ostrich fly?: some new data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning {1998} COGNITION
    Vol. {69}({2}), pp. {179-218} 
    article  
    Abstract: According to one version of the mental models theory (Oakhill, J.V., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Garnham, A., 1989. Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition 31, 117-140) beliefs exert their influence on reasoning in three ways. First they can affect the interpretation of the premises, for example by conversion. Second, they can curtail the search for alternative models of the premises, if an initial model supports a believable conclusion. Third, they can act as a filter on any conclusion that is eventually generated. This last influence is important in explaining the effects of belief bias in one-model syllogisms with no convertible premises, since such syllogisms, by definition, have no alternative models. However, the most natural interpretation of such a filter is that it filters out conclusions and leads to the response `no valid conclusion'. The present study, which was conducted with groups of both British and Italian subjects, looked at the effect of prior knowledge on syllogistic reasoning, and showed that: (1) invalid conclusions for such one model syllogisms, either thematic or abstract, are typically not of the type `no valid conclusion', but state invalid relations between the end terms; (2) belief-bias is completely suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises, and therefore the premises themselves are always considered. The results an compatible with a version of the mental models theory in which a representation of prior knowledge precedes modelling of the premises, which are then incorporated into the representation of this knowledge. The relation between this theory and other accounts of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and the implications of these findings for reasoning more generally, are considered. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000077820300003,
      author = {Cherubini, P and Garnham, A and Oakhill, J and Morley, E},
      title = {Can any ostrich fly?: some new data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {69},
      number = {2},
      pages = {179-218}
    }
    
    Christakos, G. Another look at the conceptual fundamentals of porous media upscaling {2003} STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND RISK ASSESSMENT
    Vol. {17}({5}), pp. {276-290} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: We suggest a critical look at the epistemic foundations of the porous media upscaling problem that focuses on conceptual processes at work and not merely on form manipulations. We explore the way in which critical aspects of scientific methodology make their appearance in the upscaling context, thus generating useful effective parameters in practice. The fons et origo of our approach is a conceptual blending of knowledge states that requires the revision of the traditional method of scientific argument underlying most upscaling techniques. By contrast to previous techniques, the scientific reasoning of the proposed upscaling approach is based on a stochastic model that involves teleologic solutions and stochastic logic integration principles. The syllogistic form of the approach has important advantages over the traditional reasoning scheme of porous media upscaling, such as: it allows the rigorous derivation of the joint probability distributions of hydraulic gradients and conductivities across space; it imposes no restriction on the functional form of the effective parameters or the shape of the probability laws governing the random media (non-Gaussian distributions, multiple-point statistics and non-linear models are automatically incorporated); it relies on sound methodological principles rather than being ad hoc; and it offers the rational means for integrating the multifarious core knowledge bases and uncertain site-specific information sources about the subsurface system. Previous upscaling results are derived as special cases of the proposed upscaling approach under limited conditions of porous media flow, a fact that further demonstrates the generalization power of the approach. Our hope is that looking at the upscaling problem in this novel way will direct further attention to the methodological exploration of the problem at the length and the detail that it deserves.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000186542900002,
      author = {Christakos, G},
      title = {Another look at the conceptual fundamentals of porous media upscaling},
      journal = {STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND RISK ASSESSMENT},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {17},
      number = {5},
      pages = {276-290},
      note = {ModelCARE 2002 Conference, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC, JUN 17-20, 2002},
      doi = {{10.1007/s00477-003-0150-8}}
    }
    
    Chung, F.-L., Wang, S., Deng, Z. & Hu, D. CATSMLP: Toward a robust and interpretable multilayer perceptron with sigmoid activation functions {2006} IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS PART B-CYBERNETICS
    Vol. {36}({6}), pp. {1319-1331} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Enhancing the robustness and interpretability of a multilayer perceptron (MLP) with a sigmoid activation function is a challenging topic. As a particular MLP, additive TS-type MLP (ATSMLP) can be interpreted based on single-stage fuzzy IF-THEN rules, but its robustness will be degraded with the increase in the number of intermediate layers. This paper presents a new MLP model called cascaded ATSMLP (CATSMLP), where the ATSMLPs are organized in a cascaded way. The proposed CATSMLP is a universal approximator and is also proven to be functionally equivalent to a fuzzy inference system based on syllogistic fuzzy reasoning. Therefore, the CATSMLP may be interpreted based on syllogistic fuzzy reasoning in a theoretical sense. Meanwhile, due to the fact that syllogistic fuzzy reasoning has distinctive advantage over single-stage IF-THEN fuzzy reasoning in robustness, this paper proves in an indirect way that the CATSMLP is more robust than the ATSMLP in an upper-bound sense. Several experiments were conducted to confirm such a claim.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000242690600013,
      author = {Chung, Fu-Lai and Wang, Shitong and Deng, Zhaohong and Hu, Dewen},
      title = {CATSMLP: Toward a robust and interpretable multilayer perceptron with sigmoid activation functions},
      journal = {IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS PART B-CYBERNETICS},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {36},
      number = {6},
      pages = {1319-1331},
      doi = {{10.1109/TSMCB.2006.875871}}
    }
    
    Copeland, D. & Radvansky, G. Working memory and syllogistic reasoning {2004} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {57}({8}), pp. {1437-1457} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between working memory span and syllogistic reasoning performance. In addition, performance for the reasoning task was compared to predictions made by mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. According to mental model theory, syllogisms that require the use of more mental models are more difficult. According to the probability heuristics model difficulty is related to the number of probabilistic heuristics that must be applied, or (for invalid syllogisms) inconsistencies between the derived and correct conclusion. The predictions of these theories were examined across two experiments. In general, people with larger working memory capacities reasoned better. Also, the responses made by people with larger capacities were more likely to correspond to the predictions made by both mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. Relations between working memory span and performance were also consistent with both theories.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000225394700005,
      author = {Copeland, DE and Radvansky, GA},
      title = {Working memory and syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {57},
      number = {8},
      pages = {1437-1457},
      doi = {{10.1080/02724980343000846}}
    }
    
    Copeland, D.E. Theories of categorical reasoning and extended syllogisms {2006} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {12}({4}), pp. {379-412} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The aim of this study was to examine the predictions of three theories of human logical reasoning, (a) mental model theory, (b) formal rules theory (e.g., PSYCOP), and (c) the probability heuristics model, regarding the inferences people make for extended categorical syllogisms. Most research with extended syllogisms has been restricted to the quantifier ``All'' and to an asymmetrical presentation. This study used three-premise syllogisms with the additional quantifiers that are used for traditional categorical syllogisms as well as additional syllogistic figures. The predictions of the theories were examined using overall accuracy as well as a multinomial tree modelling technique. The results demonstrated that all three theories were able to predict response selections at high levels. However, the modelling analyses showed that the probability heuristics model did the best in both, Experiments 1 and 2.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000242059900002,
      author = {Copeland, David E.},
      title = {Theories of categorical reasoning and extended syllogisms},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {12},
      number = {4},
      pages = {379-412},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780500384772}}
    }
    
    Corballis, P. Visual grouping and the right-hemisphere interpreter {2003}
    Vol. {1250}COGNITION AND EMOTION IN THE BRAIN, pp. {447-457} 
    inproceedings DOI  
    Abstract: Four decades of research with callosotomy-or ``split-brain''-patients have revealed dramatic functional asymmetries between the cerebral hemispheres. The most striking hemispheric differences have been found in tasks tapping relatively high-level cognitive functions such as language, syllogistic reasoning, and schema-based cognition, all of which are performed much better by the left hemisphere in most patients. These findings have led Gazzaniga and his colleagues to postulate the existence of a left-lateralized cognitive module called the ``interpreter'' that performs these functions and attempts to resolve ambiguous events as it occurs in the world. Characterization of right-hemisphere specialization has been more problematic. Some visuospatial functions seem to be performed equivalently by both hemispheres, whereas others appear to be strongly right lateralized. I describe a series of behavioral experiments with split-brain patients that suggest that the two hemispheres process visual information in qualitatively different ways. Specifically, it appears that the left hemisphere does not have access to all of the visual mechanisms that are available to the right hemisphere. These data suggest that the right hemisphere also performs ``interpretive'' functions that are geared towards resolving the spatial ambiguity that is inherent in visual perception. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000189432000033,
      author = {Corballis, PM},
      title = {Visual grouping and the right-hemisphere interpreter},
      booktitle = {COGNITION AND EMOTION IN THE BRAIN},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {1250},
      pages = {447-457},
      note = {International Symposium in Limbic and Association Cortical Systems, Toyama, JAPAN, OCT 07-12, 2002},
      doi = {{10.1016/S0531-5131(03)01012-4}}
    }
    
    Corcoran, J. Aristotle's Demonstrative Logic {2009} HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
    Vol. {30}({1}), pp. {1-20} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two-volume Analytics. Many examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning showing by deductively evident steps that its conclusion is a consequence of its premises. In particular, a demonstration is a deduction whose premises are known to be true. Aristotle's general theory of demonstration required a prior general theory of deduction presented in the Prior Analytics. His general immediate-deduction-chaining conception of deduction was meant to apply to all deductions. According to him, any deduction that is not immediately evident is an extended argumentation that involves a chaining of intermediate immediately evident steps that shows its final conclusion to follow logically from its premises. To illustrate his general theory of deduction, he presented an ingeniously simple and mathematically precise special case traditionally known as the categorical syllogistic.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000262513000001,
      author = {Corcoran, John},
      title = {Aristotle's Demonstrative Logic},
      journal = {HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1-20},
      note = {International Sympopsium on History of Logica Devoted to the Logic of Aristoteles, Santiago, CHILE, NOV, 2007},
      doi = {{10.1080/01445340802228362}}
    }
    
    DAGRACA, M., DIAS, B. & RUIZ, E. BLOCKING INVALID SYLLOGISTIC CONVERSION IN DEDUCTIVE REASONING {1990} ARQUIVOS BRASILEROS DE PSICOLOGIA
    Vol. {42}({3}), pp. {66-77} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1990GC15500006,
      author = {DAGRACA, M and DIAS, BB and RUIZ, EL},
      title = {BLOCKING INVALID SYLLOGISTIC CONVERSION IN DEDUCTIVE REASONING},
      journal = {ARQUIVOS BRASILEROS DE PSICOLOGIA},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {42},
      number = {3},
      pages = {66-77}
    }
    
    De Neys, W. & Van Gelder, E. Logic and belief across the lifespan: the rise and fall of belief inhibition during syllogistic reasoning {2009} DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
    Vol. {12}({1}), pp. {123-130} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Popular reasoning theories postulate that the ability to inhibit inappropriate beliefs lies at the heart of the human reasoning engine. Given that people's inhibitory capacities are known to rise and fall across the lifespan, we predicted that people's deductive reasoning performance would show similar curvilinear age trends. A group of children (12-year-olds), young adults (20-year-olds), and older adults (65+-year-olds) were presented with a classic syllogistic reasoning task and a decision-making questionnaire. Results indicated that on syllogisms where beliefs and logic conflicted, reasoning performance showed the expected curvilinear age trend: Reasoning performance initially increased from childhood to early adulthood but declined again in later life. On syllogisms where beliefs and logic were consistent and sound reasoning did not require belief inhibition, however, age did not affect performance. Furthermore, across the lifespan we observed that the better people were at resisting intuitive temptations in the decision-making task, the less they were biased by their beliefs on the conflict syllogisms. As with the effect of age, one's ability to override intuitions in the decision-making task did not mediate reasoning performance on the no-conflict syllogisms. Results lend credence to the postulated central role of inhibitory processing in those situations where beliefs and logic conflict.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000261961400017,
      author = {De Neys, Wim and Van Gelder, Elke},
      title = {Logic and belief across the lifespan: the rise and fall of belief inhibition during syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {12},
      number = {1},
      pages = {123-130},
      doi = {{10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00746.x}}
    }
    
    Deret, D. Categorical syllogisms - A reexamination of the term ``some'' from the perspective of developmental psychology {1998} CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE
    Vol. {52}({4}), pp. {174-183} 
    article  
    Abstract: Within the field of the experimental psychology of deduction, categorical reasoning has typically been studied in the context of two different paradigms: inferences based on two premises (Chapman & Chapman, 1959; Deret, 1995, 1998; Dickstein, 1978; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Politzer, 1988; Roberge, 1970; Woodworth & Sells, 1935) and immediate inferences based on a single premise (Begg & Harris, 1982; Newstead, 1989, 1995; Newstead & Griggs, 1983; Politzer, 1991a). The two-premise inferences, better known as syllogistic categories, imply relations concerning the quantifiers ``all,'' ``some,'' ``none'' and ``some... not.'' A categorical proposition can be characterized in four different ways: by its universality (''all,'' ``none''); by its particularity (''some,'' ``some... not''); by being affirmative (''all are,'' ``some are''); or by being negative (''none is,'' ``some are not''). In research on categorical reasoning, less attention has been given to immediate inferences, which are based on a single premise (one categorical proposition rather than two). Such immediate inferences (as ``All As are Bs'') provide material to help us interpret quantification and logical errors made by research participants in experimental situations. The psychological approach of immediate inferences differs from the approach based on logic, by generating different predictions. According to Politzer (1990, 1991a, 1991b), psychologists studying reasoning have for a long time neglected linguistic and pragmatic factors. The pragmatic approach to deductive reasoning was inspired by the philosophical writing of Grice (1975), who suggested that, in the framework of speech-exchange, conversational implications control the use of the rules of language. The laws of communication and use of pragmatics impose constraints in terms of informativeness. One of the main sources of error in categorical reasoning is the pragmatic interpretation by which the quantifiers ``some'' and ``some... not'' are taken to mean ``some but not all'' and therefore become equivalent for people (Begg & Hams, 1982; Politzer, 1990). In order to evaluate the new paradigm of ``compatible judgment'' (Deret, 1995, 1998), as applied to a task involving immediate inference, we studied the meaning of the quantifiers ``some'' and ``some... not'' from a developmental perspective using participants from age 10 to adulthood (N = 326). Reexamining the relations of subcontrariness (''some'' towards ``some... not,'' and ``some... not'' towards ``some'') in the light of the new paradigm enables us to identify interpretational limits: the implication ``Some but not all'' and the equivalences between ``Some'' and ``Some... not.'' While the results concerning ``immediate compatibility'' confirm those obtained in the research literature on adults and 15-to 17-year-old adolescents in the model of ``immediate inference'' (Neimark & Chapman, 1975), the interpretation of the responses of younger children in the pragmatic perspective proposed by Politzer is not satisfactory. Our results show that the pragmatic interpretation of ``Some'' as equivalent to ``Some... not'' (and vice versa) appears as the dominant responses from the age of 14 years (67% of the responses), and becomes still more dominant in adulthood (90. Among 10-year-olds, this interpretation is rarely made (16% of the responses), which tires the limits of the classical pragmatic approach to ``some'' based only on its interpretation as ``some but not all.'' Contrary to the prediction of the pragmatic approach, 10-year-old children completely reject the equivalence between ``some'' and ``some... not.'' Between the ages of 11 and 13, in contrast, such equivalence is only accepted by 50% of participants; at this age, one cannot argue that the pragmatic factor is predominant. Yet the progressive evolution of ``compatible-type'' responses is consistent with the progressive acquisition of reasoning based on the implication ``Some'' implying ``...and not all,'' which contradicts the premise ``all.'' The overall pattern of results demonstrates a real developmental evolution in the pragmatic interpretation of the quantifier ``Some,'' which has not been taken into account in the research literature. In subsequent research, one needs nevertheless to clarify the level of logical mastery of participants. This is particularly important in the case of young children and the need to use paradigms with semantic content.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000078984100002,
      author = {Deret, D},
      title = {Categorical syllogisms - A reexamination of the term ``some'' from the perspective of developmental psychology},
      journal = {CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {52},
      number = {4},
      pages = {174-183}
    }
    
    DICKSTEIN, L. THE MEANING OF CONVERSION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1981} BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY
    Vol. {18}({3}), pp. {135-138} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981ML71400012,
      author = {DICKSTEIN, LS},
      title = {THE MEANING OF CONVERSION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {135-138}
    }
    
    DICKSTEIN, L. CONVERSION AND POSSIBILITY IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1981} BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY
    Vol. {18}({5}), pp. {229-232} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981MV34700001,
      author = {DICKSTEIN, LS},
      title = {CONVERSION AND POSSIBILITY IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {18},
      number = {5},
      pages = {229-232}
    }
    
    DICKSTEIN, L. EFFECT OF FIGURE ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1978} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {6}({1}), pp. {76-83} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1978EY74900011,
      author = {DICKSTEIN, LS},
      title = {EFFECT OF FIGURE ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1978},
      volume = {6},
      number = {1},
      pages = {76-83}
    }
    
    DICKSTEIN, L. ERROR PROCESSES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1978} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {6}({5}), pp. {537-543} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1978FT67900008,
      author = {DICKSTEIN, LS},
      title = {ERROR PROCESSES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1978},
      volume = {6},
      number = {5},
      pages = {537-543}
    }
    
    DICKSTEIN, L. EFFECTS OF INSTRUCTIONS AND PREMISE ORDER ON ERRORS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1975} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-HUMAN LEARNING AND MEMORY
    Vol. {104}({4}), pp. {376-384} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1975AF73300004,
      author = {DICKSTEIN, LS},
      title = {EFFECTS OF INSTRUCTIONS AND PREMISE ORDER ON ERRORS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-HUMAN LEARNING AND MEMORY},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {104},
      number = {4},
      pages = {376-384}
    }
    
    Dougherty, M. On the alleged subalternate character of Sacra doctrina in Aquinas {2004}
    Vol. {77}PHILOSOPHY AND INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING, pp. {101-110} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: Largely uncontested among interpreters of Aquinas is the claim that the Angelic Doctor presents sacra doctrina as a subalternated science. To be sure, in four texts of the Thomistic corpus Aquinas broaches the subject of subalternation in discussions of whether sacra doctrina can be a science. I contend that the appeal to subalternation in these discussions is not to defend sacra doctrina as a subalternated science, but is rather to defend the possibility of arriving at scientific conclusions when an act of belief serves as the starting point for syllogistic reasoning. There is indeed an epistemic similarity between the starting points of a subalternated science and the science of sacra doctrina, insofar as an act of belief serves as the proximate epistemic point of departure in both cases. However, the cognitive similarity between the practitioner of a subalternated science and a practitioner of sacra doctrina does not necessitate that sacra doctrina is a subalternated science.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000224271600007,
      author = {Dougherty, MV},
      title = {On the alleged subalternate character of Sacra doctrina in Aquinas},
      booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY AND INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {77},
      pages = {101-110},
      note = {77th Annual Conference of the American-Catholic-Philosophical-Association, Houston, TX, OCT 31-NOV 02, 2003}
    }
    
    Duan, J. & Chung, F. Cascaded fuzzy neural network model based on syllogistic fuzzy reasoning {2001} IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS
    Vol. {9}({2}), pp. {293-306} 
    article  
    Abstract: In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the fusion of neural networks and fuzzy logic. Most of the existing fuzzy neural network (FNN) models have been proposed to implement different types of single-stage fuzzy reasoning mechanisms. Single-stage fuzzy reasoning, however, is only the most basic among a human being's various types of reasoning mechanisms. Syllogistic fuzzy reasoning, where the consequence of a rule in one reasoning stage is passed to the next stage as a fact, is essential to effectively build up a large scale system with high level intelligence. In view of the fact that the fusion of syllogistic fuzzy logic and neural networks has not been sufficiently studied, a new FNN model based on syllogistic fuzzy reasoning, termed cascaded FNN (CFNN), is proposed in this paper. From the stipulated input-output data pairs, the model can generate an appropriate syllogistic fuzzy rule set through structure (genetic) learning and parameter (back-propagation) learning procedures proposed in this paper. In addition, we particularly discuss and analyze the performance of the proposed model in terms of approximation ability and robustness as compared with single-stage FNN models. The effectiveness of the proposed CFNN model is demonstrated through simulating two benchmark problems in fuzzy control and nonlinear function approximation domain.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000168401900006,
      author = {Duan, JC and Chung, FL},
      title = {Cascaded fuzzy neural network model based on syllogistic fuzzy reasoning},
      journal = {IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON FUZZY SYSTEMS},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {293-306}
    }
    
    Dube, C., Rotello, C.M. & Heit, E. Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect {2010} PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
    Vol. {117}({3}), pp. {831-863} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept more valid than invalid arguments and more believable than unbelievable conclusions and show greater overall accuracy in judging arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with a contrast of contrasts, comparing the acceptance rates for valid and invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. We show that use of this measure entails the assumption of a threshold model, which predicts linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In 3 experiments, subjects made ``valid''/''invalid'' responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence ratings that allowed the construction of empirical ROCs; ROCs were also constructed from a base-rate manipulation in one experiment. In all cases, the form of the empirical ROCs was curved and therefore inconsistent with the assumptions of Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (2000) multinomial model of belief bias. We propose a more appropriate, signal detection based model of belief bias. We then use that model to develop theoretically sound and empirically justified measures of decision accuracy and response bias; those measures demonstrate that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect. Thus, our data and analyses challenge existing theories of belief bias because those theories predict an accuracy effect that our data suggest is a Type I error. Our results also provide support for processing theories of deduction that assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999).
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000280450400005,
      author = {Dube, Chad and Rotello, Caren M. and Heit, Evan},
      title = {Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {117},
      number = {3},
      pages = {831-863},
      doi = {{10.1037/a0019634}}
    }
    
    EBER, S., PEKRUN, A., BARDOSI, A., GAHR, M., KRIETSCH, W., KRUGER, J., MATTHEI, R. & SCHROTER, W. TRIOSEPHOSPHATE ISOMERASE DEFICIENCY - HEMOLYTIC-ANEMIA, MYOPATHY WITH ALTERED MITOCHONDRIA AND MENTAL-RETARDATION DUE TO A NEW VARIANT WITH ACCELERATED ENZYME CATABOLISM AND DIMINISHED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY {1991} EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICS
    Vol. {150}({11}), pp. {761-766} 
    article  
    Abstract: A new triosephosphate isomerase (TPI) variant is described in an 8-year-old Turkish girl suffering from chronic haemolytic anaemia, myopathy and developmental retardation since early infancy. The enzyme activity profile revealed a generalized deficiency in erythrocytes, granulocytes, mononuclear blood cells, skeletal muscle tissue and cerebrospinal fluid. The concentration of enzyme substrate dihydroxyacetone phosphate was distinctly elevated. Biochemical examination showed accelerated enzyme deamidation, the first step in the normal catabolism of TPI during aging of the erythrocyte. The specific activity of the variant TPI, determined by antibody titration, was reduced to 61% of normal. Its heat stability was markedly decreased. Muscle biopsy and neuropsychological testing further clarified the pathogenesis of the disorder. A prevalent alteration of mitochondria similar to that seen in mitochondrial myopathy and an elevated amount of intracellular glycogen were found. The patient's retarded intellectual development was mainly due to impaired visual perception and sensory-motor co-ordination in addition to a lack of syllogistic reasoning. The findings indicate that the low TPI activity leads to a metabolic block of the glycolytic pathway and hence to a generalized impairment of cellular energy supply.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1991GE21800004,
      author = {EBER, SW and PEKRUN, A and BARDOSI, A and GAHR, M and KRIETSCH, WKG and KRUGER, J and MATTHEI, R and SCHROTER, W},
      title = {TRIOSEPHOSPHATE ISOMERASE DEFICIENCY - HEMOLYTIC-ANEMIA, MYOPATHY WITH ALTERED MITOCHONDRIA AND MENTAL-RETARDATION DUE TO A NEW VARIANT WITH ACCELERATED ENZYME CATABOLISM AND DIMINISHED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY},
      journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICS},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {150},
      number = {11},
      pages = {761-766}
    }
    
    EHRLICH, K. COMMON-SENSE INFERENCES AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1979} BULLETIN OF THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY
    Vol. {32}({JAN}), pp. {19} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1979GG36100016,
      author = {EHRLICH, K},
      title = {COMMON-SENSE INFERENCES AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY},
      year = {1979},
      volume = {32},
      number = {JAN},
      pages = {19}
    }
    
    van Eijck, J. Natural logic for natural language {2007}
    Vol. {4363}LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND COMPUTATION, pp. {216-230} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: For a cognitive account of reasoning it is useful to factor out the syntactic aspect-the aspect that has to do with pattern matching and simple substitution-from the rest. The calculus of monotonicity, alias the calculus of natural logic, does precisely this, for it is a calculus of appropriate substitutions at marked positions in syntactic structures. We first introduce the semantic and the syntactic sides of monotonicity reasoning or `natural logic', and propose an improvement to the syntactic monotonicity calculus, in the form of an improved algorithm for monotonicity marking. Next, we focus on the role of monotonicity in syllogistic reasoning. In particular, we show how the syllogistic inference rules (for traditional syllogistics, but also for a broader class of quantifiers) can be decomposed in a monotonicity component, an argument swap component, and an existential import component. Finally, we connect the decomposition of syllogistics to the doctrine of distribution.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000251053600016,
      author = {van Eijck, Jan},
      title = {Natural logic for natural language},
      booktitle = {LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND COMPUTATION},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {4363},
      pages = {216-230},
      note = {6th International Tbilisi Symposium on Logic, Language, and Computation (TbiLLC 2005), Batumi, GA, SEP 12-16, 2005}
    }
    
    ELEY, M. SUITABILITY OF PLACEMENT TASKS AS ANALOGS FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1979} BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {70}({NOV}), pp. {541-546} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1979HU28300011,
      author = {ELEY, MG},
      title = {SUITABILITY OF PLACEMENT TASKS AS ANALOGS FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1979},
      volume = {70},
      number = {NOV},
      pages = {541-546}
    }
    
    ENGLISH, L. EVIDENCE FOR DEDUCTIVE REASONING - IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF SYLLOGISTIC STRUCTURE {1993} BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {11}({Part 4}), pp. {391-409} 
    article  
    Abstract: This study investigated children's and adults' ability to solve logical and illogical syllogisms, the latter involving unconnected premises. In Expt 1, 58 5- and 6-year-olds were individually presented with logical syllogisms set within a fantasy context involving toy play and child play, the latter in the absence of toys. Results showed that a high percentage of children were able to reason solely on the basis of the information given, making reference to the appropriate premise information in drawing their conclusions. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated Markovits, Schleifer & Fortier's (1989) claim that this ability is not sufficient evidence for deductive reasoning. Experiment 2 (168 primary school children) addressed both logical and illogical syllogisms, while Expt 3 (85 secondary students and 81 university students) examined illogical syllogisms only. The results of Expt 2 showed that children responded differently to the two syllogistic forms, with their responses to the illogical syllogisms indicating an implicit awareness of the unconnectectness of the premises. It is argued that this implicit understanding is sufficient evidence for deductive reasoning with illogical syllogisms and that an explicit recognition of indeterminacy, the criterion demanded by Markovits et al., is a more sophisticated application of this reasoning. While the students in Expt 3 demonstrated a more explicit awareness, they nevertheless gave a large number of responses of the implicit type indicating the presence of some non-age-related differences in adults' ability explicitly to recognize situations of undecidability.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993MG44300005,
      author = {ENGLISH, L},
      title = {EVIDENCE FOR DEDUCTIVE REASONING - IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF SYLLOGISTIC STRUCTURE},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {11},
      number = {Part 4},
      pages = {391-409}
    }
    
    ERICKSON, J., WELLS, G. & TRAUB, B. TESTS OF A MODEL OF FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1974} BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY
    Vol. {4}({NA4}), pp. {253} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1974U956900176,
      author = {ERICKSON, JR and WELLS, GL and TRAUB, BH},
      title = {TESTS OF A MODEL OF FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY},
      year = {1974},
      volume = {4},
      number = {NA4},
      pages = {253}
    }
    
    Espino, O., Santamaria, C. & Garcia-Madruga, J. Figure and difficulty in syllogistic reasoning {2000} CAHIERS DE PSYCHOLOGIE COGNITIVE-CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION
    Vol. {19}({4}), pp. {417-428} 
    article  
    Abstract: The model theory of syllogistic reasoning assumes that reasoners can devise models of the premises when the middle terms are contiguous. When the arrangement of the terms is not appropriate, they have to perform additional operations. Our first experiment shows that the time consumed by these operations can be measured in the reading time of the second premise. This effect is not predicted by other theories of syllogistic reasoning. The second experiment replicates the figural bias in a construction task. Both experiments yielded a reliable effect of the number of models on reading time and accuracy. The number of models and the figure seem to be independent factors that do not interact. An analysis of the invalid conclusions produced by the participants in Experiment 2 indicates that the invalid conclusions were frequently consistent with any of the initial models.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000089609900002,
      author = {Espino, O and Santamaria, C and Garcia-Madruga, JA},
      title = {Figure and difficulty in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CAHIERS DE PSYCHOLOGIE COGNITIVE-CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {19},
      number = {4},
      pages = {417-428}
    }
    
    Espino, O., Santamaria, C., Meseguer, E. & Carreiras, M. Early and late processes in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence from eye-movements {2005} COGNITION
    Vol. {98}({1}), pp. {B1-B9} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: An eye-movement monitoring experiment was carried out to examine the effects of the difficulty of the problem (simple versus complex problems) and the type of figure (figure 1 or figure 4) on the time course of processing categorical syllogisms. The results showed that the course of influence for these two factors is different. We found early processing effects for the figure but not for the difficulty of the syllogism and later processing effects for both the figure and the difficulty. These results lend support to the Model Theory (Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, New Jersey: LEA.) as opposed to other theories of reasoning (Chater, N., Oaksford, M. (1999). The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 191-258; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Rips, L. J. (1994). The psychology of proof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000233708200006,
      author = {Espino, O and Santamaria, C and Meseguer, E and Carreiras, M},
      title = {Early and late processes in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence from eye-movements},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {98},
      number = {1},
      pages = {B1-B9},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.cognition.2004.12.010}}
    }
    
    Evans, J. What could and could not be a strategy in reasoning {2000} DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND STRATEGIES, pp. {1-22}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: The term ``strategy'' is discussed with reference to Evans and Over's (1996) distinction between implicit and explicit thought processes. A strategy is used to refer to processes which are relatively slow, goal-directed, systematic, and under explicit conscious control. The remainder of the chapter concerns the theoretical accounts that have been given of reasoning in three domains: transitive inference, syllogistic reasoning, and propositional reasoning. It is argued that many descriptions of the processes involved in reasoning refer to tacit processes which could not-by the above definition-be strategic. These include pragmatic comprehension processes and nonlogical heuristics. However, it is also argued that to reason deductively rather than inductively does require a conscious effort at deduction and only occurs in response to specific instructions. Thus deduction is seen as a strategy. An account of strategic deductive reasoning with the mental models framework is preferred.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000084928600001,
      author = {Evans, JST},
      title = {What could and could not be a strategy in reasoning},
      booktitle = {DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND STRATEGIES},
      year = {2000},
      pages = {1-22},
      note = {Workshop on Deductive Reasoning and Strategies, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, MAR 20-21, 1998}
    }
    
    EVANS, J., BARSTON, J. & POLLARD, P. ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LOGIC AND BELIEF IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1983} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {11}({3}), pp. {295-306} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1983QX27500009,
      author = {EVANS, JST and BARSTON, JL and POLLARD, P},
      title = {ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LOGIC AND BELIEF IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1983},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {295-306}
    }
    
    Evans, J. & Curtis-Holmes, J. Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning {2005} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {11}({4}), pp. {382-389} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000233490300004,
      author = {Evans, JSBT and Curtis-Holmes, J},
      title = {Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {382-389},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780542000005}}
    }
    
    Evans, J., Handley, S. & Harper, C. Necessity, possibility and belief: A study of syllogistic reasoning {2001} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {54}({3}), pp. {935-958} 
    article  
    Abstract: The present study extended the investigation of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning in two ways: (1) The effect was studied under instructions to decide whether conclusions were possible, as well as necessary, given the premises; and (2) the effect was studied for types of syllogism where people rarely endorse the conclusions as well as those (valid and fallacious) where endorsements are common. Three experiments are reported, which show first that there is a marked tendency to reject unbelievable conclusions relative to abstract or neutral controls on all kinds of syllogism and under both types of instruction. There was also significant evidence of positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable conclusions) and of interactions between belief bias effects and logical form. The results are discussed with particular respect to accounts of belief bias offered by theorists in the mental-model tradition.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000170702000015,
      author = {Evans, JST and Handley, SJ and Harper, CNJ},
      title = {Necessity, possibility and belief: A study of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {54},
      number = {3},
      pages = {935-958}
    }
    
    Evans, J., Handley, S., Harper, C. & Johnson-Laird, P. Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction {1999} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION
    Vol. {25}({6}), pp. {1495-1513} 
    article  
    Abstract: This article examined syllogistic reasoning that differs from previous research in 2 significant ways: (a) Participants were asked to decide whether conclusions were possible as well as necessary, and (b) every possible combination of syllogistic premises and conclusions was presented for evaluation with both single-premise (Experiment 1) and double-premise (Experiment 2) problems. Participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible than as necessary, and differences in response to the 2 forms of instruction conformed to several predictions derived from the mental model theory of deduction. Findings of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that some fallacies are consistently endorsed and others consistently resisted when people are asked to judge whether conclusions that are only possible follow necessarily. This finding was accounted for by the computational implementation of the model theory: Fallacies are made when the first mental model of the premises considered supports the conclusion presented.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000083955600009,
      author = {Evans, JST and Handley, SJ and Harper, CNJ and Johnson-Laird, PN},
      title = {Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {25},
      number = {6},
      pages = {1495-1513}
    }
    
    EVANS, J., NEWSTEAD, S., ALLEN, J. & POLLARD, P. DEBIASING BY INSTRUCTION - THE CASE OF BELIEF BIAS {1994} EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {6}({3}), pp. {263-285} 
    article  
    Abstract: The study is concerned with the question of whether robust biases in reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in principles of reasoning. Three experiments are reported in which the effect of instructions upon the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning is investigated. Belief bias is most clearly marked by a tendency for subjects to accept invalid conclusions which are a priori believable. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate and extend an experiment reported by Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992). In contrast with their experiment, it was found that belief bias was maintained despite the use of augmented instructions which emphasised the principle of logical necessity. Experiment 2 provided an exact replication of the augmented instructions condition of Newstead et al., including the presence of problems with belief-neutral conclusions. Once again, significant effects of conclusion believability were found. A third experiment examined the use of elaborated instructions which lacked specific reference to the notion of logical necessity. The use of these instructions significantly reduced the effects of belief on the reasoning observed. Taking the current findings together with the experiment of Newstead et al., the overall conclusion is that elaborated instructions can reduce the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, but not eliminate it. This conclusion is discussed with reference to (1) the practical implications for improving thinking and reasoning via verbal instruction and (2) the nature of the belief bias phenomenon.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994PK97700003,
      author = {EVANS, JSBT and NEWSTEAD, SE and ALLEN, JL and POLLARD, P},
      title = {DEBIASING BY INSTRUCTION - THE CASE OF BELIEF BIAS},
      journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {6},
      number = {3},
      pages = {263-285}
    }
    
    EVANS, J., OVER, D. & MANKTELOW, K. REASONING, DECISION-MAKING AND RATIONALITY {1993} COGNITION
    Vol. {49}({1-2}), pp. {165-187} 
    article  
    Abstract: It is argued that reasoning in the real world supports decision making and is aimed at the achievement of goals. A distinction is developed between two notions of rationality: rationality1 which is reasoning in such a way as to achieve one's goals - within cognitive constraints - and rationality2 which is reasoning by a process of logic. This dichotomy is related to the philosophical distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. It is argued that logicality (rationality2) does not provide a good basis for rationality1 and some psychological research on deductive reasoning is re-examined in this light. First, we review belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning, and argue that the phenomena do not support the interpretations of irrationality that are often placed upon them. Second, we review and discuss recent studies of deontic reasoning in the Wason selection task, which demonstrate the decision making, and rational1 nature of reasoning in realistic contexts. The final section of the paper examines contemporary decision theory and shows how it fails, in comparable manner to formal logic, to provide an adequate model for assessing the rationality of human reasoning and decision making.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993MG56100007,
      author = {EVANS, JSBT and OVER, DE and MANKTELOW, KI},
      title = {REASONING, DECISION-MAKING AND RATIONALITY},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {49},
      number = {1-2},
      pages = {165-187}
    }
    
    Evans, J.S.B.T., Handley, S.J. & Bacon, A.M. Reasoning Under Time Pressure A Study of Causal Conditional Inference {2009} EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {56}({2}), pp. {77-83} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: In this study, we examine the role of beliefs in conditional inference in two experiments, demonstrating a robust tendency for people to make fewer inferences from statements they disbelieve, regardless of logical validity. The main purpose of this study was to test whether participants are able to inhibit this belief effect where it constitutes a bias. This is the case when participants are specifically instructed to assume the truth of the premises. However, Experiment 1 showed that the effect is no less marked than when this instruction is given, than when it is not, although higher ability participants did show slightly less influence of belief (Experiment 2). Contrary to the findings with syllogistic reasoning, use of speeded tasks had no effect on the extent of the belief bias (both experiments), although it did considerably reduce the numbers of inferences that were drawn overall. These findings suggest that the belief bias in conditional inference is less open to volitional control than that associated with syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000263741600001,
      author = {Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. and Handley, Simon J. and Bacon, Alison M.},
      title = {Reasoning Under Time Pressure A Study of Causal Conditional Inference},
      journal = {EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {56},
      number = {2},
      pages = {77-83},
      doi = {{10.1027/1618-3169.56.2.77}}
    }
    
    FALMAGNE, R. & GONSALVES, J. DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE {1995} ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {46}, pp. {525-559} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995QF07700020,
      author = {FALMAGNE, RJ and GONSALVES, J},
      title = {DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE},
      journal = {ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {46},
      pages = {525-559}
    }
    
    Favrel, J. & Barrouillet, P. On the relation between representations constructed from text comprehension and transitive inference production {2000} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION
    Vol. {26}({1}), pp. {187-203} 
    article  
    Abstract: Deductive inference production from texts is a process considered to involve either the construction of an integrated mental model or the step-by-step coordination of propositional representations of the sentences. These alternative hypotheses were tested in 3 experiments using a set inclusion task paradigm in which participants had to recall the premises and to evaluate transitive inferences. Contrary to what is known about linear ordering relations, order of recalls and reaction times provide evidence that the encoding of set inclusion relations does not result in an integrated representation. These results suggest that the mental models theory needs to take account of the nature of the relation to be represented if it is to become a general theory of reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000085147300010,
      author = {Favrel, J and Barrouillet, P},
      title = {On the relation between representations constructed from text comprehension and transitive inference production},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {26},
      number = {1},
      pages = {187-203}
    }
    
    FISHER, D. A 3-FACTOR MODEL OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - THE STUDY OF ISOLABLE STAGES {1981} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {9}({5}), pp. {496-514} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981MR69100007,
      author = {FISHER, DL},
      title = {A 3-FACTOR MODEL OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - THE STUDY OF ISOLABLE STAGES},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {9},
      number = {5},
      pages = {496-514}
    }
    
    Fisk, J., Montgomery, C., Wareing, M. & Murphy, P. Reasoning deficits in ecstasy (MDMA) polydrug users {2005} PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
    Vol. {181}({3}), pp. {550-559} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Rationale/objectives: Previous research has shown that ecstasy users are impaired in thinking and reasoning. The present study sought to explore the possibility that syllogistic reasoning errors in ecstasy users were due to an inability to construct a model of the premises due to working memory limitations. Methods: Twenty-nine ecstasy users and 25 nonecstasy user controls completed abstract syllogistic reasoning problems varying in difficulty. Pairs of premises were provided, and participants were required to generate conclusions that followed necessarily from them. Results: On the easier problems, both groups performed at well above chance although nonusers achieved significantly more correct responses. Consistent with existing research, on the more difficult problems, errors by nonusers were characterised by incorrect conclusions suggesting that while nonusers have the working memory capacity to construct a single model of the premises, this is not an exhaustive representation and usually results in an erroneous conclusion. On the other hand, for all problem types, ecstasy users, rather than produce incorrect responses, were more likely to fail to generate a conclusion. Conclusions: The present results are consistent with the possibility that ecstasy users with their reduced working memory capacity may experience difficulty in constructing even a single model of the premises. While this might be attributable to the effects of 3,4-methlylenedioxymethamphetamine neurotoxicity, many of the ecstasy users in the present study were polydrug users. Thus, the possibility that other drugs including cannabis and cocaine might contribute to the present results cannot be excluded.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000232635200014,
      author = {Fisk, JE and Montgomery, C and Wareing, M and Murphy, PN},
      title = {Reasoning deficits in ecstasy (MDMA) polydrug users},
      journal = {PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {181},
      number = {3},
      pages = {550-559},
      doi = {{10.1007/s00213-005-0006-7}}
    }
    
    Fisk, J. & Sharp, C. Syllogistic reasoning and cognitive ageing {2002} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {55}({4}), pp. {1273-1293} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Gilinsky and Judd (1994) demonstrated that age-related impairment in syllogistic reasoning was in part due to reduced working-memory capacity. A total of 30 older (average age 66 Nears) and 34 younger persons (average age 24 Nears) were tested on syllogisms of various types as well as on other measures. Syllogistic reasoning was significantly correlated with education, processing speed, word span, and word fluency. Correlations with visuo-spatial processing and random letter generation were just short of significance. Syllogistic reasoning performance declined with age, although the deficit was no longer statistically significant following control for age-related differences in information-processing speed. On the other hand the inclusion of word fluency as an additional covariate boosted the apparent age effect, returning it to statistical significance. Thus it is possible that cognitive processes outside of working memory might underpin at least part of the apparent age deficit. This possibility is evaluated in the light of neuropsychological evidence implicating the prefrontal cortex in both the processing of syllogisms and more generally in cognitive ageing.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000178655100012,
      author = {Fisk, JE and Sharp, C},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning and cognitive ageing},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {55},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1273-1293},
      doi = {{10.1080/02724980244000107}}
    }
    
    FORD, M. 2 MODES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND PROBLEM SOLUTION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1995} COGNITION
    Vol. {54}({1}), pp. {1-71} 
    article  
    Abstract: In this paper, the theory of syllogistic reasoning proposed by Johnson-Laird (1983, 1986; Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) is shown to be inadequate and an alternative theory is put forward. Protocols of people attempting to solve syllogistic problems and explaining to another person how they reached their conclusions were obtained. Two main groups of subjects were identified. One group represented the relationship between classes in a spatial manner that was supplemented by a verbal representation. The other group used a primarily verbal representation. A detailed theory of the processes for both groups is given.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995QB26500001,
      author = {FORD, M},
      title = {2 MODES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND PROBLEM SOLUTION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {54},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1-71}
    }
    
    FRENCH, J. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS IN AUSTRALIA {1994} REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
    Vol. {9}({5}), pp. {547-568} 
    article  
    Abstract: Although Australia has had State and Federal antitrust laws for most of the twentieth century, its antitrust jurisprudence has only developed significantly since the enactment of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Judges have had to come to grips with economic concepts not readily amenable to syllogistic reasoning and traditional fact finding processes. There has been increasing sophistication in judicial reasoning in the area of competition law. However restrictions placed by the rules of evidence upon the role of expert economists have attracted criticism. A new rule of court enables such testimony to be received by way of argument or submission rather than as evidence. This reflects the evaluative and normative nature of many of the judgments required under competition laws. It also provides an opportunity for a more fruitful and constructive interaction between economists and the judiciary in the application of such laws.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994QD38000005,
      author = {FRENCH, JRS},
      title = {JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS IN AUSTRALIA},
      journal = {REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {5},
      pages = {547-568}
    }
    
    FRENCH, P. LINGUISTIC MARKING, STRATEGY, AND AFFECT IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1979} JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH
    Vol. {8}({5}), pp. {425-449} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1979HN01800001,
      author = {FRENCH, PL},
      title = {LINGUISTIC MARKING, STRATEGY, AND AFFECT IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH},
      year = {1979},
      volume = {8},
      number = {5},
      pages = {425-449}
    }
    
    FUCHS, A., GOSCHKE, T. & GUDE, D. ON THE ROLE OF IMAGERY IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1988} PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH-PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG
    Vol. {50}({1}), pp. {43-49} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1988P002500007,
      author = {FUCHS, A and GOSCHKE, T and GUDE, D},
      title = {ON THE ROLE OF IMAGERY IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH-PSYCHOLOGISCHE FORSCHUNG},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {50},
      number = {1},
      pages = {43-49}
    }
    
    GALOTTI, K. THE ROLE OF WORKING MEMORY IN PLAUSIBILITY EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1990} BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY
    Vol. {28}({6}), pp. {518} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1990EC29300453,
      author = {GALOTTI, KM},
      title = {THE ROLE OF WORKING MEMORY IN PLAUSIBILITY EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {28},
      number = {6},
      pages = {518}
    }
    
    GALOTTI, K., BARON, J. & SABINI, J. INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - DEDUCTION RULES OR MENTAL MODELS {1986} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
    Vol. {115}({1}), pp. {16-25} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1986A236100002,
      author = {GALOTTI, KM and BARON, J and SABINI, JP},
      title = {INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - DEDUCTION RULES OR MENTAL MODELS},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {115},
      number = {1},
      pages = {16-25}
    }
    
    GALOTTI, K. & KOMATSU, L. CORRELATES OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING SKILLS IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD AND EARLY ADOLESCENCE {1989} JOURNAL OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE
    Vol. {18}({1}), pp. {85-96} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1989T750700006,
      author = {GALOTTI, KM and KOMATSU, LK},
      title = {CORRELATES OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING SKILLS IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD AND EARLY ADOLESCENCE},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {18},
      number = {1},
      pages = {85-96}
    }
    
    Gamez, E. & Marrero, H. The role of the middle terms contiguity in pragmatic syllogistic reasoning {2000} CAHIERS DE PSYCHOLOGIE COGNITIVE-CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION
    Vol. {19}({5-6}), pp. {487-512} 
    article  
    Abstract: Bringing the middle terms into contiguity is proposed by mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) as a cognitive operation involved in syllogistic reasoning. However, a causal-agency behavioural content has been demonstrated to bias the deductive process towards a pragmatic conclusion in opposition to the figural effect (Marrero & Gamez, 1999). In this paper we examined if bringing the middle terms into contiguity remains as a cognitive operation in the process of drawing a pragmatic conclusion. We carried out two experiments. In Experiment 1, we examined both if the middle terms contiguity presentation facilitates the drawing of the pragmatic conclusion, and if in syllogisms with the causal-agency direction reversed the subjects carried out two cognitive operations: returning the content to the standard causal-agency direction, and subsequently, placing the middle terms into contiguity. In Experiment 2, we compared the latency of drawing a formal conclusion facilitated by the middle terms contiguity and a pragmatic conclusion facilitated by the standard causal-agency direction presentation. In general, the results did not support the idea that bringing the middle terms into contiguity is a cognitive operation involved in the process of drawing a pragmatic conclusion. The implications for syllogistic reasoning research are discussed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000167415700001,
      author = {Gamez, E and Marrero, H},
      title = {The role of the middle terms contiguity in pragmatic syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CAHIERS DE PSYCHOLOGIE COGNITIVE-CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {19},
      number = {5-6},
      pages = {487-512}
    }
    
    Garcia, L., Khayata, M. & Pacholczyk, D. A symbolic formalisation of direct inference principle {2001} IC-AI'2001: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, VOLS I-III, pp. {144-150}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: In this paper, we extend the abilities of our previous symbolic model of syllogistic reasoning based on quantified statements having the form ``Q A's are B's''. More precisely, we present a symbolic formalisation of direct inference principle allowing us to deal with particular individuals c knowing that ``c is A''.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000173960400023,
      author = {Garcia, L and Khayata, MY and Pacholczyk, D},
      title = {A symbolic formalisation of direct inference principle},
      booktitle = {IC-AI'2001: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, VOLS I-III},
      year = {2001},
      pages = {144-150},
      note = {International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, LAS VEGAS, NV, JUN 25-28, 2001}
    }
    
    Garnham, A. & Oakhill, J. Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: Comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000) {2005} PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
    Vol. {112}({2}), pp. {509-517} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, K A. Garnham, 1989) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000227887600009,
      author = {Garnham, A and Oakhill, JV},
      title = {Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: Comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {112},
      number = {2},
      pages = {509-517},
      doi = {{10.1037/0033-295X.112.2.509}}
    }
    
    Geminiani, G. & Bucciarelli, M. Deductive reasoning in right-brain damaged {1998} PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {386-391}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Deduction is a high level cognitive ability which has not been much analyzed in neuropsychology. Cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists strongly debate the nature of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. A theory particularly pertinent to the neuropsychology of thinking is Mental Model Theory, which postulates the use of analogical representations in reasoning. Studies on unilateral neglect in neuropsychology show that the right hemisphere is involved in analogical representations. On these theoretical bases we make a critical prediction about the role of the right hemisphere in reasoning. This paper investigates the ability of right-brain damaged patients to deal with two main sorts of deduction: syllogistic and relational reasoning. Our results suggest a significant involvement of the right hemisphere in reasoning. Also. as far as syllogistic reasoning is concerned, the results allow for the existence of a verbal component, beside the analogical one.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168193500075,
      author = {Geminiani, GC and Bucciarelli, M},
      title = {Deductive reasoning in right-brain damaged},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1998},
      pages = {386-391},
      note = {20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, MADISON, WI, AUG 01-04, 1998}
    }
    
    Geurts, B. Reasoning with quantifiers {2003} COGNITION
    Vol. {86}({3}), pp. {223-251} 
    article  
    Abstract: In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and one of the main topics in psychological studies on deductive reasoning is syllogistic inference, which is just a restricted form of reasoning with quantifiers. But thus far the semantical and psychological enterprises have remained disconnected. This paper aims to show how our understanding of syllogistic reasoning may benefit from semantical research on quantification. I present a very simple logic that pivots on the monotonicity properties of quantified statements - properties that are known to be crucial not only to quantification but to a much wider range of semantical phenomena. This logic is shown to account for the experimental evidence available in the literature as well as for the data from a new experiment with cardinal quantifiers (''at least n'' and ``at most n''), which cannot be explained by any other theory of syllogistic reasoning. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000180328500002,
      author = {Geurts, B},
      title = {Reasoning with quantifiers},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {86},
      number = {3},
      pages = {223-251}
    }
    
    GILHOOLY, K., LOGIE, R., WETHERICK, N. & WYNN, V. WORKING MEMORY AND STRATEGIES IN SYLLOGISTIC-REASONING TASKS {1993} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {21}({1}), pp. {115-124} 
    article  
    Abstract: It has often been asserted that working-memory limitations are a major factor contributing to problem difficulty; for example, Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental-models theory appeals to working-memory limitations to explain the difficulty of syllogistic reasoning. However, few studies have directly explored working memory in problem solving in general or syllogistic reasoning in particular. This paper reports two studies. In the first, working-memory load was varied by presenting syllogistic tasks either verbally or visually (so that the premises were continuously available for inspection). A significant effect of memory load was obtained. In the second study, premises were presented visually for a subject-determined time. Dual-task methods were used to assess the role of working-memory components, as identified in Baddeley's (1986) model. Syllogistic performance was disrupted by concurrent random-number generation but not by concurrent articulatory suppression or by concurrent tapping in a preset pattern. Furthermore, the concurrent syllogism task interfered with random generation and to a lesser extent with articulatory suppression, but not with tapping. We conclude that while the central-executive component of working memory played a major role in the syllogistic-task performance reported here, the articulatory loop had a lesser role, and the visuospatial scratch pad was not involved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993LE78800012,
      author = {GILHOOLY, KJ and LOGIE, RH and WETHERICK, NE and WYNN, V},
      title = {WORKING MEMORY AND STRATEGIES IN SYLLOGISTIC-REASONING TASKS},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {21},
      number = {1},
      pages = {115-124}
    }
    
    GILHOOLY, K., LOGIE, R., WETHERICK, N. & WYNN, V. WORKING MEMORY AND STRATEGIES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASKS {1992} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {27}({3-4}), pp. {148} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992JF42000774,
      author = {GILHOOLY, KJ and LOGIE, RH and WETHERICK, NE and WYNN, V},
      title = {WORKING MEMORY AND STRATEGIES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASKS},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3-4},
      pages = {148}
    }
    
    Gilhooly, K., Logie, R. & Wynn, V. Syllogistic reasoning tasks and working memory: Evidence from sequential presentation of premises {2002} CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {21}({2}), pp. {111-120} 
    article  
    Abstract: An experiment is reported concerning the role of working memory components in syllogistic reasoning. In this study, the syllogistic premises were presented sequentially and subjects attempted the syllogisms with and without three secondary tasks (articulatory suppression; spatial suppression and verbal random generation). Taking account of possible trade-offs among the dual tasks, it appeared that syllogisms with sequentially presented premises markedly loaded the central executive and the phonological loop components of working memory and also showed an involvement of the visuo-spatial scratchpad. It appears that the ``slave'' systems of working memory were more heavily loaded when sequential presentation of premises was used than was found previously with simultaneous premise presentation (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick Wynn, 1993).
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000178774200001,
      author = {Gilhooly, KJ and Logie, RH and Wynn, VE},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning tasks and working memory: Evidence from sequential presentation of premises},
      journal = {CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {21},
      number = {2},
      pages = {111-120}
    }
    
    Gilhooly, K., Logie, R. & Wynn, V. Syllogistic reasoning tasks, working memory, and skill {1999} EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {11}({4}), pp. {473-498} 
    article  
    Abstract: The involvement of working memory sub-systems in syllogistic reasoning problems was assessed by dual task methods. Effects of skill level and training on working memory involvement in syllogistic reasoning were examined. In Study 1, participants were pre-selected into groups of High and Low skill at syllogistic reasoning on the basis of a pencil-and-paper screening test. Six separate High and Low skill groups completed syllogistic reasoning tasks in control conditions and each group was also tested under one of the following six dual task conditions: articulatory suppression, unattended speech, verbal random generation, spatial random generation, tapping in a simple pattern, unattended pictures. The results indicated that the more skilled participants were generally following a high demand strategy, which loaded the central executive, phonological loop and imagery sub-systems, but that lower skill participants were generally following a less demanding strategy which did not load working memory components so heavily. In two Pilot Studies a training procedure was assessed and validated. In Study 2, participants were selected, on the basis of a screening test, as being unskilled at solving syllogisms but as performing above guessing level. These participants underwent the training regime validated in the Pilot Studies. Following training, separate groups of participants carried out syllogistic tests with and without one of the following four secondary tasks: articulatory suppression, unattended pictures. spatial random generation, and verbal random generation. The pattern of results indicated that training had induced high demand strategies (often logic-equivalent), which loaded the central executive and to a lesser extent the phonological loop.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000084384400003,
      author = {Gilhooly, KJ and Logie, RH and Wynn, V},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning tasks, working memory, and skill},
      journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {473-498}
    }
    
    GILINSKY, A. & JUDD, B. WORKING-MEMORY AND BIAS IN REASONING ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN {1994} PSYCHOLOGY AND AGING
    Vol. {9}({3}), pp. {356-371} 
    article  
    Abstract: Age differences in syllogistic reasoning in relation to crystallized and fluid ability were studied in 278 adults from 19 to 96 years of age. Two reasoning tasks, the evaluation and the construction of conclusions for syllogisms of varying complexity and believability, a vocabulary test, and 3 tasks of working memory were administered. The magnitude of age-related variance on selected reasoning tasks was only partially reduced by statistically controlling measures of both working memory and vocabulary. Additional age-related effects on reasoning were found to be significantly associated with number of mental models and bias produced by conflict between belief and logic. A significant bias was also found toward acceptance of invalid syllogisms as valid, even when contents were abstract. These sources of error in logic are discussed in relation to Johnson-Laird's (1983) theory of mental models and Evans's (1989) account of bias in human reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994PG65600002,
      author = {GILINSKY, AS and JUDD, BB},
      title = {WORKING-MEMORY AND BIAS IN REASONING ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGY AND AGING},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {9},
      number = {3},
      pages = {356-371}
    }
    
    Goel, V., Buchel, C., Frith, C. & Dolan, R. Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic reasoning {2000} NEUROIMAGE
    Vol. {12}({5}), pp. {504-514} 
    article  
    Abstract: A key question for cognitive theories of reasoning is whether logical reasoning is inherently a sentential linguistic process or a process requiring spatial manipulation and search. We addressed this question in an event-related fMRI study of syllogistic reasoning, using sentences with and without semantic content Our findings indicate involvement of two dissociable networks in deductive reasoning. During content-based reasoning a left hemisphere temporal system was recruited. By contrast, a formally identical reasoning task, which lacked semantic content, activated a parietal system. The two systems share common components in bilateral basal ganglia nuclei, right cerebellum, bilateral fusiform gyri, and left prefrontal cortex. We conclude that syllogistic reasoning is implemented in two distinct systems whose engagement is primarily a function of the presence or absence of semantic content. Furthermore, when a logical argument results in a belief-logic conflict, the nature of the reasoning process is changed by:recruitment of the right prefrontal cortex. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000165265100003,
      author = {Goel, V and Buchel, C and Frith, C and Dolan, RJ},
      title = {Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {NEUROIMAGE},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {12},
      number = {5},
      pages = {504-514}
    }
    
    Goel, V., Makale, M. & Grafman, J. The hippocampal system mediates logical reasoning about familiar spatial environments {2004} JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
    Vol. {16}({4}), pp. {654-664} 
    article  
    Abstract: It has recently been shown that syllogistic reasoning engages two dissociable neural systems. Reasoning about familiar situations engages a frontal-temporal lobe system, whereas formally identical reasoning tasks involving unfamiliar situations recruit a frontal-parietal visuospatial network. These two systems may correspond to the ``heuristic'' and ``formal'' methods, respectively, postulated by cognitive theory. To determine if this dissociation generalizes to reasoning about transitive spatial relations, we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they reasoned about landmarks in familiar and unfamiliar environments. Our main finding is a task ( reasoning and baseline) by spatial content ( familiar and unfamiliar) interaction. Modulation of reasoning toward unfamiliar landmarks resulted in bilateral activation of superior and inferior parietal lobules ( BA 7, 40), dorsal superior frontal cortex ( BA 6), and right superior and middle frontal gyri ( BA 8), regions widely implicated in visuospatial processing. By contrast, modulation of the reasoning task toward familiar landmarks, engaged the right inferior/orbital frontal gyrus (BA 11/47), bilateral occipital (BA 18, 19), and temporal lobes. The temporal lobe activation included the right inferior temporal gyrus ( BA 37), posterior hippocampus, and parahippocampal gyrus, regions implicated in spatial memory and navigation tasks. These results provide support for the generalization of dual mechanism theory to transitive reasoning and highlight the importance of the hippocampal system in reasoning about familiar spatial environments.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000221521200013,
      author = {Goel, V and Makale, M and Grafman, J},
      title = {The hippocampal system mediates logical reasoning about familiar spatial environments},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {16},
      number = {4},
      pages = {654-664}
    }
    
    GUYOTE, M. & STERNBERG, R. A TRANSITIVE-CHAIN THEORY OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1981} COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {13}({4}), pp. {461-525} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981MG73700001,
      author = {GUYOTE, MJ and STERNBERG, RJ},
      title = {A TRANSITIVE-CHAIN THEORY OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {461-525}
    }
    
    Haarmann, H., Davelaar, E. & Usher, M. Individual differences in semantic short-term memory capacity and reading comprehension {2003} JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE
    Vol. {48}({2}), pp. {320-345} 
    article  
    Abstract: We report three correlation studies, which investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in the capacity of a semantic short-term memory (STM) component in working memory (WM) predict performance on complex language tasks. To measure the capacity of semantic STM, we devised a storage-only measure, the conceptual span, which makes use of a category-cued recall procedure. In the first two studies, where the conceptual span was administered with randomized words (not blocked by categories), we found that conceptual span predicted single-sentence and text comprehension, semantic anomaly detection and verbal problem solving, explaining unique variance beyond non-word and word span. In some cases, the conceptual span explained unique variance beyond the reading span. Conceptual span correlated better with verbal problem solving than reading span, suggesting that a storage-only measure can outperform a storage-plus-processing measure. In Study 3, the conceptual span was administered with semantically clustered lists. The clustered span correlated with the comprehension measures as well as the non-clustered span, indicating that the critical process is memory maintenance and not semantic clustering. Moreover, we found an interaction between subjects' performance on the conceptual span and the effect of the distance between critical words in anomaly detection, supporting the proposal that semantic STM maintains unintegrated word meanings. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000181236600005,
      author = {Haarmann, HJ and Davelaar, EJ and Usher, M},
      title = {Individual differences in semantic short-term memory capacity and reading comprehension},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {48},
      number = {2},
      pages = {320-345},
      note = {40th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic-Society, Los Angeles, CA, NOV, 1999}
    }
    
    Halberda, J. Is this a dax which I see before me? Use of the logical argument disjunctive syllogism supports word-learning in children and adults {2006} COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {53}({4}), pp. {310-344} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Many authors have argued that word-learning constraints help guide a word-learner's hypotheses as to the meaning of a newly heard word. One such class of constraints derives from the observation that word-learners of all ages prefer to map novel labels to novel objects in situations of referential ambiguity. In this paper I use eye-tracking to document the mental computations that support this word-learning strategy. Adults and preschoolers saw images of known and novel objects, and were asked to find the referent of known and novel labels. Experiment 1 shows that adults systematically reject a known distractor (e.g. brush) before mapping a novel label (e.g. ``dax'') to a novel object. This is consistent with the proposal that participants worked through a Disjunctive Syllogism (i.e. Process-of-Elimination) to motivate the mapping of the novel label to the novel object. Experiment 2 shows that processing is similar for adults performing an implicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. ``the winner is the dax'') and an explicit Disjunctive Syllogism (e.g. ``the winner is not the iron''). Experiment 3 reveals that similar processes govern preschoolers' mapping of novel labels. Taken together, these results suggest that word-learners use Disjunctive Syllogism to motivate the mapping of novel labels to novel objects. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000242864200002,
      author = {Halberda, Justin},
      title = {Is this a dax which I see before me? Use of the logical argument disjunctive syllogism supports word-learning in children and adults},
      journal = {COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {53},
      number = {4},
      pages = {310-344},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.04.003}}
    }
    
    HALVERSON, J. GOODY AND THE IMPLOSION OF THE LITERACY THESIS {1992} MAN
    Vol. {27}({2}), pp. {301-317} 
    article  
    Abstract: In a series of influential books, articles and lectures over the past quarter-century, Jack Goody has probably been the foremost advocate of the `literacy thesis', the principal claim of which is that the development of logical thought ('syllogistic reasoning', `formal operations', `higher psychological processes') is dependent on writing, both in theory and in historical fact. The aim of the present critique is to show that there is no inherent relationship between literacy and logic; that the possibilities for such development supposedly afforded uniquely by literacy also exist in non-literate discourse; that such possibilities, in any case, had no evident role in the historical beginnings of logic; that, in short, the `cognitive' claims of the literacy thesis have no substance.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992JA40000004,
      author = {HALVERSON, J},
      title = {GOODY AND THE IMPLOSION OF THE LITERACY THESIS},
      journal = {MAN},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {27},
      number = {2},
      pages = {301-317}
    }
    
    HAMILL, J. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AND TAXONOMIC SEMANTICS {1979} JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
    Vol. {35}({4}), pp. {481-494} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1979LJ37500007,
      author = {HAMILL, JF},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AND TAXONOMIC SEMANTICS},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH},
      year = {1979},
      volume = {35},
      number = {4},
      pages = {481-494}
    }
    
    Handley, S., Dennis, I., Evans, J. & Capon, A. Individual differences and the search for counterexamples in syllogistic reasoning {2000} DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND STRATEGIES, pp. {241-265}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: In this chapter we consider whether people search for alternatives to the initial conclusions they draw from deductive arguments and the degree to which this tendency might be mediated by individual differences. We present experimental data which suggests that reasoners do not search for counter-examples when engaged in syllogistic reasoning; rather they make judgments based on a single model of the premises. This finding holds for both judgments of necessity and judgments of possibility. We go on to present a confirmatory factor analysis of the data and identify a factor which is interpreted as the degree to which people search for alternative models. This factor is a significant predictor of performance on certain problem types. Problems that can only be solved by considering alternative models to those initially constructed load positively on this factor, whereas problems that can be solved with reference to an initial model load negatively. We argue that there an clear differences in the tendency to search for alternatives but that these differences manifest themselves in different ways dependent upon the processing requirements of a particular problem type. The findings are discussed in the context of current views on the role of counter-example search in human reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000084928600012,
      author = {Handley, SJ and Dennis, I and Evans, JST and Capon, A},
      title = {Individual differences and the search for counterexamples in syllogistic reasoning},
      booktitle = {DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND STRATEGIES},
      year = {2000},
      pages = {241-265},
      note = {Workshop on Deductive Reasoning and Strategies, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, MAR 20-21, 1998}
    }
    
    HARDMAN, D. & PAYNE, S. PROBLEM DIFFICULTY AND RESPONSE FORMAT IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1995} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {48}({4}), pp. {945-975} 
    article  
    Abstract: It was hypothesized that the perceived irrelevance of the proposition `'Some X are not Y'' is a factor contributing to the difficulty of nearly all the determinate syllogisms classed as multiple model by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), according to mental models theory. Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis by showing that subjects frequently correctly evaluate valid `'Some...not'' conclusions but rarely produce them, even when they have evaluated them elsewhere. Explanations of these findings based on the use of superficial strategies were ruled out. Experiment 2 further supported the hypothesis by showing that performance increased across the no-conclusion, multiple-choice, and evaluation task formats, and that this effect generalized to problems containing the quantifier `'only''. However, the initial hypothesis was rejected in light of Experiment 3, which found no difference between multiple-choice and no-conclusion formats when the number of allowable conclusions was controlled for. Nevertheless, superior performance remained in the evaluation format, and it is suggested that offered conclusions may be used as a goal for the reasoning process. This interpretation is supported by the finding (Experiments 1 and 3) that subjects appear to search only for alternative conclusions that maintain the subject-predicate structure of the offered conclusion.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995TG60900007,
      author = {HARDMAN, DK and PAYNE, SJ},
      title = {PROBLEM DIFFICULTY AND RESPONSE FORMAT IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {48},
      number = {4},
      pages = {945-975}
    }
    
    Harris, P. The veridicality assumption {2001} MIND & LANGUAGE
    Vol. {16}({3}), pp. {247-262} 
    article  
    Abstract: Writers on cognitive development differ on whether children are naturally inclined to maintain a veridical conception of the world or whether such an inclination emerges only gradually in the course of development. In either case, however. it is assumed that there is a consistent premium on veridicality. I argue against that assumption. Three different contexts are examined in which successful cognitive performance depends on temporarily setting aside what is known to be: the case: counterfactual thinking, syllogistic reasoning and thr comprehension of connected discourse.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000169121200001,
      author = {Harris, PL},
      title = {The veridicality assumption},
      journal = {MIND & LANGUAGE},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {247-262}
    }
    
    HEINRICH, I. CHANGES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING INFLUENCED BY SEMANTIC VARIATION OF PROPOSITIONS {1975} PSYCHOLOGISCHE BEITRAGE
    Vol. {17}({4}), pp. {497-518} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1975BA53500002,
      author = {HEINRICH, I},
      title = {CHANGES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING INFLUENCED BY SEMANTIC VARIATION OF PROPOSITIONS},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGISCHE BEITRAGE},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {17},
      number = {4},
      pages = {497-518}
    }
    
    HELSABECK, F. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - GENERATION OF COUNTEREXAMPLES {1975} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {67}({1}), pp. {102-108} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1975V568000013,
      author = {HELSABECK, F},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - GENERATION OF COUNTEREXAMPLES},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {67},
      number = {1},
      pages = {102-108}
    }
    
    Hilpinen, R. Aristotelian syllogistic as a foundation of C.S. Peirce's theory of reasoning {2000} ARISTOTLE AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE, VOL I, pp. {109-125}  inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168523400006,
      author = {Hilpinen, R},
      title = {Aristotelian syllogistic as a foundation of C.S. Peirce's theory of reasoning},
      booktitle = {ARISTOTLE AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE, VOL I},
      year = {2000},
      pages = {109-125},
      note = {Aristotle and Contemporary Science International Conference, THESSALONIKI, GREECE, 1997}
    }
    
    Hochschild, J. Did Aquinas answer Cajetads question? Aquinas's semantic rules for analogy and the interpretation of De Nominum Analogia {2004}
    Vol. {77}PHILOSOPHY AND INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING, pp. {273-288} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: Cajetan's analogy theory is usually evaluated in terms of its fidelity to the teachings of Aquinas. But what if Cajetan was trying to answer questions Aquinas himself did not raise, and so could not help to answer? Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia can be interpreted as intending to solve a particular semantic problem: to characterize the unity of the analogical concept, so as to defend the possibility of a non-univocal teras mediating syllogistic reasoning. Aquinas offers various semantic characterizations of analogy, saying it involves, for instance: signification per prius et posterius; or a ratio propria which is only found in one analogate; or diverse modi significandi with a common res significata. Examined in turn, it is clear that none of Aquinas's rules for analogy solve the semantic problem described. Cajetan thus cannot be reasonably expected to have intended his analogy treatise primarily as an interpretation or systematization of Aquinas's teaching on analogy.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000224271600019,
      author = {Hochschild, JP},
      title = {Did Aquinas answer Cajetads question? Aquinas's semantic rules for analogy and the interpretation of De Nominum Analogia},
      booktitle = {PHILOSOPHY AND INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {77},
      pages = {273-288},
      note = {77th Annual Conference of the American-Catholic-Philosophical-Association, Houston, TX, OCT 31-NOV 02, 2003}
    }
    
    Imbo, I., Duverne, S. & Lemaire, P. Working memory, strategy execution, and strategy selection in mental arithmetic {2007} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {60}({9}), pp. {1246-1264} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: A total of 72 participants estimated products of complex multiplications of two-digit operands (e.g., 63 x 78), using two strategies that differed in complexity. The simple strategy involved rounding both operands down to the closest decades (e.g., 60 x 70), whereas the complex strategy required rounding both operands up to the closest decades (e.g., 70 x 80). Participants accomplished this estimation task in two conditions: a no-load condition and a working-memory load condition in which executive components of working memory were taxed. The choice/no-choice method was used to obtain unbiased strategy execution and strategy selection data. Results showed that loading working-memory resources led participants to poorer strategy execution. Additionally, participants selected the simple strategy more often under working-memory load. We discuss the implications of the results to further our understanding of variations in strategy selection and execution, as well as our understanding of the impact of working-memory load on arithmetic performance and other cognitive domains.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000249609200007,
      author = {Imbo, Ineke and Duverne, Sandrine and Lemaire, Patrick},
      title = {Working memory, strategy execution, and strategy selection in mental arithmetic},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {60},
      number = {9},
      pages = {1246-1264},
      doi = {{10.1080/17470210600943419}}
    }
    
    JACKSON, S. 2 MODELS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - AN EMPIRICAL-COMPARISON {1982} COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
    Vol. {49}({3}), pp. {203-213} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1982PU53900005,
      author = {JACKSON, S},
      title = {2 MODELS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - AN EMPIRICAL-COMPARISON},
      journal = {COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS},
      year = {1982},
      volume = {49},
      number = {3},
      pages = {203-213}
    }
    
    Jia, X., Lu, S., Zhong, N. & Yao, Y. Figural Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning with Evaluation Paradigm: An Eye-Movement Study {2009}
    Vol. {5819}BRAIN INFORMATICS, PROCEEDINGS, pp. {106-114} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: Figural effects demonstrate that the influence on reasoning performance derives from the figure of the presented syllogistic arguments (Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984). It has been reported that figure P-M/M-S is easier to reason with than figure M-P/S-M with syllogistic generation paradigm (Johnson-Laird, 1984), where M is the middle term, S is the subject and P is the predicate of conclusion, respectively. However, the figural effects are still unclear in syllogistic evaluation paradigm. In order to study Such effects, we employed the figure M-P/S-M/S-P and the figure P-M/M-S/S-P syllogistic evaluation tasks with 30 subjects using eye-movement. The results showed that figural effects that the figure P-M/M-S/S-P was more cognitively demanding than the figure M-P/SM/S-P, occurred in major premise and conclusion for the early processes, and in both premises and conclusion for late processes, rather than in minor premise reported by Espino et al (2005) that the figure P-M/M-S has less cognitive load than the figure M-P/S-M with generation paradigm. Additionally, pre-/post-conclusion viewing analysis found that for the inspection times of both premises the figure P-M/M-S/S-P took Lip more cognitive resources than the figure M-P/S-M/S-P when after viewing the conclusion. The findings suggested there were differences in figural effects between evaluation and generation paradigm.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000271337700010,
      author = {Jia, Xiuqin and Lu, Shengfu and Zhong, Ning and Yao, Yiyu},
      title = {Figural Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning with Evaluation Paradigm: An Eye-Movement Study},
      booktitle = {BRAIN INFORMATICS, PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {5819},
      pages = {106-114},
      note = {International Conference on Brain Informatics, Beijing, PEOPLES R CHINA, OCT 22-24, 2009}
    }
    
    Jia, X., Lu, S., Zhong, N., Yao, Y., Li, K. & Yang, Y. Common and Distinct Neural Substrates of Forward-chaining and Backward-chaining Syllogistic Reasoning {2009} 2009 ICME INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPLEX MEDICAL ENGINEERING, pp. {85-90}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Syllogistic reasoning is a form of deductive reasoning in which a logical conclusion is drawn from premises. Forward-chaining syllogistic reasoning refers to response pattern of figure 1 syllogism (M-P, S-M, S-P with response chain of S-M-P) and backward-chaining syllogistic reasoning refers to response pattern of figure 4 syllogism (P-M, S-M, S-P with response chain of P-M-S). Previous psychological studies show that forward-chaining is significantly higher accuracy and less response time, and backward-chaining is significantly lower accuracy and more response time. However, little is known about the underlying neural mechanisms. We carried out a study using event-related fMRI to clarify their neural substrates. Conjunction analysis showed common areas of activations were the bilateral caudate, the left ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), the left superior parietal lobule, and the right lingual gyrus. Direct comparisons showed distinct area of activation for forward-chaining in contrast to backward-chaining involved more activation in the left inferior parietal lobule, whereas backward-chaining in contrast to forward-chaining recruited the left dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the left medial frontal gyrus, and the right cerebellum. The results suggested that forward-chaining and backward-chaining syllogistic reasoning engaged distinct neural substrates based on common brain areas.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000272211300017,
      author = {Jia, Xiuqin and Lu, Shengfu and Zhong, Ning and Yao, Yiyu and Li, Kuncheng and Yang, Yanhui},
      title = {Common and Distinct Neural Substrates of Forward-chaining and Backward-chaining Syllogistic Reasoning},
      booktitle = {2009 ICME INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPLEX MEDICAL ENGINEERING},
      year = {2009},
      pages = {85-90},
      note = {ICME International Conference on Complex Medical Engineering, Tempe, AZ, APR 09-11, 2009}
    }
    
    JohnsonLaird, P. & Byrne, R. Mental models and syllogisms - Response {1996} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {19}({3}), pp. {543-\&} 
    article  
    Abstract: We resolve the two problems that Hardman raises. The first problem arises from a misunderstanding: the crucial distinction is between one-model and multiple-model problems. The second problem illuminates a deeper principle: conclusions depend on the procedures for interpreting models. We describe an algorithm that obviates the problem and empirical work that reveals a new view of syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1996WL41700068,
      author = {JohnsonLaird, PN and Byrne, RMJ},
      title = {Mental models and syllogisms - Response},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {19},
      number = {3},
      pages = {543-&}
    }
    
    JOHNSONLAIRD, P., OAKHILL, J. & BULL, D. CHILDRENS SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1986} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {38}({1}), pp. {35-58} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1986A146400002,
      author = {JOHNSONLAIRD, PN and OAKHILL, J and BULL, D},
      title = {CHILDRENS SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {38},
      number = {1},
      pages = {35-58}
    }
    
    KEATING, D. & CARAMAZZA, A. EFFECTS OF AGE AND ABILITY ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN EARLY ADOLESCENCE {1975} DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {11}({6}), pp. {837-842} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1975AW52700023,
      author = {KEATING, DP and CARAMAZZA, A},
      title = {EFFECTS OF AGE AND ABILITY ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN EARLY ADOLESCENCE},
      journal = {DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {11},
      number = {6},
      pages = {837-842}
    }
    
    Khayata, M. & Pacholczyk, D. A symbolic approach to syllogistic reasoning {2002}
    Vol. {89}TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONSTRUCTING INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 1: TASKS, pp. {99-112} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: In this paper we present a new approach to a symbolic treatment of quantified statements having the following form ``Q A's are B's'', knowing that A and B are labels denoting sets, and Q is a linguistic quantifier interpreted as a proportion evaluated in a qualitative way. Our model can be viewed as a symbolic generalization of statistical conditional probability notions as well as a symbolic generalization of the classical probabilistic operators. Our approach is founded on a symbolic finite M-valued logic in which the graduation scale of M symbolic quantifiers is translated in terms of truth degrees of a particular predicate. Then, we present symbolic syllogisms allowing us to deal with quantified statements.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000175969000008,
      author = {Khayata, MY and Pacholczyk, D},
      title = {A symbolic approach to syllogistic reasoning},
      booktitle = {TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONSTRUCTING INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 1: TASKS},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {89},
      pages = {99-112},
      note = {8th International Conference on Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems (IPMU 2000), MADRID, SPAIN, JUL 03-07, 2000}
    }
    
    Khayata, M., Pacholczyk, D. & Garcia, L. A qualitative approach to syllogistic reasoning {2002} ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
    Vol. {34}({1-3}), pp. {131-159} 
    article  
    Abstract: In this paper we present a new approach to a symbolic treatment of quantified statements having the following form ``Q A's are B's'', knowing that A and B are labels denoting sets, and Q is a linguistic quantifier interpreted as a proportion evaluated in a qualitative way. Our model can be viewed as a symbolic generalization of statistical conditional probability notions as well as a symbolic generalization of the classical probabilistic operators. Our approach is founded on a symbolic finite M-valued logic in which the graduation scale of M symbolic quantifiers is translated in terms of truth degrees. Moreover, we propose symbolic inference rules allowing us to manage quantified statements.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000174706800006,
      author = {Khayata, MY and Pacholczyk, D and Garcia, L},
      title = {A qualitative approach to syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {34},
      number = {1-3},
      pages = {131-159}
    }
    
    Klauer, K., Musch, J. & Naumer, B. On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning {2000} PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
    Vol. {107}({4}), pp. {852-884} 
    article  
    Abstract: A multinomial model is used to disentangle the respective contributions of reasoning processes and response bias in conclusion-acceptance data that exhibit belief bias. A model-based meta-analysis of 22 studies reveals that such data are structurally too sparse to allow discrimination of different accounts of belief bias. Four experiments are conducted to obtain richer data, allowing deeper tests through the use of the multinomial model. None of the current accounts of belief bias is consistent with the complex pattern of results. A new theory of belief bias is proposed that assumes that most reasoners construct only one mental model representing the premises as well as the conclusion or, in the case of an unbelievable conclusion, its logical negation. New predictions derived from the theory are confined in 4 additional studies.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000165117600008,
      author = {Klauer, KC and Musch, J and Naumer, B},
      title = {On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {107},
      number = {4},
      pages = {852-884}
    }
    
    Knauff, M., Rauh, R., Schlieder, C. & Strube, G. Continuity effect and figural bias in spatial relational inference {1998} PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {573-578}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Two experiments on spatial relational inference investigated effects known from relational and syllogistic reasoning. (1) Continuity effect: n-term-series problems with continuous (W r(1) X. X r(2) Y, Y r(3) Z) and semi-continuous (X r(2) Y, Y r(3) Z W r(1) X) premise order are easier than tasks with discontinuous order (Y r(3) Z W r(1) X, X r(2) Y) (2) Figural bias: the order of terms in the premises (X r Y, Y r Z or Y r X, Z r Y) effects the order of terms in the conclusion (X r Z or Z r X), In the first experiment subjects made more errors and took more time to process the premises when in discontinuous order. In the second experiment subjects showed the general preference for the term order Z r X in the generated conclusions, modulated by a ``figural bias'': subjects used X r Z more often if the premise term order was X r I: Y r Z, whereas Z r X was used most often for the premise term order Yr X, Z r Y Results are discussed in the framework of mental model theory with special reference to computational models of spatial relational inference.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168193500107,
      author = {Knauff, M and Rauh, R and Schlieder, C and Strube, G},
      title = {Continuity effect and figural bias in spatial relational inference},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1998},
      pages = {573-578},
      note = {20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, MADISON, WI, AUG 01-04, 1998}
    }
    
    KONTOS, J. ARISTA - KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING WITH SCIENTIFIC TEXTS {1992} INFORMATION AND SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY
    Vol. {34}({9}), pp. {611-616} 
    article  
    Abstract: The paper presents results of experiments in knowledge engineering with scientific texts by the application of the ARISTA method. ARISTA stands for Automatic Representation Independent Syllogistic Text Analysis. This method uses natural language text as a knowledge base in contrast with the methods followed by the prevailing approach, which rely on the translation of texts into some knowledge representation formalism. The experiments demonstrate the feasibility of deductive question-answering and explanation generation directly from texts involving mainly causal reasoning. Illustrative examples of the operation of a prototype based on the ARISTA method and implemented in Prolog are presented.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992KB17600005,
      author = {KONTOS, J},
      title = {ARISTA - KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING WITH SCIENTIFIC TEXTS},
      journal = {INFORMATION AND SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {34},
      number = {9},
      pages = {611-616}
    }
    
    KOOPMANS, M. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN PUERTO-RICAN BILINGUAL ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL-CHILDREN {1990} PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS
    Vol. {71}({1}), pp. {335-338} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1990DX98400059,
      author = {KOOPMANS, M},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN PUERTO-RICAN BILINGUAL ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL-CHILDREN},
      journal = {PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {71},
      number = {1},
      pages = {335-338}
    }
    
    Kruglanski, A.W. & Dechesne, M. Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) {2006} PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
    Vol. {132}({5}), pp. {736-739} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The authors comment on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006) associative-propositional evaluation model of implicit and explicit attitudes by examining the claims that (a) truth value is attached to propositions but not to associations; (b) pattern activation is qualitatively different from syllogistic structure of arguments; and (c) Pavlovian conditioning may be propositional, whereas evaluative conditioning is not. They conclude that despite surface dissimilarities between implicit and explicit attitudes both may be mediated by the same underlying process.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000239934000005,
      author = {Kruglanski, Arie W. and Dechesne, Mark},
      title = {Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006)},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {132},
      number = {5},
      pages = {736-739},
      doi = {{10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.736}}
    }
    
    Kumova, B.I. & Cakir, H. Algorithmic Decision of Syllogisms {2010}
    Vol. {6097}TRENDS IN APPLIED INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, PT II, PROCEEDINGS, pp. {28-38} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: A syllogism, also known as a rule of inference, is a formal logical scheme used to draw a conclusion from a set of premises In a categorical syllogisms. every premise and conclusion is given in form a of quantified relationship between two objects The syllogistic system consists of systematically combined piemises and conclusions to so called figures and moods The syllogistic system is a theory for reasoning, developed by Aristotle. who is known as one of the most important contributors or the western thought and logic Since Aristotle, philosophers and sociologists have successfully modelled human thought and reasoning with syllogistic structures However, a major lack was that the mathematical properties of the whole syllogistic system could not he fully revealed by now To be able to calculate any syllogistic property exactly. by using a single algorithm, could indeed facilitate modelling possibly any sort of consistent, inconsistent or approximate human reasoning In this paper we present such an algorithm
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000281604400004,
      author = {Kumova, Bora I. and Cakir, Huseyin},
      title = {Algorithmic Decision of Syllogisms},
      booktitle = {TRENDS IN APPLIED INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, PT II, PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {6097},
      pages = {28-38},
      note = {23rd International Conference on Industrial, Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems, Cordoba, SPAIN, JUN 01-04, 2010}
    }
    
    Lacroix, G., Osana, H., Tucker, B., Cuffari, A., Couto, A. & Howell, G. The impact of print exposure quality, inference construction, and working memory on syllogistic reasoning {2008} CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE
    Vol. {62}({4}), pp. {279} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000272667400105,
      author = {Lacroix, Guy and Osana, Helena and Tucker, Bradley and Cuffari, Amanda and Couto, Andreia and Howell, Glen},
      title = {The impact of print exposure quality, inference construction, and working memory on syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {62},
      number = {4},
      pages = {279}
    }
    
    Lai, J. & Xu, Y. Linguistic truth-valued lattice-valued propositional logic system lP(X) based on linguistic truth-valued lattice implication algebra {2010} INFORMATION SCIENCES
    Vol. {180}({10, Sp. Iss. SI}), pp. {1990-2002} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and syllogistic reasoning is one of the main topics in many-valued logic studies on inference. Particularly, lattice-valued logic, a kind of important non-classical logic, can be applied to describe and treat incomparability by the incomparable elements in its truth-valued set. In this paper, we first focus on some properties of linguistic truth-valued lattice implication algebra. Secondly, we introduce some concepts of linguistic truth-valued lattice-valued propositional logic system lP(X), whose truth-valued domain is a linguistic truth-valued lattice implication algebra. Then we investigate the semantic problem of lP(X). Finally, we further probe into the syntax of linguistic truth-valued lattice-valued propositional logic system lP(X), and prove the soundness theorem, deduction theorem and consistency theorem. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000276708100017,
      author = {Lai, Jiajun and Xu, Yang},
      title = {Linguistic truth-valued lattice-valued propositional logic system lP(X) based on linguistic truth-valued lattice implication algebra},
      journal = {INFORMATION SCIENCES},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {180},
      number = {10, Sp. Iss. SI},
      pages = {1990-2002},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.ins.2010.01.021}}
    }
    
    Lambell, N., Evans, J. & Handley, S. Belief bias, logical reasoning and presentation order on the syllogistic evaluation task {1999} PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {282-287}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Evans, Barston and Pollard, (1983) found that on the syllogistic evaluation task participants tended to endorse believable conclusions as being valid but reject unbelievable conclusions as invalid, A phenomenon known as ``Belief Bias''. Additionally, they collected verbal protocols from participants and established that this influence of belief was primarily associated with initial reference to the conclusions of these syllogistic arguments. In contrast, better logical reasoning was associated with initial reference to the premises. This experiment was designed to try to direct participants' attention to either the conclusion or the premises of a syllogistic argument with the intention of manipulating participants' logical reasoning ability and susceptibility to belief. The results reflected an inability to alter the influence of beliefs, but in one condition where the conclusion was presented prior to the premises, there was a successful reduction in participants' reasoning ability. The results are discussed with respect to the current theories of belief bias.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168193900054,
      author = {Lambell, NJ and Evans, JSBT and Handley, SJ},
      title = {Belief bias, logical reasoning and presentation order on the syllogistic evaluation task},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1999},
      pages = {282-287},
      note = {21st Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, VANCOUVER, CANADA, AUG 19-21, 1999}
    }
    
    Lammens, J. & Lancry, A. Differential study of fluctuations in performance of a complex task during the course of a day {1998} TRAVAIL HUMAIN
    Vol. {61}({2}), pp. {153-169} 
    article  
    Abstract: The LER (Reactivity Evaluation Programme) that allowed us to confront our subjects with a complex task requiring many cognitive functions and therefore both going beyond the modular approach of cognition and improving the ecological validity of experimental! results (this tool was developed in nuclear power stations, by analysis of operators activity). In order to determine our variables, we divided people into morning and evening types based an their own subjective ratings and made two groups of subjects whose performances on the programme (speed and quality) were measured at different times of the day. We could thus follow the evolution of indicators respectivly reflecting vigilance, memory, spatial representation, and problem solving. Our study has shown that cognitive function are not equally efficient at all limes of the days. Several different indices were recorded, both with emphasis on speed and on quality. Moreover, taking into account the typology?, of subjects the results can be extended to apply to a typical cross-section of the population. The results concerning reaction times are in accordance with previous observations by Horne, Brass, & Pettitt (1980) and Patkai (1971) : early risers work faster in the mornings. On the other hand, our experiment shows reaction times to be constant during the course of a day for evening subjects. Whilst both early risers and evening subjects detect an equal number of incidents in the morning, the latter take the lead in the afternoon. In addition, the percentage of pans nor checked increases for early risers during the course of the day, showing a decrease in work memory quality. Evening subjects, on the other hand, show stability. These results are similar to those cited by Folkard, Monk, & Knauth (1976, 1980) further confirming the importance of taking into account differences between individuals. These writers, who did nor use the morning/evening distinction in their research, noted a continuous decrease in efficiency of short term memory during the course of the day. Our results are similar close to those described by Lancry (1986), who found significant differences between morning and evening subjects at 16 h 00 and 20 h 00: here the difference lies in the significance of 10 h 15. Unlike Lancry (1986), however, zee did nor record any fluctuations in long term memory performance either within each of the two groups, or between them. Problem resolution quality (automatic evaluation of success) is constant throughout the course of the day for evening subjects, and diminishes for early risers. This results giver added precision to the conclusions of Folkard (1975), who conducted a test of syllogistic reasoning and observed that quality was better in the morning than in the evening.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000074265500004,
      author = {Lammens, JM and Lancry, A},
      title = {Differential study of fluctuations in performance of a complex task during the course of a day},
      journal = {TRAVAIL HUMAIN},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {61},
      number = {2},
      pages = {153-169}
    }
    
    LEE, G. & OAKHILL, J. THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNALIZATION ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1984} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {36}({3}), pp. {519-530} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1984TF90500007,
      author = {LEE, G and OAKHILL, J},
      title = {THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNALIZATION ON SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1984},
      volume = {36},
      number = {3},
      pages = {519-530}
    }
    
    Leevers, H. & Harris, P. Counterfactual syllogistic reasoning in normal 4-year-olds, children with learning disabilities, and children with autism {2000} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {76}({1}), pp. {64-87} 
    article  
    Abstract: Instruction encouraging imagery improves logical reasoning with counterfactual premises by normal preschool children, In contrast, children with autism have been reported to reason accurately with counterfactual premises in the absence of such instruction (F. J. Scott. S. Baron-Cohen, & A. M. Leslie, 1999). To investigate this: pattern of findings, we compared the performance of children with autism. children with learning disabilities, and normally developing 4-year-olds, who were given reasoning problems both with and without instruction in two separate testing sessions 2 to 3 weeks apart. Overall, instruction to use imagery led to persistent logical performance. However, children with autism displayed a distinctive pattern of responding, performing around chance levels, showing a simple response bias, and rarely justifying their responses by elaborating on the premises. We propose that instruction boosts logical performance by clarifying the experimenter's intention that a false proposition be accepted as a basis for reasoning and that children with autism have difficulty grasping this intention. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000086661400004,
      author = {Leevers, HJ and Harris, PL},
      title = {Counterfactual syllogistic reasoning in normal 4-year-olds, children with learning disabilities, and children with autism},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {76},
      number = {1},
      pages = {64-87},
      note = {Meeting of the Society-for-Research-in-Child-Development, WASHINGTON, D.C., APR 05-06, 1997}
    }
    
    Leighton, J., Gierl, M. & Hunka, S. The attribute hierarchy method for cognitive assessment: A variation on Tatsuoka's rule-space approach {2004} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
    Vol. {41}({3}), pp. {205-237} 
    article  
    Abstract: A cognitive item response theory model called the attribute hierarchy method (AHM) is introduced and illustrated. This method represents a variation of Tatsuoka's rule-space approach. The AHM is designed explicitly to link cognitive theory and psychometric practice to facilitate the development and analyses of educational and psychological tests. The following are described: cognitive properties of the AHM; psychometric properties of the AHM, as well as a demonstration of how the AHM differs from Tatsuoka's rule-space approach; and application of the AHM to the domain of syllogistic reasoning to illustrate how this approach can be used to evaluate the cognitive competencies required in a higher-level thinking task. Future directions for research are also outlined.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000224039400002,
      author = {Leighton, JP and Gierl, MJ and Hunka, SM},
      title = {The attribute hierarchy method for cognitive assessment: A variation on Tatsuoka's rule-space approach},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {41},
      number = {3},
      pages = {205-237}
    }
    
    Leth-Steensen, C. & Marley, A. A model of response time effects in symbolic comparison {2000} PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
    Vol. {107}({1}), pp. {62-100} 
    article  
    Abstract: cognitive process model is developed that predicts the 3 major symbolic comparison response time effects (distance, end, and semantic congruity) found in the results of the linear syllogistic reasoning task. The model includes a simple connectionist learning component and dual evidence accumulation decisionmaking components. It assumes that responses can be based either on information concerning the positional difference between the presented stimulus items or on information concerning the endpoint status of each of these items. The model provides an excellent quantitative account of the mean correct response times obtained from 16 participants who performed paired comparisons of 6 ordered symbolic stimuli (3-letter names).
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000086654100004,
      author = {Leth-Steensen, C and Marley, AAJ},
      title = {A model of response time effects in symbolic comparison},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {107},
      number = {1},
      pages = {62-100},
      note = {14th Annual Meeting of the International-Society-of-Psychophysics, QUEBEC CITY, CANADA, AUG, 1998}
    }
    
    Levy, W. & Wu, X. A simple, biologically motivated neural network solves the transitive inference problem {1997} 1997 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL NETWORKS, VOLS 1-4, pp. {368-371}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Configural learning problems can be resolved by both rats and humans if they are not too difficult (e.g. Alvarado and Rudy 1992, 1995). The configural learning problem which we explore here is transitive inference. Transitive inference (learn the four pairs A>B, B>C, C>D, D>E, then test with the novel pair B?D) was once viewed as a logical problem. However, it is now acknowledged that when the stimuli are appropriate even three year old humans can solve this problem and, as well, so can pigeons and rats. Thus, even though the problem is a simple exercise in logic, there is reason to suspect that mammals, or for that matter, neural networks will solve such a problem without recourse to any explicit syllogistic reasoning. In fact, by casting the input stimuli in a form appropriate for a sequence learning neural network, a hippocampal-like network can solve the transitive inference problem. Furthermore, performance is appropriately disrupted by turning the linear sequence of relationships into a nonlinear (circular) relationship.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1997BJ42Y00073,
      author = {Levy, WB and Wu, XB},
      title = {A simple, biologically motivated neural network solves the transitive inference problem},
      booktitle = {1997 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL NETWORKS, VOLS 1-4},
      year = {1997},
      pages = {368-371},
      note = {1997 IEEE International Conference on Neural Networks (ICNN 97), HOUSTON, TX, JUN 09-12, 1997}
    }
    
    LIPPMAN, M. INFLUENCE OF GRAMMATICAL TRANSFORM IN A SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASK {1972} JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR
    Vol. {11}({4}), pp. {424-\&} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1972N197200003,
      author = {LIPPMAN, MZ},
      title = {INFLUENCE OF GRAMMATICAL TRANSFORM IN A SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASK},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR},
      year = {1972},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {424-&}
    }
    
    LIU, I. & WU, J. A LINK BETWEEN CONDITIONAL AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1992} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {27}({3-4}), pp. {161} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992JF42000840,
      author = {LIU, IM and WU, JT},
      title = {A LINK BETWEEN CONDITIONAL AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3-4},
      pages = {161}
    }
    
    Luo, J., Yuan, J., Qiu, J., Zhang, Q., Zhong, J. & Huai, Z. Neural correlates of the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning: an event-related potential study {2008} NEUROREPORT
    Vol. {19}({10}), pp. {1073-1078} 
    article  
    Abstract: This study investigated electrophysiological correlates of belief-bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. Event-related brain potentials were recorded for minor premises with which participants were required to draw a logic conclusion during three conditions: the inhibitory belief condition (IBC, the belief is inhibitory to the logical task), the facilitatory belief condition (FBC, the belief is facilitatory to the logical task), and the baseline condition. The results demonstrated a more positive event-related potential deflection during IBC and FBC conditions than during the noninference baseline condition in both the 300-500 and the 1000-1600 ms time windows. Moreover, IBC elicited a more positive event-related potential deflection (P500) than did FBC across central-frontal cortical regions during the 300-600 ms interval. Therefore, this study observed a clear belief-bias effect, and the enhanced P500 activity during IBC, which relates to the belief bias that obstructs normal inferences, most likely reflects an inhibition to beliefs during later relation integration stage.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000257488500015,
      author = {Luo, Junlong and Yuan, JiaJin and Qiu, Jiang and Zhang, Qinglin and Zhong, Jun and Huai, Zhangcui},
      title = {Neural correlates of the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning: an event-related potential study},
      journal = {NEUROREPORT},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {19},
      number = {10},
      pages = {1073-1078}
    }
    
    Mackintosh, N. & Bennett, E. The fractionation of working memory maps onto different components of intelligence {2003} INTELLIGENCE
    Vol. {31}({6}), pp. {519-531} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: One hundred thirty-eight sixth form students, aged 16-17, took tests of vocabulary, mental rotation, and abstract reasoning as markers of Gc, Gv, and Gf and also three working memory tests, one verbal, one spatial, and one numerical (mental counters). Consistent with a number of earlier results, we found that verbal working memory correlated with the vocabulary test and spatial working memory with the mental rotation test, but there was only a weak relationship between these two domains. Performance on the reasoning test was associated most strongly with the mental counters working memory test but was also related to performance on both verbal and spatial tests. Confirmatory factor analysis supported a three-factor solution of these data, with one ability test and one working memory test loading onto each factor. This suggests that although working memory may be partly general, it is also at least in part domain-specific with three of these domains corresponding to Gc, Gv, and Gf. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000186220900002,
      author = {Mackintosh, NJ and Bennett, ES},
      title = {The fractionation of working memory maps onto different components of intelligence},
      journal = {INTELLIGENCE},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {31},
      number = {6},
      pages = {519-531},
      doi = {{10.1016/S0160-2896(03)00052-7}}
    }
    
    Macpherson, R. & Stanovich, K.E. Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and instructional set as predictors of critical thinking {2007} LEARNING AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
    Vol. {17}({2}), pp. {115-127} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: This study examined the predictors of belief bias in a formal reasoning paradigm (a syllogistic reasoning task) and myside bias in two informal reasoning paradigms (an argument generation task and an experiment evaluation task). Neither cognitive ability nor thinking dispositions predicted myside bias, but both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions were significant predictors of the ability to overcome belief bias in the syllogistic reasoning task. However, instructional set (either decontextualizing or non-directive instructions) had a significant effect on myside bias in the argument generation task, as well as a marginal effect on the syllogistic reasoning task. On the latter, and to some extent on the former task, instructional set interacted with cognitive ability. The debiasing effect of decontextualizing instructions was particularly large for those participants in the lowest quartile of cognitive ability. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000248718100002,
      author = {Macpherson, Robyn and Stanovich, Keith E.},
      title = {Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and instructional set as predictors of critical thinking},
      journal = {LEARNING AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {17},
      number = {2},
      pages = {115-127},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.lindif.2007.05.003}}
    }
    
    MARKOVITS, H. & BOUFFARDBOUCHARD, T. THE BELIEF-BIAS EFFECT IN REASONING - THE DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVATION OF COMPETENCE {1992} BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {10}({Part 3}), pp. {269-284} 
    article  
    Abstract: The aim of this study was (1) to examine the development of the influence of personal belief about the truth or falsity of conclusion deduced from syllogistic reasoning and (2) to determine whether a procedure of activation of previously established knowledge could improve reasoning performance. A total of 271 17-year-olds and 215 university students were given one of a series of four paper-and-pencil tests. The results indicated that the effect of belief on reasoning is greater among adolescents for logical forms having a valid conclusion (valid forms), but that belief-bias is greater among adults for logical forms with no valid conclusion (invalid forms). The activation procedure significantly improved performance both among adolescents and among adults, although the effects were limited. Finally, a relation was found between subjects' explicit knowledge of the empirical-logical distinction and their ability to reason with an abstract problem. The results were interpreted as indicating that the effect of belief on reasoning is not linear but involves a complex relation between reasoning competence and task difficulty.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992JL23700003,
      author = {MARKOVITS, H and BOUFFARDBOUCHARD, T},
      title = {THE BELIEF-BIAS EFFECT IN REASONING - THE DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVATION OF COMPETENCE},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {10},
      number = {Part 3},
      pages = {269-284}
    }
    
    Marrero, H. & Gamez, E. Content and strategy in syllogistic reasoning {2004} CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE
    Vol. {58}({3}), pp. {168-180} 
    article  
    Abstract: Syllogistic reasoning has been investigated as a general deductive process (Johnson-Laird S Byrne, 1991; Revlis, 1975; Rips, 1994). However, several studies have demonstrated the role of cognitive strategies in this type of reasoning. These strategies focus on the method used by the participants (Ford, 1995; Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, S Wynn, 1993) and strategies related to different interpretations of the quantified premises (Roberts, Newstead, S Griggs, 2001). In this paper, we propose that content (as well as individual cognitive differences) is an important factor in inducing a certain strategy or method for syllogistic resolution. Specifically, we suggest that syllogisms with a causal conditional premise that can be extended by an agency premise induce the use of a conditional method. To demonstrate this, we carried out two experiments. Experiment 1 provided evidence that this type of syllogism leads participants to draw the predicted conditional conclusions, in contrast with control content syllogisms. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that the drawing of conditional conclusions is based on a causal conditional to an agent representation of the syllogism premises. These results support the role of content as inducing a particular strategy for syllogistic resolution. The implications of these results are discussed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000227769500002,
      author = {Marrero, H and Gamez, E},
      title = {Content and strategy in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {58},
      number = {3},
      pages = {168-180}
    }
    
    MCLAURIN, P. AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON PRO-SOCIAL MESSAGES DIRECTED AT AFRICAN-AMERICAN AT-RISK YOUTH {1995} COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
    Vol. {62}({4}), pp. {301-326} 
    article  
    Abstract: This study was part of a larger project designed to develop effective, pro-social messages for dissemination to African-American youth. The research methods used were designed to examine the world view and `'sense making'' schemata of the culture's participants. The study's findings indicate that messages intended for urban youth populations often fail to account for the culture of the audience. Two basic issues became evident: first, these messages overlook the social contexts that shape the receiver's reception and interpretation of messages in urban youth culture; second, the design of these messages incorrectly assumes that the linear communication style used by mainstream culture, with its accompanying syllogistic reasoning, will be persuasive with an audience that communicates in a highly interactive, oral style utilizing a more horizontal mode of influence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995TE89000003,
      author = {MCLAURIN, P},
      title = {AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON PRO-SOCIAL MESSAGES DIRECTED AT AFRICAN-AMERICAN AT-RISK YOUTH},
      journal = {COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {62},
      number = {4},
      pages = {301-326}
    }
    
    Mineshima, K., Okada, M., Sato, Y. & Takemura, R. Diagrammatic Reasoning System with Euler Circles: Theory and Experiment Design {2008}
    Vol. {5223}DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION AND INFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS, pp. {188-205} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: In this paper we are concerned with logical and cognitive aspects of reasoning with Euler circles. We give a proof-theoretical analysis of diagrammatic reasoning with Euler circles involving unification and deletion rules. Diagrammatic syllogistic reasoning is characterized as a particular class of the general diagrammatic proofs. Given this proof-theoretical analysis, we present some conjectures on cognitive aspects of reasoning with Euler diagrams. Then we proposes a design of experiment for a cognitive psychological study.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000260632000018,
      author = {Mineshima, Koji and Okada, Mitsuhiro and Sato, Yuri and Takemura, Ryo},
      title = {Diagrammatic Reasoning System with Euler Circles: Theory and Experiment Design},
      booktitle = {DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION AND INFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {5223},
      pages = {188-205},
      note = {5th International Conference on Diagrammatic Representation and Inference, Herrsching, GERMANY, SEP 19-21, 2008}
    }
    
    Montgomery, C., Fisk, J., Newcombe, R., Wareing, M. & Murphy, P. Syllogistic reasoning performance in MDMA (Ecstasy) users {2005} EXPERIMENTAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
    Vol. {13}({2}), pp. {137-145} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated working memory and executive deficits in recreational users of MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine; Ecstasy). In turn, both of these constructs have been implicated in syllogistic reasoning performance. Twenty-two MDMA users (mean age = 21.36) and 26 MDMA nonuser controls (mean age = 21.31) were tested on syllogisms of varying difficulty and on measures of working memory and executive functioning. MDMA users were significantly impaired in aspects of syllogistic reasoning, and the effect remained significant after the authors controlled for the use of other drugs. However, the MDMA-related variance was reduced to below statistical significance following control for group differences in working memory span. The results are consistent with the possibility that MDMA-related deficits in aspects of executive functioning result in impaired reasoning performance among MDMA users.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000229692300006,
      author = {Montgomery, C and Fisk, JE and Newcombe, R and Wareing, M and Murphy, PN},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning performance in MDMA (Ecstasy) users},
      journal = {EXPERIMENTAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {13},
      number = {2},
      pages = {137-145},
      doi = {{10.1037/1064-1297.13.2.137}}
    }
    
    Montgomery, C., Fisk, J.E., Wareing, M. & Murphy, P. Self reported sleep quality and cognitive performance in ecstasy users {2007} HUMAN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY-CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
    Vol. {22}({8}), pp. {537-548} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Objectives Research suggests that ecstasy users exhibit psychobiological changes relative to nonusers such as altered sleep patterns and cognitive deficits. In turn, it has been suggested that sleep quality may be a mediator of such cognitive deficits in ecstasy users. The present study sought to investigate this proposed relationship. Methods Aspects of cognitive functioning in 104 ecstasy users and 103 nonusers obtained from our previous studies were reanalysed to explore the extent to which ecstasy-related group differences were attributable to differences in sleep quality. Cognitive function was assessed via the computation span test, consonant updating, paired associate learning, syllogistic reasoning and word fluency. Sleep quality was measured via the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS), and the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS). Results Ecstasy users performed worse than nonusers on all cognitive measures. While no differences were observed on the ESS, ecstasy users reported greater tiredness at the beginning of testing than nonusers. When the sleep variables were included as covariates, the effects of ecstasy on all cognitive measures remained significant. Conclusions The results of the present study suggest little evidence for the mediating effects of sleep on cognitive function in ecstasy users. Copyright (C) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000252305600005,
      author = {Montgomery, Catharine and Fisk, John E. and Wareing, Michelle and Murphy, Philip},
      title = {Self reported sleep quality and cognitive performance in ecstasy users},
      journal = {HUMAN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY-CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {22},
      number = {8},
      pages = {537-548},
      doi = {{10.1002/hup.879}}
    }
    
    Morley, N., Evans, J. & Handley, S. Belief bias and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning {2004} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {57}({4}), pp. {666-692} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Belief bias is the tendency to be influenced by the believability of the conclusion when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. Figural bias is the tendency to be influenced by the order in which the information is presented in the premises when attempting to solve a syllogistic reasoning problem. When studied simultaneously they enable an investigation of whether participants' reasoning on the syllogistic reasoning task is guided by the conclusion (backward reasoning) or the premises (forward reasoning). Experiments 1 and 2 found evidence of belief bias but not figural bias on the syllogistic evaluation task paradigm. Experiments 3 and 4 found evidence of figural bias but not belief bias on the syllogistic production task paradigm. The findings highlight that different task characteristics influence performance dependent upon the nature of task presentation. These findings are discussed in the context of current theories of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000221024700004,
      author = {Morley, NJ and Evans, JST and Handley, SJ},
      title = {Belief bias and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {57},
      number = {4},
      pages = {666-692},
      doi = {{10.1080/02724980343000440}}
    }
    
    Moss, L.S. Completeness theorems for syllogistic fragments {2008}
    Vol. {201}LOGICS FOR LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES, pp. {143-173} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: Traditional syllogisms involve sentences of the following simple forms: All X are Y, Some X are Y, No X are Y; similar sentences with proper names as subjects, and identities between names. These sentences come with the natural semantics using subsets of a given universe, and so it is natural to ask about complete proof systems. Logical systems are important in this area due to the prominence of syllogistic arguments in human reasoning, and also to the role they have played in logic from Aristotle onwards. We present complete systems for the entire syllogistic fragment and many sub-fragments. These begin with the fragment of All sentences, for which we obtain one of the easiest completeness theorems in logic. The last system extends syllogistic reasoning with the classical boolean operations and cardinality comparisons.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000277273800007,
      author = {Moss, Lawrence S.},
      title = {Completeness theorems for syllogistic fragments},
      booktitle = {LOGICS FOR LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {201},
      pages = {143-173},
      note = {Conference in Honor of Uwe Monnich on his 70th Birthday, Freudenstadt, GERMANY, NOV, 2004}
    }
    
    Moutier, S., Plagne-Cayeux, S., Melot, A. & Houde, M. Syllogistic reasoning and belief-bias inhibition in school children: evidence from a negative priming paradigin {2006} DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE
    Vol. {9}({2}), pp. {166-172} 
    article  
    Abstract: Research on deductive reasoning in adolescents and adults has shown that errors in deductive logic are not necessarily due to a lack of logical ability but can stem from an executive failure to inhibit biases. Few studies have examined this dissociation in children. Here, we used a negative priming paradigm with 64 children (8-10 years old) to test the role of cognitive inhibition in syllogisms with belief-bias effects. On trials where negative priming was predicted, results were as follows: For the first syllogism (A), the strategy `unbelievable-equals- invalid' had to be inhibited. The logic of the syllogism led to affirming a conclusion inconsistent with one's knowledge of the world, such as All elephants are light.' For the second syllogism (B), one's real-world knowledge and the syllogism's logic were congruent but the latter required affirming exactly what had been inhibited for A (i.e. that elephants are heavy). A negative printing effect on the A-B sequence was reflected in a significant drop in reasoning performance on R This supports the idea that during cognitive development, inhibitory control is required for success on syllogisms where beliefs and logic interfere.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000236016400009,
      author = {Moutier, SV and Plagne-Cayeux, S and Melot, AM and Houde, M},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning and belief-bias inhibition in school children: evidence from a negative priming paradigin},
      journal = {DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {166-172}
    }
    
    NARAZAKI, H. A MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO SYLLOGISTIC REASONING WITH CONSISTENCY MAINTENANCE {1995} PROCEEDINGS OF 1995 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOLS I-IV, pp. {1935-1942}  inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1995BD22M00272,
      author = {NARAZAKI, H},
      title = {A MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO SYLLOGISTIC REASONING WITH CONSISTENCY MAINTENANCE},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF 1995 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOLS I-IV},
      year = {1995},
      pages = {1935-1942},
      note = {4th IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems/2nd International Fuzzy Engineering Symposium (FUZZY-IEEE/IFES 95), YOKOHAMA, JAPAN, MAR 20-24, 1995}
    }
    
    NARAZAKI, H. & TURKSEN, I. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE CONSISTENCY LEVEL MAINTENANCE {1994} IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS
    Vol. {24}({4}), pp. {548-563} 
    article  
    Abstract: We propose a new approach that integrates syllogistic reasoning and knowledge-base consistency level maintenance based on the framework of multi-objective decision-making. Syllogistic reasoning is formulated as a maximization process of the degree to which a priori inference rules (i.e., the prior knowledge) are compatible with given data (i.e., the empirical knowledge) while simultaneously using the rules to make inference from the data. Our method estimates the default values of missing membership values in the observed data, and, at the same time, the evaluation of the consistency degree of the prior knowledge is computed with the empirical knowledge. The unique feature of our method is the feedback capability of the empirical knowledge through the evaluation process in determining the most preferable default value. In contrast to the traditional inference methods that concentrates on the estimation part of the problem, leaving the evaluation part for some other `'learning mechanism'', our method treats the dynamic interaction process between prior and empirical knowledge based on the multi-objective consistency maximization.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994NR45000002,
      author = {NARAZAKI, H and TURKSEN, IB},
      title = {AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE CONSISTENCY LEVEL MAINTENANCE},
      journal = {IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {24},
      number = {4},
      pages = {548-563}
    }
    
    NARAZAKI, H. & TURKSEN, I. A DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO A SYLLOGISTIC REASONING PROBLEM WITH CONSISTENCY MAINTENANCE IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASE {1993} SECOND IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOLS 1 AND 2, pp. {76-81}  inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1993BY47N00014,
      author = {NARAZAKI, H and TURKSEN, IB},
      title = {A DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO A SYLLOGISTIC REASONING PROBLEM WITH CONSISTENCY MAINTENANCE IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASE},
      booktitle = {SECOND IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FUZZY SYSTEMS, VOLS 1 AND 2},
      year = {1993},
      pages = {76-81},
      note = {2ND INTERNATIONAL CONF ON FUZZY SYSTEMS / INTERNATIONAL CONF ON NEURAL NETWORKS, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, MAR 28-APR 01, 1993}
    }
    
    NEHRKE, M. AGE, SEX, AND EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1972} JOURNALS OF GERONTOLOGY
    Vol. {27}({4}), pp. {466-\&} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1972N714100007,
      author = {NEHRKE, MF},
      title = {AGE, SEX, AND EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNALS OF GERONTOLOGY},
      year = {1972},
      volume = {27},
      number = {4},
      pages = {466-&}
    }
    
    NESTER, M. & COLBERG, M. THE EFFECTS OF NEGATION MODE, SYLLOGISTIC INVALIDITY, AND LINGUISTIC MEDIUM ON THE PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING TESTS {1984} APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT
    Vol. {8}({1}), pp. {71-79} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1984SS80500008,
      author = {NESTER, MA and COLBERG, M},
      title = {THE EFFECTS OF NEGATION MODE, SYLLOGISTIC INVALIDITY, AND LINGUISTIC MEDIUM ON THE PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING TESTS},
      journal = {APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT},
      year = {1984},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {71-79}
    }
    
    NEWELL, A. PRECIS OF UNIFIED THEORIES OF COGNITION {1992} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {15}({3}), pp. {425-437} 
    article  
    Abstract: The book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition. SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory - there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992JN07000001,
      author = {NEWELL, A},
      title = {PRECIS OF UNIFIED THEORIES OF COGNITION},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {15},
      number = {3},
      pages = {425-437}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S. CONVERSION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1990}
    Vol. {1}LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING , pp. {73-84} 
    inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1990BT12U00006,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE},
      title = {CONVERSION IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      booktitle = {LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING },
      year = {1990},
      volume = {1},
      pages = {73-84},
      note = {INTERNATIONAL CONF ON THINKING, ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND, AUG, 1988}
    }
    
    Newstead, S. Can natural language semantics explain syllogistic reasoning? {2003} COGNITION
    Vol. {90}({2}), pp. {193-199} 
    article DOI  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000186590800003,
      author = {Newstead, SE},
      title = {Can natural language semantics explain syllogistic reasoning?},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {90},
      number = {2},
      pages = {193-199},
      doi = {{10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00117-3}}
    }
    
    Newstead, S. What is an ecologically rational heuristic? {2000} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {23}({5}), pp. {759+} 
    article  
    Abstract: The notion of ecological rationality, although plausible, does not readily lead to testable predictions. This is illustrated sixth respect to heuristics in syllogistic reasoning. Several possible heuristics have been proposed but ecological rationality does not appear to offer a sensible rationale for choosing between these.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000170102200065,
      author = {Newstead, SE},
      title = {What is an ecologically rational heuristic?},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {23},
      number = {5},
      pages = {759+}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S. GRICEAN IMPLICATURES AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1995} JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE
    Vol. {34}({5}), pp. {644-664} 
    article  
    Abstract: It is a common assumption that one type of Gricean error-interpreting the quantifier `'some'' as being incompatible with a situation in which `'all'' is the case-is an important factor in determining errors in syllogistic reasoning. However, the errors that would be predicted by Gricean theory were found to be surprisingly rare in a reanalysis of previously published research on syllogisms. In a series of four experiments, it is demonstrated that Gricean errors are common in simple, interpretational tasks but become less common as the logical demands of the task increase; and they seem to be virtually nonexistent in syllogistic reasoning tasks. The results are interpreted in terms of mental models theory under the assumption that increasing task complexity leads to greater elaboration of preliminary models. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RW36100004,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE},
      title = {GRICEAN IMPLICATURES AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {34},
      number = {5},
      pages = {644-664}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S. DO MENTAL MODELS PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING PERFORMANCE {1993} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {16}({2}), pp. {359-360} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993LG84700083,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE},
      title = {DO MENTAL MODELS PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING PERFORMANCE},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2},
      pages = {359-360}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S. INTERPRETATIONAL ERRORS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1989} JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE
    Vol. {28}({1}), pp. {78-91} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1989R947400005,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE},
      title = {INTERPRETATIONAL ERRORS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {28},
      number = {1},
      pages = {78-91}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S. & EVANS, J. MENTAL MODELS AS AN EXPLANATION OF BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1993} COGNITION
    Vol. {46}({1}), pp. {93-97} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993KF86200004,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE and EVANS, JST},
      title = {MENTAL MODELS AS AN EXPLANATION OF BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {46},
      number = {1},
      pages = {93-97}
    }
    
    Newstead, S. & Griggs, R. Premise misinterpretation and syllogistic reasoning {1999} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {52}({4}), pp. {1057-1075} 
    article  
    Abstract: A study by Ceraso and Provitera (1971) found that elaboration of the premises used in syllogistic reasoning led to substantially improved performance. This finding is of considerable importance because of the implications it has for mental logic and mental models theories of reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which replicated and extended the original findings. It was found that elaboration led to a significant improvement in performance, but that this was confined to multiple model syllogisms, where the elaboration has the effect of reducing the number of models involved. A fourth experiment indicated that elaboration can vary within the same syllogism depending on the direction of the conclusion drawn. These findings are best explained under the assumption that reasoners build mental models when solving problems and that elaboration can reduce the number of possible models.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000083756000013,
      author = {Newstead, SE and Griggs, RA},
      title = {Premise misinterpretation and syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {52},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1057-1075}
    }
    
    Newstead, S., Handley, S. & Buck, E. Falsifying mental models: Testing the predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning {1999} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {27}({2}), pp. {344-354} 
    article  
    Abstract: Four experiments are reported that tested the claim, drawn from mental models theory, that reasoners attempt to construct alternative representations of problems that might falsify preliminary conclusions they have drawn. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate which alternative conclusion(s) they had considered in a syllogistic reasoning task. In Experiments 2-4 participants were asked to draw diagrams consistent with the premises, on the assumption that these diagrams would provide insights into the mental representation being used. In none of the experiments was there any evidence that people constructed more models for multiple-model than for single-model syllogisms, nor was there any correlation between number of models constructed and overall accuracy. The results are interpreted as showing that falsification of the kind proposed by mental models theory may not routinely occur in reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000079821600014,
      author = {Newstead, SE and Handley, SJ and Buck, E},
      title = {Falsifying mental models: Testing the predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {27},
      number = {2},
      pages = {344-354}
    }
    
    NEWSTEAD, S., POLLARD, P., EVANS, J. & ALLEN, J. THE SOURCE OF BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1992} COGNITION
    Vol. {45}({3}), pp. {257-284} 
    article  
    Abstract: In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1992KC24300003,
      author = {NEWSTEAD, SE and POLLARD, P and EVANS, JST and ALLEN, JL},
      title = {THE SOURCE OF BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1992},
      volume = {45},
      number = {3},
      pages = {257-284}
    }
    
    NGUYEN, D. & REVLIN, R. TRANSITIVE INFERENCES FROM NARRATIVE RELATIONS {1993} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION
    Vol. {19}({5}), pp. {1197-1210} 
    article  
    Abstract: Inferences drawn while reading artificial set inclusion passages tend to be different than those made when reasoning with categorical syllogisms and linear orderings even though all three describe transitive relations. The present study tests the hypothesis that this disparity results from reasoners' perceptions of the commonality among category terms. In three experiments, students were given artificial set inclusion paragraphs that either contained convergent category terms that possess a common superordinate, similar to what is found in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Revlin, Ammerman, Petersen, & Leirer, 1978), or they were given divergent category terms that do not possess a common superordinate (similar to Griggs, 1976a). The perceived commonality among the category terms affected the interpretations of the narrative relations and determined the pattern of inferences that students were willing to draw.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993LY06700017,
      author = {NGUYEN, DB and REVLIN, R},
      title = {TRANSITIVE INFERENCES FROM NARRATIVE RELATIONS},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {19},
      number = {5},
      pages = {1197-1210}
    }
    
    OAKHILL, J. & GARNHAM, A. ON THEORIES OF BELIEF BIAS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1993} COGNITION
    Vol. {46}({1}), pp. {87-92} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993KF86200003,
      author = {OAKHILL, J and GARNHAM, A},
      title = {ON THEORIES OF BELIEF BIAS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {46},
      number = {1},
      pages = {87-92}
    }
    
    OAKHILL, J., GARNHAM, A. & JOHNSONLAIRD, P. BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1990}
    Vol. {1}LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING , pp. {125-138} 
    inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1990BT12U00010,
      author = {OAKHILL, J and GARNHAM, A and JOHNSONLAIRD, PN},
      title = {BELIEF BIAS EFFECTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      booktitle = {LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING },
      year = {1990},
      volume = {1},
      pages = {125-138},
      note = {INTERNATIONAL CONF ON THINKING, ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND, AUG, 1988}
    }
    
    OAKHILL, J., JOHNSONLAIRD, P. & GARNHAM, A. BELIEVABILITY AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1989} COGNITION
    Vol. {31}({2}), pp. {117-140} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1989U717400002,
      author = {OAKHILL, J and JOHNSONLAIRD, PN and GARNHAM, A},
      title = {BELIEVABILITY AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {31},
      number = {2},
      pages = {117-140}
    }
    
    Oaksford, M., Carlile, J. & Moore, S. The effects of reasoning, prior mood, and personality on emotion {2004} PSYCHOLOGIA
    Vol. {47}({4}), pp. {250-263} 
    article  
    Abstract: Whether performing a syllogistic reasoning task (SRT) affects emotional state in different prior moods was tested using eighty participants in either a positive, negative, or neutral mood. A film mood induction procedure (MIP) was used and affective state was assessed before the MIP, after the MIP and after the SRT. The affective reactivity hypothesis - that personality influences the magnitude of affective change to an MIP - was also tested by having participants fill out the Eysenck Personality Inventory. Participants in a positive, but not in a negative or neutral, prior mood moved more negative after the SRT. Participants' pattern of affective reactivity partly replicated previous research but contrary to prediction in the positive condition extraversion was inversely related to increases in positive (in the MIP) and negative (in the SRT) affect. These results suggest that, under some conditions, people may adaptively move to the mood-state that is most conducive to the type of cognitive task they must perform.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000226784500005,
      author = {Oaksford, M and Carlile, J and Moore, SC},
      title = {The effects of reasoning, prior mood, and personality on emotion},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGIA},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {47},
      number = {4},
      pages = {250-263}
    }
    
    Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. Precis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning {2009} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {32}({1}), pp. {69+} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic - the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining the end-point of cognitive development; and contemporary psychology of reasoning has focussed on comparing human reasoning against logical standards. Bayesian Rationality argues that rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty. Although people are typically poor at numerical reasoning about probability, human thought is sensitive to subtle patterns of qualitative Bayesian, probabilistic reasoning. In Chapters 1-4 of Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford & Chater 2007), the case is made that cognition in general, and human everyday reasoning in particular, is best viewed as solving probabilistic, rather than logical, inference problems. In Chapters 5-7 the psychology of ``deductive'' reasoning is tackled head-on: It is argued that purportedly ``logical'' reasoning problems, revealing apparently irrational behaviour, are better understood from a probabilistic point of view. Data from conditional reasoning, Wason's selection task, and syllogistic inference are captured by recasting these problems probabilistically. The probabilistic approach makes a variety of novel predictions which have been experimentally confirmed. The book considers the implications of this work, and the wider ``probabilistic turn'' in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, for understanding human rationality.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000263768700028,
      author = {Oaksford, Mike and Chater, Nick},
      title = {Precis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {32},
      number = {1},
      pages = {69+},
      doi = {{10.1017/S0140525X09000284}}
    }
    
    Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. The probabilistic approach to human reasoning {2001} TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES
    Vol. {5}({8}), pp. {349-357} 
    article  
    Abstract: A recent development in the cognitive science of reasoning has been the emergence of a probabilistic approach to the behaviour observed on ostensibly logical tasks. According to this approach the errors and biases documented on these tasks occur because people import their everyday uncertain reasoning strategies into the laboratory. Consequently participants' apparently irrational behaviour is the result of comparing it with an inappropriate logical standard. In this article, we contrast the probabilistic approach with other approaches to explaining rationality, and then show how it has been applied to three main areas of logical reasoning: conditional inference, Wason's selection task and syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000170330200006,
      author = {Oaksford, M and Chater, N},
      title = {The probabilistic approach to human reasoning},
      journal = {TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {5},
      number = {8},
      pages = {349-357}
    }
    
    Oaksford, M., Roberts, L. & Chater, N. Relative informativeness of quantifiers used in syllogistic reasoning {2002} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {30}({1}), pp. {138-149} 
    article  
    Abstract: Three experiments tested a possible resolution of the probability heuristics model (PHM) of syllogistic reasoning proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999), with their experimental results apparently showing that the generalized quantifier few was not as informative as suggested theoretically. Modifying the interpretation of few to take into account the distinction between positive and negative quantifiers (Moxey & Sanford, 1993) indicated two orderings over the quantifiers all, most, few, some, none, and some... not that are more consistent with the results. Experiments 1-3 tested these orderings empirically by having participants rank whether a quantifier applied to a particular probabilistic state of affairs. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants agreed on when a quantifier applied and that the empirically derived informativeness orderings were consistent with the proposed modifications of the order. Experiment 3 showed that this finding was robust even when response competition was eliminated.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000174820600014,
      author = {Oaksford, M and Roberts, L and Chater, N},
      title = {Relative informativeness of quantifiers used in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {30},
      number = {1},
      pages = {138-149}
    }
    
    Oberauer, K. A semantic theory of deductive reasoning {1995} SPRACHE & KOGNITION
    Vol. {14}({4}), pp. {193-209} 
    article  
    Abstract: A theory of deductive reasoning is proposed which is based on the `'mental model'' theory of Johnson-Laird. The theory is developed by applying the central postulate of model semantics consequently: Symbolic propositions are interpreted by mentally constructing states of affairs which in themselves are not symbolic. `'Symbolic extensions'' in mental models are criticized for violating this postulate. They are not necessary in the new theory. Deductive reasoning rests on the mental construction of structures of objects, events and regions in a possible world which are in accordance with the truth conditions of the premises. Logical truth emerges out of the geometrical restrictions of a semantic space which serves as the medium for mental models. Syllogistic and propositional logic are discussed as examples to illustrate this assumptions. Finally, some empirical consequences are discussed which in part deviate from Johnson-Laird's theory.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995UY11900003,
      author = {Oberauer, K},
      title = {A semantic theory of deductive reasoning},
      journal = {SPRACHE & KOGNITION},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {193-209}
    }
    
    Orlowska, E. Many-valuedness and uncertainty {1997} 27TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MULTIPLE-VALUED LOGIC - 1997 PROCEEDINGS, pp. {153-158}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: A generalisation of modal information logics to many-valued modal logics is presented. Information logics are the formalisms for reasoning about uncertain knowledge discovered from incomplete information. In these logics an analysis of information that has the form of descriptions of objects in terms of their properties can be carried on and relationships among objects based on their common properties (referred to as information relations) can be represented and discussed. In the proposed many-valued information logics both properties of objects and relationships among the objects are assumed to be many-valued A relationship between the calculus of information relations and Aristotelian syllogistic is outlined.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1997BH95C00022,
      author = {Orlowska, E},
      title = {Many-valuedness and uncertainty},
      booktitle = {27TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MULTIPLE-VALUED LOGIC - 1997 PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {1997},
      pages = {153-158},
      note = {27th International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic, ANTIGONISH, CANADA, MAY 28-30, 1997}
    }
    
    Osana, H.P., Lacroix, G.L., Tucker, B.J., Idan, E. & Jabbour, G.W. The impact of print exposure quality and inference construction on syllogistic reasoning {2007} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {99}({4}), pp. {888-902} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: This study extended the work of S. Siddiqui, R. F. West, and K. E. Stanovich (1998), who studied the link between general print exposure and syllogistic reasoning. It was hypothesized that exposure to certain text structures that contain well-delineated logical forms, such as popularized scientific texts, would be a better predictor of deductive reasoning skill than general print exposure, which is not sensitive to the quality of an individual's reading activity. Furthermore, it was predicted that the ability to generate explanatory bridging inferences while reading would also be predictive of syllogistic reasoning. Undergraduate students (N = 112) were tested for vocabulary, nonverbal cognitive ability, exposure to general print, exposure to popularized scientific literature, and the ability to comprehend texts distinguished by the number of inferences that must be generated to support comprehension. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that a combined measure of exposure to general and scientific literature was a significant predictor of syllogistic reasoning ability. Additionally, the ability to comprehend high-inference-load texts was related to solving syllogisms that were inconsistent with world knowledge, indicating an overlap in deductive reasoning skill and text comprehension processes.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000250969400014,
      author = {Osana, Helena P. and Lacroix, Guy L. and Tucker, Bradley J. and Idan, Einat and Jabbour, Guillaume W.},
      title = {The impact of print exposure quality and inference construction on syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {99},
      number = {4},
      pages = {888-902},
      note = {Annual Meeting of the American-Educational-Research-Association, Montreal, CANADA, APR, 2005},
      doi = {{10.1037/0022-0663.99.4.888}}
    }
    
    Panayiotou, C. & Bennett, B. Semantic web reasoning tutoring agent {2008}
    Vol. {5091}INTELLIGENT TUTORING SYSTEM, PROCEEDINGS, pp. {816-818} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: This paper proposes a proof theoretic approach to check conflicts between the arguments derived from the ontologies of learning resources. Two types of arguments that can arise in a situation where a learner encounters conflicting viewpoints about a topic are identified, namely syllogistic arguments and arguments about the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that represent a concept. A method based on set equations is applied to create Syllogistic arguments from ontologies. The taxonomic associations of concepts in Ontologies, can be converted to categorical statements giving rise to syllogisms. We also consider arguments about the necessary and sufficient features for the representation of concepts and show that they can be handled in a very similar way as syllogistic arguments. The approach can be applied by a pedagogical agent in an interactive learning environment in order to identify, discuss differences in conceptualizations and check the validity of claims of different resources.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000258073200117,
      author = {Panayiotou, Christiana and Bennett, Brandon},
      title = {Semantic web reasoning tutoring agent},
      booktitle = {INTELLIGENT TUTORING SYSTEM, PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {5091},
      pages = {816-818},
      note = {9th International Conference on Intelligent Tutoring Systems, Montreal, CANADA, JUN 23-JUL 27, 2008}
    }
    
    Pare-Rey, P. Demonstrare to uincere: the tragic enthymemism between logic and rhetoric {2005}
    Vol. {69}Demonstrare Voir et Faire Voir: Forme de la Demonstration a Rome, pp. {413+} 
    inproceedings  
    Abstract: After defining the enthymemism as a ``rhetorical syllogism'', we study its connections with two networks of meanings of the verb demonstrare. Not only does the enthymemism exhibit a reality but it also belongs, like syllogism, to a reasoning by deduction. Enthymemism being both a form (as syllogistic argument) and a means of demonstration (as ``technical proof''), we examine the gnome part of enthymemism and the enthymematic gnome by comparing their respective devices and persuasive effectiveness. Giving shape to a deductive argument, enthymemism relies on the implicit. Its premisses, constituted by gnomai, are not all of them expressed, and it is thanks to that ellipsis that it is efficacious, in other words persuasive. enthymemism also brings into play emotional components (ethos and pathos) more or less successfully. In addition to deliberately limited means and the motivating force of pathos, there is the formal terseness that imparts to a circumscribed statement the evidence of a general truth. As an argumentative weapon, enthymemism works out the transit from an apparent logic (demonstrare) to a triumphant rhetoric (uincere).
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000250329400030,
      author = {Pare-Rey, Pascale},
      title = {Demonstrare to uincere: the tragic enthymemism between logic and rhetoric},
      booktitle = {Demonstrare Voir et Faire Voir: Forme de la Demonstration a Rome},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {69},
      pages = {413+},
      note = {Interantional Symposium of Toulouse 2004, Toulouse, FRANCE, NOV 18-20, 2004}
    }
    
    Park, J. & Han, S. Using deductive reasoning to promote the change of students' conceptions about force and motion {2002} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION
    Vol. {24}({6}), pp. {593-609} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Deductive reasoning is a basic logic form used in scientific explanations and predictions. In dynamics, the process of finding the direction of force acting on a moving object, from the change of its motion, can be structured as a syllogism that is an elementary model of deduction. In this study, the syllogistic form of a scientific explanation task was used to help middle school students change their prior conceptions about force and motion. However, because the conclusion drawn from a syllogistic explanation task contradicted students' prior ideas, many rejected the conclusion or reached another conclusion without using deductive reasoning. From the preliminary interview using the syllogistic explanation task with eight students, we found four factors preventing students' use of deductive reasoning. In the main interview designed to remove these obstacles, it was observed that 26 of the 27 students could find the direction of force correctly by using deduction. Finally, implications for classroom teaching are suggested.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000176614800004,
      author = {Park, J and Han, SJ},
      title = {Using deductive reasoning to promote the change of students' conceptions about force and motion},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {24},
      number = {6},
      pages = {593-609},
      doi = {{10.1080/09500690110074026}}
    }
    
    PIPER, D. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN VARIED NARRATIVE CONTEXTS - ASPECTS OF LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENT {1985} JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH
    Vol. {14}({1}), pp. {19-43} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1985AAY5900002,
      author = {PIPER, D},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN VARIED NARRATIVE CONTEXTS - ASPECTS OF LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC DEVELOPMENT},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {14},
      number = {1},
      pages = {19-43}
    }
    
    Politzer, G. No problem for Aristotle's subject and predicate {2003} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {26}({3}), pp. {298+} 
    article  
    Abstract: It is argued that, in the traditional subject-predicate sentence, two interpretations of the subject term coexist, one intensional and the other extensional, which explains the superficial difference between the traditional S-P relation and the predication of predicate logic. Data from psychological studies of syllogistic reasoning support the view that the contrast between predicate and argument is carried over to the traditional S-P sentence.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000222579800019,
      author = {Politzer, G},
      title = {No problem for Aristotle's subject and predicate},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {26},
      number = {3},
      pages = {298+}
    }
    
    Politzer, G. & Mercier, H. Solving categorical syllogisms with singular premises {2008} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {14}({4}), pp. {434-454} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: We elaborate on the approach to syllogistic reasoning based on case identification (Stenning Oberlander, 1995; Stenning Yule, 1997). It is shown that this can be viewed as the formalisation of a method of proof that dates back to Aristotle, namely proof by exposition (ecthesis), and that there are traces of this method in the strategies described by a number of psychologists, from Storring (1908) to the present day. We hypothesised that by rendering individual cases explicit in the premises, the chance that reasoners would engage in a proof by exposition would be enhanced, and thus performance improved. To do so, we used syllogisms with singular premises (e.g., this X is Y). This resulted in a uniform increase in performance as compared to performance on the associated standard syllogisms. These results cannot be explained by the main theories of syllogistic reasoning in their current state.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000260608900006,
      author = {Politzer, Guy and Mercier, Hugo},
      title = {Solving categorical syllogisms with singular premises},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {14},
      number = {4},
      pages = {434-454},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780802407271}}
    }
    
    POLK, T. & NEWELL, A. DEDUCTION AS VERBAL REASONING {1995} PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
    Vol. {102}({3}), pp. {533-566} 
    article  
    Abstract: Most theories of deduction have assumed that linguistic processes transduce from language into an internal representation and back again, and that non-linguistic processes are central to deduction itself. In this article it is proposed that for deduction tasks for which the necessary information is provided verbally, the heart of deduction for untrained participants involves repeatedly reencoding the problem, a type of behavior referred to here as verbal reasoning. It is shown that model theory accounts of behavior on most deduction tasks are consistent with verbal reasoning and that verbal reasoning can account for detailed behavior in a single task; a computational model of syllogistic reasoning-VR-base on linguistic mechanisms is presented. VR models all of the standard phenomena, makes a number of accurate novel predictions, and fits the behavior of individual participants with an accuracy that rivals their own test-retest reliability.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RL52000005,
      author = {POLK, TA and NEWELL, A},
      title = {DEDUCTION AS VERBAL REASONING},
      journal = {PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {102},
      number = {3},
      pages = {533-566}
    }
    
    Prowse Turner, J.A. & Thompson, V.A. The role of training, alternative models, and logical necessity in determining confidence in syllogistic reasoning {2009} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {15}({1}), pp. {69-100} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Prior research shows that reasoners' confidence is poorly calibrated (Shynkaruk Thompson, 2006). The goal of the current experiment was to increase calibration in syllogistic reasoning by training reasoners on (a) the concept of logical necessity and (b) the idea that more than one representation of the premises may be possible. Training improved accuracy and was also effective in remedying some systematic misunderstandings about the task: those in the training condition were better at estimating their overall performance than those who were untrained. However, training was less successful in helping reasoners to discriminate which items are most likely to cause them difficulties. In addition we explored other variables that may affect confidence and accuracy, such as the number of models required to represent the problem and whether or not the presented conclusion was necessitated by the premises, possible given the premises, or impossible given the premises. These variables had systematically different relationships to confidence and accuracy. Thus, we propose that confidence in reasoning judgements is analogous to confidence in memory retrievals, in that they are inferentially derived from cues that are not diagnostic in terms of accuracy.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000262641400003,
      author = {Prowse Turner, Jamie A. and Thompson, Valerie A.},
      title = {The role of training, alternative models, and logical necessity in determining confidence in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {15},
      number = {1},
      pages = {69-100},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780802619248}}
    }
    
    Prowse, J. & Thompson, V.A. Heuristic effects on confidence and accuracy: An extension of the probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning {2007} CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE
    Vol. {61}({4}), pp. {372} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000258421900178,
      author = {Prowse, Jamie and Thompson, Valerie A.},
      title = {Heuristic effects on confidence and accuracy: An extension of the probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHOLOGIE EXPERIMENTALE},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {61},
      number = {4},
      pages = {372}
    }
    
    Qiu, J., Li, H., Luo, Y., Zhang, Q. & Tu, S. The neural basis of syllogistic reasoning: An event-related potential study {2009} BRAIN RESEARCH
    Vol. {1273}, pp. {106-113} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The spatiotemporal analysis of brain activation during syllogistic reasoning, and the execution of 1 baseline task (BST) were performed in 14 healthy adult participants using high-density event-related brain potentials (ERPs). The following results were obtained: First, the valid syllogistic reasoning task (VSR) elicited a greater positive ERP deflection than the invalid syllogistic reasoning task (ISR) and BST between 300 and 400 ms after the onset of the minor premise. Dipole source analysis of the difference waves (VSR-BST and VSR-ISR) indicated that the positive components were localized in the vicinity of the occipito-temporal cortex, possibly related to visual premise processing. Second, VSR and ISR demonstrated greater negativity than BST developed at 600-700 ms. Dipole source analysis of difference waves (VSR-BST and ISR-BST) indicated that the negative components were mainly localized near the medial frontal cortex/the anterior cingulate cortex, possibly related to the manipulation and integration of premise information. Third, both VSR and ISR elicited a more positive ERP deflection than BST between 2500 and 3000 ms. Voltage maps of the difference waves (VSR-BST and VSR-ISR) demonstrated strong activity in the right frontal scalp regions. Results indicate that the reasoning tasks may require more mental effort to spatial processing of working memory. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000267516600012,
      author = {Qiu, Jiang and Li, Hong and Luo, Yuejia and Zhang, Qinglin and Tu, Shen},
      title = {The neural basis of syllogistic reasoning: An event-related potential study},
      journal = {BRAIN RESEARCH},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {1273},
      pages = {106-113},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.brainres.2009.03.054}}
    }
    
    Qiu, J. & Qinglin, Z. The neural basis of syllogistic reasoning: An event-related potential {2008} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {43}({3-4}), pp. {511} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000259264306028,
      author = {Qiu, Jiang and Zhang Qinglin},
      title = {The neural basis of syllogistic reasoning: An event-related potential},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {43},
      number = {3-4},
      pages = {511}
    }
    
    Quayle, J. & Ball, L. Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning {1997} PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {626-631}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: An experiment is reported in which participants were asked to record how confident they felt about the correctness of their responses as they assessed the validity of deductive arguments whose conclusions varied in prior believability. The results showed that participants were more confident of their responses to valid problems than invalid problems irrespective of believability status, providing support for the idea that invalid problems are more demanding to process than valid problems. Effects of belief, logic on conclusion acceptance rates and a logicxbelief interaction are also demonstrated, and evidence is provided to suggest that belief bias principally reflects a tendency to reject unbelievable arguments. A theory is proposed in which belief bias effects are accounted for by the variations in the processing demands of valid and invalid syllogisms.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168551500107,
      author = {Quayle, JD and Ball, LJ},
      title = {Subjective confidence and the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1997},
      pages = {626-631},
      note = {19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, Stanford, CA, AUG 07-10, 1997}
    }
    
    Quayle, J. & Ball, L. Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning {2000} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {53}({4}), pp. {1202-1223} 
    article  
    Abstract: Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form. This paper presents a mental models-based account, which explains these findings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types. We propose that belief bias may reflect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one's processing-attributable to working-memory overload-is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in confidence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments, with participants being more confident in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic figure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the figural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants' articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between high and low spatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000089907500013,
      author = {Quayle, JD and Ball, LJ},
      title = {Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {53},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1202-1223}
    }
    
    Reverberi, C., Cherubini, P., Frackowiak, R.S.J., Caltagirone, C., Paulesu, E. & Macaluso, E. Conditional and Syllogistic Deductive Tasks Dissociate Functionally During Premise Integration {2010} HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING
    Vol. {31}({9}), pp. {1430-1445} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Deduction allows us to draw consequences from previous knowledge. Deductive reasoning can be applied to several types of problem, for example, conditional, syllogistic, and relational. It has been assumed that the same cognitive operations underlie solutions to them all; however, this hypothesis remains to be tested empirically We used event-related fMRI, in the same group of subjects, to compare reasoning-related activity associated with conditional and syllogistic deductive problems. Furthermore, we assessed reasoning-related activity for the two main stages of deduction, namely encoding of premises and their integration Encoding syllogistic premises for reasoning was associated with activation of BA 44/45 more than encoding them for literal recall During integration, left fronto-lateral cortex (BA 44/45, 6) and basal ganglia activated with both conditional and syllogistic reasoning. Besides that, integration of syllogistic problems additionally was associated with activation of left parietal (BA 7) and left ventro-lateral frontal cortex (BA 47) This difference suggests a dissociation between conditional and syllogistic reasoning at the integration stage Our finding indicates that the integration of conditional and syllogistic reasoning is carried out by means of different, but partly overlapping, sets of anatomical regions and by inference, cognitive processes The involvement of BA 44/45 during both encoding (syllogisms) and premise integration (syllogisms and conditionals) suggests a central role in deductive reasoning for syntactic manipulations and formal/linguistic representations Hum Brain Mapp 31 1430-1445, 2010 (C) 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000281725100012,
      author = {Reverberi, Carlo and Cherubini, Paolo and Frackowiak, Richard S. J. and Caltagirone, Carlo and Paulesu, Eraldo and Macaluso, Emiliano},
      title = {Conditional and Syllogistic Deductive Tasks Dissociate Functionally During Premise Integration},
      journal = {HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {31},
      number = {9},
      pages = {1430-1445},
      doi = {{10.1002/hbm.20947}}
    }
    
    Reverberi, C., Rusconi, P., Paulesu, E. & Cherubini, P. Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning {2009} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {62}({3}), pp. {513-530} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, it weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere Of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role In the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those. used. in a previous neuroimaging study Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000265837300009,
      author = {Reverberi, Carlo and Rusconi, Patrice and Paulesu, Eraldo and Cherubini, Paolo},
      title = {Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {62},
      number = {3},
      pages = {513-530},
      doi = {{10.1080/17470210801995010}}
    }
    
    REVLIN, R., AMMERMAN, K., PETERSEN, K. & LEIRER, V. CATEGORY RELATIONS AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1978} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {70}({4}), pp. {613-625} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1978FP93600024,
      author = {REVLIN, R and AMMERMAN, K and PETERSEN, K and LEIRER, V},
      title = {CATEGORY RELATIONS AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1978},
      volume = {70},
      number = {4},
      pages = {613-625}
    }
    
    REVLIS, R. 2 MODELS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - FEATURE SELECTION AND CONVERSION {1975} JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR
    Vol. {14}({2}), pp. {180-195} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1975AD02700005,
      author = {REVLIS, R},
      title = {2 MODELS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - FEATURE SELECTION AND CONVERSION},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {180-195}
    }
    
    REVLIS, R. CONVERSION PROCESS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1972} PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE
    Vol. {29}({4B}), pp. {269-\&} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1972O359300148,
      author = {REVLIS, R},
      title = {CONVERSION PROCESS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE},
      year = {1972},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4B},
      pages = {269-&}
    }
    
    Reyna, V.F. & Mills, B. Converging evidence supports fuzzy-trace theory's nested sets hypothesis, but not the frequency hypothesis {2007} BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES
    Vol. {30}({3}), pp. {278+} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Evidence favors the nested sets hypothesis, introduced by fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) in the 1990s to explain ``class-inclusion'' effects and extended to many tasks, including conjunction fallacy, syllogistic reasoning, and base-rate effects (e.g., Brainered & Reyna 1990; Reyna 1991; 2004; Reyna & Adam 2003; Reyna & Brainerd 1995). Crucial differences in mechanisms distinguish the FTT and Barbey & Sloman (B&S) accounts, but both contrast with frequency predictions (see Reyna & Brainerd, in press).
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000254847800023,
      author = {Reyna, Valerie F. and Mills, Britain},
      title = {Converging evidence supports fuzzy-trace theory's nested sets hypothesis, but not the frequency hypothesis},
      journal = {BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {30},
      number = {3},
      pages = {278+},
      doi = {{10.1017/S0140525X07001872}}
    }
    
    Richards, C. & Sanderson, J. The role of imagination in facilitating deductive reasoning in 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds {1999} COGNITION
    Vol. {72}({2}), pp. {B1-B9} 
    article  
    Abstract: When 4- and 6-year-olds are cued to use their imagination, they can overcome the belief bias effect and demonstrate deductive reasoning ability on syllogisms containing contrary-to-fact material. This study tested whether 2- and 3-year-olds could also reason with incongruent syllogisms when encouraged to use their imagination. Eighty-four 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: no cue, word cue, fantasy planet or imagery. Children were then presented with six syllogistic reasoning problems containing incongruent information. In the imagination conditions, 2- and 3-year-olds performed as competently as 4-year-olds. The findings are discussed in relation to other research which suggests that under certain circumstances 2- and S-year-olds have the capacity for counterfactual thinking. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000083312400005,
      author = {Richards, CA and Sanderson, JA},
      title = {The role of imagination in facilitating deductive reasoning in 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds},
      journal = {COGNITION},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {72},
      number = {2},
      pages = {B1-B9}
    }
    
    ROBERGE, J. REEXAMINATION OF INTERPRETATIONS OF ERRORS IN FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1970} PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE
    Vol. {19}({6}), pp. {331-333} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1970Y314100008,
      author = {ROBERGE, JJ},
      title = {REEXAMINATION OF INTERPRETATIONS OF ERRORS IN FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE},
      year = {1970},
      volume = {19},
      number = {6},
      pages = {331-333}
    }
    
    Roberts, M. Expanding the universe of categorical syllogisms: A challenge for reasoning researchers {2005} BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS
    Vol. {37}({4}), pp. {560-580} 
    article  
    Abstract: Syllogistic reasoning, in which people identify conclusions from quantified premise pairs, remains a benchmark task whose patterns of data must be accounted for by general theories of deductive reasoning. However, psychologists have confined themselves to administering only the 64 premise pairs historically identified by Aristotle. By utilizing all combinations of negations, the present article identifies an expanded set of 576 premise pairs and gives the valid conclusions that they support. Many of these have interesting properties, and the identification of predictions and their verification will be an important next step for all proponents of such theories.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000236315600002,
      author = {Roberts, MJ},
      title = {Expanding the universe of categorical syllogisms: A challenge for reasoning researchers},
      journal = {BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {37},
      number = {4},
      pages = {560-580}
    }
    
    Roberts, M. & Sykes, E. Categorical reasoning from multiple diagrams {2005} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {58}({2}), pp. {333-376} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Syllogistic reasoning from categorical premise pairs is generally taken to be a multistep process. Quantifiers (all, no, some, some ... not) must be interpreted, representations constructed, and conclusions identified from these. Explanations of performance have been proposed in which errors may occur at any of these stages. The current paper contrasts (a) representation explanations of performance, in which errors occur because not all possible representations are constructed, and/or mistakes are made when doing so (e.g., mental models theory), and (b) conclusion identification explanations, in which errors occur even when information has been correctly and exhaustively represented, due to systematic difficulties that people may have when identifying particular conclusions, or in identifying conclusions in particular circumstances. Three experiments are reported, in which people identified valid conclusions from diagrams analogous to Euler circles, so that the first two stages of reasoning from premise pairs were effectively removed. Despite this, several phenomena associated with reasoning from premise pairs persisted, and it is suggested that whereas representation explanations may account for some of these phenomena, conclusion identification explanations, which have never previously been considered, are required for others.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000227090600006,
      author = {Roberts, MJ and Sykes, EDA},
      title = {Categorical reasoning from multiple diagrams},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A-HUMAN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {58},
      number = {2},
      pages = {333-376},
      doi = {{10.1080/02724980343000909}}
    }
    
    Roberts, M.J. Mental models and falsification: It depends on the task {2007} Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions, pp. {85-113}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: This chapter reviews a number of task factors that have previously been shown to increase the likelihood that a falsification strategy will be applied when reasoning by using mental models. These are (1) the presence of unbelievable conclusionsn (2) enhanced instructions to improve the understanding of a task, and (3) reducing the cognitive load of a task. In addition, a new factor is discussed: task construal. It is suggested that people adopt nonlogical quantifier interpretations when solving categorical syllogisms, with the consequence that the prevalence and success of falsification behavior at this task has been underestimated in the past. Overall, it is argued (1) that in appropriate circumstances, falsification will be widespread and robust, (2) that care is required to ensure that methods of identifying falsification behavior do not themselves alter its prevalence, and (3) that care is required not to make widespread generalizations from one or a small number of tasks.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000242995700005,
      author = {Roberts, Maxwell J.},
      title = {Mental models and falsification: It depends on the task},
      booktitle = {Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions},
      year = {2007},
      pages = {85-113},
      note = {Workshop on Mental Models and Deductive Reasoning, Brussels, BELGIUM, MAR 23-24, 2001}
    }
    
    Rodriguez-Moreno, D. & Hirsch, J. The dynamics of deductive reasoning: An fMRI investigation {2009} NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA
    Vol. {47}({4}), pp. {949-961} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Although the basis for deductive reasoning has been a traditional focus of philosophical discussion, the neural correlates and mechanisms that underlie deductive reasoning have only recently become the focus of scientific investigation. In syllogistic deductive reasoning information presented in two related sequential premises leads to a subsequent conclusion. While previous imaging studies have identified frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital complexes that are activated during these reasoning events, there are substantive differences among the findings with respect to the specific regions engaged in reasoning and the contribution of language areas. Further, little is known about the various stages of information processing during reasoning. Using event-related fMRI and an auditory and visual conjunction technique, we identified a long-range supramodal network active during reasoning processes including areas in the left frontal and parietal regions as well as the bilateral caudate nucleus. Time courses of activation for each of these regions suggest that reasoning processes emerge during the presentation of the second premise, and remain active until the validation of the conclusion. Thus, areas within the frontal and parietal regions are differentially engaged at different time points in the reasoning process consistent with coordinated intra-network interactions. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000264519200001,
      author = {Rodriguez-Moreno, Diana and Hirsch, Joy},
      title = {The dynamics of deductive reasoning: An fMRI investigation},
      journal = {NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {47},
      number = {4},
      pages = {949-961},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.08.030}}
    }
    
    ROTH, T. & MEYER, H. CONTENT-ANALYSIS INDICATORS FOR THE TENDENCY TOWARD ERROR IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1989} ZEITSCHRIFT FUR EXPERIMENTELLE UND ANGEWANDTE PSYCHOLOGIE
    Vol. {36}({4}), pp. {597-609} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1989CG33100005,
      author = {ROTH, T and MEYER, HA},
      title = {CONTENT-ANALYSIS INDICATORS FOR THE TENDENCY TOWARD ERROR IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {ZEITSCHRIFT FUR EXPERIMENTELLE UND ANGEWANDTE PSYCHOLOGIE},
      year = {1989},
      volume = {36},
      number = {4},
      pages = {597-609}
    }
    
    Ruan, D., Shi, Y. & Kerre, E. On the Chaining Syllogism in Fuzzy Logic {2008} 2008 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT SYSTEM AND KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING, VOLS 1 AND 2, pp. {459-464}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: In this paper we deal with an extension of the fuzzy chaining syllogism in fuzzy logic, which was initiated by Zadeh [LA. Zadeh, Syllogistic reasoning in fuzzy logic and its application to reasoning with dispositions, IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 15, 754-763, 1985]. We introduce the extended fuzzy chaining syllogism, and investigate it with three important classes of fuzzy implications against the validity of their deduction scheme in fuzzy logic. We show that the fuzzy chaining syllogism holds for an arbitrary fuzzy implication and a continuous extended triangular norm as long as the fuzzy syllogism holds. For an arbitrary triangular norm and an S- or QL- implication we prove that the generalised Kleene-Dienes implication constitutes a lower bound for the inference result of the chaining syllogism. Similarly for Zadeh's triangular norm (minimum). and an R-implication I we obtain this I as a lower bound for the conclusion of the chaining syllogism.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000262437400088,
      author = {Ruan, Da and Shi, Yun and Kerre, Etienne},
      title = {On the Chaining Syllogism in Fuzzy Logic},
      booktitle = {2008 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT SYSTEM AND KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING, VOLS 1 AND 2},
      year = {2008},
      pages = {459-464},
      note = {3rd International Conference on Intelligent System and Knowledge Engineering, Xiamen, PEOPLES R CHINA, NOV 17-19, 2008}
    }
    
    Sa, W., West, R. & Stanovich, K. The domain specificity and generality of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill {1999} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {91}({3}), pp. {497-510} 
    article  
    Abstract: The domain specificity and generality of belief-biased reasoning was examined across a height judgment task and a syllogistic reasoning task that differed greatly in cognitive requirements. Moderate correlations between belief-bias indices on these 2 tasks falsified an extreme form of the domain specificity view of critical thinking skills. Two measures of cognitive ability and 2 measures of cognitive decontextualization skill were positively correlated with belief bias in a height judgment task where prior knowledge accurately reflected an aspect of the environment and negatively correlated with belief bias in a height judgment task where prior knowledge was incongruent with the environment. Likewise, cognitive ability was associated with skill at resisting the influence of prior knowledge in the syllogistic reasoning task. Participants high in cognitive ability were able to flexibly use prior knowledge, depending upon its efficacy in a particular environment. They were more Likely to project a relationship when it reflected a useful cue, but they were also less likely to project a prior belief when the belief was inefficacious.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000082829900007,
      author = {Sa, WC and West, RF and Stanovich, KE},
      title = {The domain specificity and generality of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {91},
      number = {3},
      pages = {497-510}
    }
    
    Santamaria, C., Garciamadruga, J. & Carretero, M. Beyond belief bias: Reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation {1996} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {24}({2}), pp. {250-261} 
    article  
    Abstract: Mental models constitute an alternative to the rule-based systems in the explanation of human reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In this paper, we claim that the concept of believability generally used to categorize content and context effects is of little use within a semantic theory. Thus, we propose the use of categories that are directly extracted from subjective relations among concepts within the reasoning problem. We demonstrate that manipulations based on this kind of categorization produce predictable patterns of responses in reasoning problems. We present two experiments to test our predictions, using conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems, and in both cases, we demonstrate the influence of conceptual knowledge not only in natural contexts, but also in experimentally created artificial contexts.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1996UA44400011,
      author = {Santamaria, C and Garciamadruga, JC and Carretero, M},
      title = {Beyond belief bias: Reasoning from conceptual structures by mental models manipulation},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {24},
      number = {2},
      pages = {250-261}
    }
    
    Schmidt, J.R. & Thompson, V.A. ``At least one'' problem with ``some'' formal reasoning paradigms {2008} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {36}({1}), pp. {217-229} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: In formal reasoning, the quantifier ``some'' means ``at least one and possibly all.'' In contrast, reasoners often pragmatically interpret ``some'' to mean ``some, but not all'' on both immediate-inference and Euler circle tasks. It is still unclear whether pragmatic interpretations can explain the high rates of errors normally observed on syllogistic reasoning tasks. To address this issue, we presented participants (reasoners) in the present experiments either standard quantifiers or clarified quantifiers designed to precisely articulate the quantifiers' logical interpretations. In Experiment 1, reasoners made significantly more logical responses and significantly fewer pragmatic responses on an immediate-inference task when presented with logically clarified as opposed to standard quantifiers. In Experiment 2, this finding was extended to a variant of the immediate-inference task in which reasoners were asked to deduce what followed from premises they were to assume to be false. In Experiment 3, we used a syllogistic reasoning task and observed that logically clarified premises reduced pragmatic and increased logical responses relative to standard ones, providing strong evidence that pragmatic responses can explain some aspects of the errors made in the syllogistic reasoning task. These findings suggest that standard quantifiers should be replaced with logically clarified quantifiers in teaching and in future research.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000257228500020,
      author = {Schmidt, James R. and Thompson, Valerie A.},
      title = {``At least one'' problem with ``some'' formal reasoning paradigms},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {36},
      number = {1},
      pages = {217-229},
      doi = {{10.3758/MC.36.1.217}}
    }
    
    Schroder, E. Selective differentiation in cognitive development: A longitudinal analysis of the emergence of individual differences in syllogistic reasoning {2002} ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE
    Vol. {34}({3}), pp. {136-148} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: In order to analyze the emergence of interindividual differences in the development of deductive reasoning a longitudinal study was conducted from childhood to adolescence. ne present analysis focuses on the interface between individual development and the conditions of cognitive socialization. As part of a longitudinal study various syllogistic tasks were administered repeatedly to an urban sample (61 girls and 60 boys) and to a non urban sample (29 girls and 35 boys) at ages 9, 12, 15, and partly at age 17. The tasks were varied in the following ways: (1) four basic propositions (modus ponens, denial of antecedent, affirmation of consequent, and modus tollens), and (2) different contexts of application (experiential, counterintuitive, and abstract), The quasi-experimental design of the study allows a systematic stratification of the sample according to developmental status at the onset of schooling, social class, and gender. The analyses show that developmental status at the age of 7 years has great influence on the development of deductive reasoning in adolescence. The influence increases across time. While social conditions and gender have only weak direct impact on development in deductive reasoning, the interface between internal and external constraints shows that their influence is mediated by internal developmental conditions. The developmental trajectories of deductive reasoning in adolescence are characterized by a process of selective differentiation (without compensation).
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000176677400002,
      author = {Schroder, E},
      title = {Selective differentiation in cognitive development: A longitudinal analysis of the emergence of individual differences in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {34},
      number = {3},
      pages = {136-148},
      doi = {{10.1026//0049-8637.34.3.136}}
    }
    
    SCHRODER, E. DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRAINTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE {1995} ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE
    Vol. {27}({3}), pp. {226-250} 
    article  
    Abstract: In order to analyze the emergence of intraindividual differences in the development of syllogistic reasoning, a longitudinal study from childhood to adolescence was undertaken. The present analysis focuses on the interface between the form and context of a syllogistic proposition. As pan of a longitudinal study, various syllogistic tasks were repeatedly administered to an urban sample (61 girls and 60 boys) and to a nonurban sample (29 girls and 35 boys) at ages 9, 12, 15, and (partly) 17 years. The tasks were varied in the following ways: (1) four basic propositions (modus ponens, denial of antecedent, affirmation of consequent, and modus tollens), and (2) different contexts of application (experiential, counterintuitive, and abstract). The analysis shows that intraindividual differences between contexts decrease over time, while the form and the context of tasks interact systematically. While large differences between different forms of proposition were found in the experiential and the counterintuitive tasks, no differences were seen in the abstract task.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RY78300003,
      author = {SCHRODER, E},
      title = {DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRAINTS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE},
      journal = {ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {27},
      number = {3},
      pages = {226-250}
    }
    
    SHIGAKI, I. & WOLF, W. HIERARCHIES OF FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING OF YOUNG GIFTED-CHILDREN {1980} CHILD STUDY JOURNAL
    Vol. {10}({2}), pp. {87-106} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1980JV31500003,
      author = {SHIGAKI, IS and WOLF, W},
      title = {HIERARCHIES OF FORMAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING OF YOUNG GIFTED-CHILDREN},
      journal = {CHILD STUDY JOURNAL},
      year = {1980},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {87-106}
    }
    
    Shikishima, C., Hiraishi, K., Yamagata, S., Sugimoto, Y., Takemura, R., Ozaki, K., Okada, M., Toda, T. & Ando, J. Is g an entity? A Japanese twin study using syllogisms and intelligence tests {2009} INTELLIGENCE
    Vol. {37}({3}), pp. {256-267} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Using a behavioral genetic approach. we examined the validity of the hypothesis concerning the singularity of human general intelligence, the g theory, by analyzing data from two tests: the first consisted of 100 syllogism problems and the second a full-scale intelligence test. The participants were 448 Japanese young adult twins (167 pairs of identical and 53 pairs of fraternal twins). Data were analyzed for their fit to two kinds of multivariate genetic models: a common pathway model, in which a higher-order latent variable, g, was postulated as an entity: and an independent pathway model, in which the higher-order latent variable was not posited. These analyses revealed that the common pathway model which included additive genetic and nonshared environmental factors best accounted for the three distinct mental abilities: syllogistic logical deductive reasoning, verbal, and spatial. Both the substantial g-loading for syllogism-solving, historically recognized as the symbol of human intelligence, and the emergence of g as an entity at an etiological level, that is, at the genetic and environmental factor level. provide further support for the g theory. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000266526000005,
      author = {Shikishima, Chizuru and Hiraishi, Kai and Yamagata, Shinji and Sugimoto, Yutaro and Takemura, Ryo and Ozaki, Koken and Okada, Mitsuhiro and Toda, Tatsushi and Ando, Juko},
      title = {Is g an entity? A Japanese twin study using syllogisms and intelligence tests},
      journal = {INTELLIGENCE},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {37},
      number = {3},
      pages = {256-267},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.intell.2008.10.010}}
    }
    
    Shynkaruk, J.M. & Thompson, V.A. Confidence and accuracy in deductive reasoning {2006} MEMORY & COGNITION
    Vol. {34}({3}), pp. {619-632} 
    article  
    Abstract: In two experiments, we investigated the relationship between confidence and accuracy in syllogistic reasoning. Participants judged the validity of conclusions and provided confidence ratings twice for each problem: once quickly and again after further deliberation. Correlations between confidence and accuracy were small or nonexistent. In addition, confidence and accuracy were mediated by different variables. Confidence judgments appeared to reflect external cues, so that confidence was greater when the participants were allowed additional time to think about the problem, as well as when the conclusion was either believable or unbelievable, rather than neutral. In contrast, accuracy changed little as a function of the amount of time available and did not differ for believable and neutral problems. These data support a model in which initial decisions are made quickly, on the basis of heuristic cues, and analytic processes are used to justify or rationalize the earlier decision.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000239695500014,
      author = {Shynkaruk, Jody M. and Thompson, Valerie A.},
      title = {Confidence and accuracy in deductive reasoning},
      journal = {MEMORY & COGNITION},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {34},
      number = {3},
      pages = {619-632}
    }
    
    Simpson, J., Cove, J., Fineberg, N., Msetfi, R.M. & Ball, L.J. Reasoning in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder {2007} BRITISH JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {46}({Part 4}), pp. {397-411} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Objectives. The aim of this study was to investigate the inductive and deductive reasoning abilities of people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Following previous research, it was predicted that people with OCD would show different abilities on inductive reasoning tasks but similar abilities to controls on deductive reasoning tasks. Design. A two-group comparison was used with both groups matched on a range of demographic variables. Where appropriate, unmatched variables were entered into the analyses as covariates. Methods. Twenty-three people with OCD and 25 control participants were assessed on two tasks: an inductive reasoning task (the 20-questions task) and a deductive reasoning task (a syllogistic reasoning task with a content-neutral and content-emotional manipulation). Results. While no group differences emerged on several of the parameters of the inductive reasoning task, the OCD group did differ on one, and arguably the most important, parameter by asking fewer correct direct-hypothesis questions. The syllogistic reasoning task results were analysed using both correct response and conclusion acceptance data. While no main effects of group were evident, significant interactions indicated important differences in the way the OCD group reasoned with content neutral and emotional syllogisms. Conclusions. It was argued that the OCD group's patterns of response on both tasks were characterized by the need for more information, states of uncertainty, and doubt and postponement of a final decision.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000251163600002,
      author = {Simpson, Jane and Cove, Jennifer and Fineberg, Naomi and Msetfi, Rachel M. and Ball, Linden J.},
      title = {Reasoning in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {46},
      number = {Part 4},
      pages = {397-411},
      doi = {{10.1348/014466507X228438}}
    }
    
    Smeets, G. & De Jong, P. Belief bias and symptoms of psychopathology in a non-clinical sample {2005} COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH
    Vol. {29}({4}), pp. {377-386} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: This study explores the tenability of the idea that a general tendency to confirm rather than to falsify personal beliefs (i.e., belief bias) is responsible for the general refractoriness of dysfunctional convictions that play a role in psychopathology. Therefore, we investigated the relationship between a generally enhanced belief bias and the severity of self-reported psychopathological symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Participants (N = 200) solved a series of linear syllogisms concerning neutral themes. They were asked to judge the syllogisms' logical validity, without taking the believability of the syllogisms into account. Participants performed relatively poor (i.e., they made more errors and displayed longer response latencies) when there was a mismatch between the logical validity and believability of the syllogisms (i.e., a general belief bias). However, there was no linear association between the severity of the general belief bias and the severity of psychopathological complaints. Thus, the present study lends no support to the idea that a generally enhanced tendency to confirm rather than to falsify prior beliefs is a diathesis for the development of psychopathology.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000231600100001,
      author = {Smeets, G and De Jong, PJ},
      title = {Belief bias and symptoms of psychopathology in a non-clinical sample},
      journal = {COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {29},
      number = {4},
      pages = {377-386},
      doi = {{10.1007/s10608-005-1676-5}}
    }
    
    Sommerfeld, E., Hensel, A. & Hildebrandt, A. Cooperation of frontal and parietal brain areas as a function of cognitive training {1999} FECHNER DAY 99: THE END OF 20TH CENTURY PSYCHOPHYSICS, PROCEEDINGS, pp. {356-361}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: In solving memory based problems working memory is realizing control processes involved in the temporary maintenance and manipulation of information. Such control processes can be reduced on the basis of cognitive training. However, in terms of inner psychophysics, the relationship between the process of cognitive training and changes in the cooperation of cortical subsystems supporting these processes remains an open issue. The work presented in this paper was guided by the idea that functional cooperation of specific cortical subsystems is indicated by synchronization of relevant brain areas. EEG coherence was used to assess the synchronization of spatially separate brain areas as a function of increasing practice on the task. The paradigm consisted of memory based tasks of syllogistic reasoning. The present study investigated training-dependent EEG coherence changes across eight phases of cognitive training. The results show a training-dependent decrease as well of the reaction time as of the interregional coherence of fronto-parietal electrode pairs within the left hemisphere in the analyzed 4-7.5 Hz and 13-20 Hz frequency bands. This supports our hypothesis that a training-dependent reduction of mental effort for control processes is accompanied by a reduction of the strength of the functional coupling between specific frontal and parietal brain regions. However, there exist certain differences between the training-dependent functions. Based on these different functions it is possible to reveal functional relations between the process of cognitive training and accompanying changes of the functional coupling between cortical subsystems underlying task performance.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000084731400063,
      author = {Sommerfeld, E and Hensel, A and Hildebrandt, A},
      title = {Cooperation of frontal and parietal brain areas as a function of cognitive training},
      booktitle = {FECHNER DAY 99: THE END OF 20TH CENTURY PSYCHOPHYSICS, PROCEEDINGS},
      year = {1999},
      pages = {356-361},
      note = {15th Annual Meeting of the International-Society-for-Psychophysics, TEMPE, AZ, OCT 21-24, 1999}
    }
    
    Spiel, C., Gluck, J. & Gossler, H. Competence profile and competence level in deductive reasoning in the SDV - integration of Piaget's developmental theory and item response models {2004} DIAGNOSTICA
    Vol. {50}({3}), pp. {145-152} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The paper describes the theoretical background, development, and preliminary results of the ``Leistungsprofiltest Schlussfolgemdes Denken - Verbal (SDV)'' (competence profile test: deductive reasoning - verbal). The test was derived from Piaget's developmental theory. According to results from performance-competence research the transition from concrete-operatioral stage to formal-operational stage is influenced by moderator variables and is therefore more gradual than proposed by Piaget. Hypotheses concerning transition stages are presented in the paper. The SDV consists of system atically constructed (syllogistic) conditional inference items. The theoretical assumptions were tested on a sample of 418 secondary school students, grades 7 to 12. For data analysis, Mixed Rasch Models (MRMs) were applied. The 3-class solution fits the data best. Based on their competence profiles, the three latent classes can be described as concrete-operational stage, transition stage 1. and transition stage 2. Results support the theoretical assumptions of the SDV. Key words: deductive reasoning, Mixed Rasch Models, test, cognitive development
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000222486500004,
      author = {Spiel, C and Gluck, J and Gossler, H},
      title = {Competence profile and competence level in deductive reasoning in the SDV - integration of Piaget's developmental theory and item response models},
      journal = {DIAGNOSTICA},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {50},
      number = {3},
      pages = {145-152},
      doi = {{10.1026/0012-1924.50.3.145}}
    }
    
    Stanovich, K. & West, R. Individual differences in rational thought {1998} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
    Vol. {127}({2}), pp. {161-188} 
    article  
    Abstract: Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict individual differences in performance on these tasks.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000073911300003,
      author = {Stanovich, KE and West, RF},
      title = {Individual differences in rational thought},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {127},
      number = {2},
      pages = {161-188}
    }
    
    STANOVICH, K., WEST, R. & HARRISON, M. KNOWLEDGE GROWTH AND MAINTENANCE ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN - THE ROLE OF PRINT EXPOSURE {1995} DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {31}({5}), pp. {811-826} 
    article  
    Abstract: One hundred thirty-three college students (mean age = 19.1 years) and 49 older individuals( mean age = 79.9 years) completed 2 general knowledge tasks, a vocabulary task, a working memory task, a syllogistic reasoning task, and several measures of exposure to print. A series of hierarchical regression analyses indicated that when measures of exposure to print were used as control variables, the positive relationships between age and vocabulary, and age and declarative knowledge, were eliminated. Within each of the age groups, exposure to print was a significant predictor of vocabulary and declarative knowledge even after differences in working memory, general ability, and educational level were controlled. These results support the theory of fluid-crystallized intelligence and suggest a more prominent role for exposure to print in theories of individual differences in knowledge acquisition and maintenance.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RT14300010,
      author = {STANOVICH, KE and WEST, RF and HARRISON, MR},
      title = {KNOWLEDGE GROWTH AND MAINTENANCE ACROSS THE LIFE-SPAN - THE ROLE OF PRINT EXPOSURE},
      journal = {DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {31},
      number = {5},
      pages = {811-826}
    }
    
    Stenning, K. & Cox, R. Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences {2006} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {59}({8}), pp. {1454-1483} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an ``immediate inference'' task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' ``intended models'' of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single ``fundamental human reasoning mechanism''.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000239756700009,
      author = {Stenning, Keith and Cox, Richard},
      title = {Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {59},
      number = {8},
      pages = {1454-1483},
      doi = {{10.1080/17470210500198759}}
    }
    
    Stenning, K. & Yule, P. Image and language in human reasoning: A syllogistic illustration {1997} COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {34}({2}), pp. {109-159} 
    article  
    Abstract: Existing accounts of syllogistic reasoning oppose rule-based and model-based methods. Stenning and Oberlander (1995) show that the latter are isomorphic to well-known graphical methods, when these are correctly interpreted. We here extend these results by showing that equivalent sentential implementations exist, thus revealing that all these theories are members of a family of abstract individual identification algorithms variously implemented in diagrams or sentences. This abstract logical analysis suggests a novel individual identifaction task for observing syllogistic reasoning processes. Comparison of the results of this task with the Standard Task confirms that the tasks are psychologically closely related, throwing light on sources of error, on subjects' sensitivity to metalogical properties, and on term-ordering phenomena. Since it avoids posing the subtask of formulating a quantified conclusion, the new task allows comparison of explanations of problem difficulty in terms of the number of models (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) with alternatives in terms of the difficulty of choosing a quantifier for the conclusion. Logical concepts of source and conditional premisses provide a comprehensive account of term order data, including figural effects, at a level abstract with regard to imagistic or sentential representations. These results argue that much richer empirical evidence will be required to discriminate phenomenologically distinct reasoning processes than has hitherto been supposed. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1997YJ29300001,
      author = {Stenning, K and Yule, P},
      title = {Image and language in human reasoning: A syllogistic illustration},
      journal = {COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {34},
      number = {2},
      pages = {109-159}
    }
    
    Stenning, K., Yule, P. & Cox, R. Quantifier interpretation and syllogistic reasoning: An individual differences account {1996} PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {678-683}  inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1996BG10A00144,
      author = {Stenning, K and Yule, P and Cox, R},
      title = {Quantifier interpretation and syllogistic reasoning: An individual differences account},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1996},
      pages = {678-683},
      note = {18th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, LA JOLLA, CA, JUL 12-15, 1996}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. MAYDAY FOR MAYBERY - A REPLY TO AN INVALID CRITIQUE OF THE MIXED MODEL OF LINEAR-SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1990} BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {81}({Part 3}), pp. {285-286} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1990DW97700002,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ},
      title = {MAYDAY FOR MAYBERY - A REPLY TO AN INVALID CRITIQUE OF THE MIXED MODEL OF LINEAR-SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1990},
      volume = {81},
      number = {Part 3},
      pages = {285-286}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. DEVELOPMENT OF LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1980} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {29}({2}), pp. {340-356} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1980JK83300011,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ},
      title = {DEVELOPMENT OF LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1980},
      volume = {29},
      number = {2},
      pages = {340-356}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. REPRESENTATION AND PROCESS IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1980} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL
    Vol. {109}({2}), pp. {119-159} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1980JU94600001,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ},
      title = {REPRESENTATION AND PROCESS IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL},
      year = {1980},
      volume = {109},
      number = {2},
      pages = {119-159}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. MODEL OF LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1976} BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY
    Vol. {8}({4}), pp. {260} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1976CL56900305,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ},
      title = {MODEL OF LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOCIETY},
      year = {1976},
      volume = {8},
      number = {4},
      pages = {260}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. & TURNER, M. COMPONENTS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1981} ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
    Vol. {47}({3}), pp. {245-265} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1981LK77600004,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ and TURNER, ME},
      title = {COMPONENTS OF SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {47},
      number = {3},
      pages = {245-265}
    }
    
    STERNBERG, R. & WEIL, E. AN APTITUDE X STRATEGY INTERACTION IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1980} JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {72}({2}), pp. {226-239} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1980JP26700013,
      author = {STERNBERG, RJ and WEIL, EM},
      title = {AN APTITUDE X STRATEGY INTERACTION IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1980},
      volume = {72},
      number = {2},
      pages = {226-239}
    }
    
    STRIZENEC, M. RECENT CONCEPTS CONCERNING BIAS IN REASONING {1995} CESKOSLOVENSKA PSYCHOLOGIE
    Vol. {39}({2}), pp. {143-149} 
    article  
    Abstract: Current approaches to erroneousness in syllogistic reasoning are presented. Following introductory knowledge of logics about syllogistic reasoning, various aspects of failure, mainly inconsistent use of the method of formal logics and the effect of beliefs are discussed. Details are given about the ways in which beliefs influence reasoning and about relevant theoretic explanations (e.g., conversion, selective choosing, mental models). The elimination of bias in reasoning by means of instruction was studied, too. The conclusion evaluates the overall situation in this field.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RN04900005,
      author = {STRIZENEC, M},
      title = {RECENT CONCEPTS CONCERNING BIAS IN REASONING},
      journal = {CESKOSLOVENSKA PSYCHOLOGIE},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {39},
      number = {2},
      pages = {143-149}
    }
    
    STRIZENEC, M. & PROKOPCAKOVA, A. QUALITATIVE-ANALYSIS OF ERRONEOUSNESS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1995} STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA
    Vol. {37}({1}), pp. {21-25} 
    article  
    Abstract: Following previous overviews we have analyzed erroneousness in selecting the correct conclusion in 20 syllogisms in a sample of 119 students. Erroneousness was influenced mainly by the syllogism figure, the type of premise as wt ll as the order of the conclusions given. Greater erroneousness was found in negative and particular statements.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995QW08800003,
      author = {STRIZENEC, M and PROKOPCAKOVA, A},
      title = {QUALITATIVE-ANALYSIS OF ERRONEOUSNESS IN SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {STUDIA PSYCHOLOGICA},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {37},
      number = {1},
      pages = {21-25}
    }
    
    Stupple, E.J.N. & Ball, L.J. Belief-logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model {2008} THINKING & REASONING
    Vol. {14}({2}), pp. {168-181} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the ``belief-first'' selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including ``reasoning-first'' and ``parallel-process'' models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief-logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief-logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000255373000002,
      author = {Stupple, Edward J. N. and Ball, Linden J.},
      title = {Belief-logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model},
      journal = {THINKING & REASONING},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {168-181},
      doi = {{10.1080/13546780701739782}}
    }
    
    Stupple, E.J.N. & Ball, L.J. Figural effects in a syllogistic evaluation paradigm - An inspection-time analysis {2007} EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {54}({2}), pp. {120-127} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Robust biases have been found in syllogistic reasoning that relate to the figure of premises and to the directionality of terms in given conclusions. Mental models theorists (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) have explained figural bias by assuming that reasoners can more readily form integrated models of premises when their middle terms are contiguous than when they are not. Biases associated with the direction of conclusion terms have been interpreted as reflecting a natural mode of reading off conclusions from models according to a ``first-in, first-out principle.'' We report an experiment investigating the impact of systematic figural and conclusion-direction manipulations on the processing effort directed at syllogistic components, as indexed through a novel inspection-time method. The study yielded reliable support for mental-models predictions concerning the nature and locus of figural and directionality effects in syllogistic reasoning. We argue that other accounts of syllogistic reasoning seem less able to accommodate the full breadth of inspection-time findings observed.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000245633200004,
      author = {Stupple, Edward J. N. and Ball, Linden J.},
      title = {Figural effects in a syllogistic evaluation paradigm - An inspection-time analysis},
      journal = {EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {54},
      number = {2},
      pages = {120-127},
      doi = {{10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.120}}
    }
    
    Stupple, E.J.N. & Waterhouse, E.F. Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic-analytic conflict {2009} QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {62}({8}), pp. {1533-1541} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: An experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000267463700005,
      author = {Stupple, Edward J. N. and Waterhouse, Eleanor F.},
      title = {Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic-analytic conflict},
      journal = {QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {62},
      number = {8},
      pages = {1533-1541},
      doi = {{10.1080/17470210902785674}}
    }
    
    Theron, S. The interdependence of semantics, logic, and metaphysics as exemplified in the Aristotelian tradition {2002} INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
    Vol. {42}({1}), pp. {63-91} 
    article  
    Abstract: A general metaphysical account of logic, meaning, and reference that developed from the Greeks through the medievals and up into modern times can be called Aristotelian. `Copernican' claims (Kant, Frege), radically to replace this paradigm as quasi-'Ptolemaic', actually participated in the prolonged decline of scholasticism, after Aquinas in particular. We need to recognize, or to remember, the priority of being to truth and not to conflate them. We need to explicate the origin of thinking (abstraction) as at one remove from immediate sense-experience. Syllogistic logic then emerges as a true causal account of reasoning in general; it is not some primitive attempt to outline a formal logical system. An account of suppositio as controlling the analogous uses of our finite store of words in reference to an infinite reality itself shaped by criss-cross patterns of likenesses, governs the general picture supplied here.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000174171100004,
      author = {Theron, S},
      title = {The interdependence of semantics, logic, and metaphysics as exemplified in the Aristotelian tradition},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {42},
      number = {1},
      pages = {63-91}
    }
    
    Thompson, V., Striemer, C., Reikoff, R., Gunter, R. & Campbell, J. Syllogistic reasoning time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed {2003} PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW
    Vol. {10}({1}), pp. {184-189} 
    article  
    Abstract: Models of deductive reasoning typically assume that reasoners dedicate more logical analysis to unbelievable conclusions than to believable ones (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994- Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). When the conclusion is believable, reasoners are assurne to accept it without much further thought, but when it is unbelievable, they are assumed to analyze the conclusion, presumably in an attempt to disconfirm it. This disconfirmation hypothesis leads to two predictions, which were tested in the present experiment: Reasoners should take longer to reason about problems leading to unbelievable conclusions, and reasoners should consider more models or representations of premise information for unbelievable conclusions than for believable ones. Neither prediction was supported by our data. Indeed, we observed that reasoners took significantly longer to reason about believable conclusions than about unbelievable ones and generated the same number of representations regardless of the believability of the premises. We propose a model, based on a modified version of verbal reasoning theory (Polk & Newell, 1995), that does not depend on the disconfirmation assumption.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000182332200019,
      author = {Thompson, VA and Striemer, CL and Reikoff, R and Gunter, RW and Campbell, JID},
      title = {Syllogistic reasoning time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed},
      journal = {PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {10},
      number = {1},
      pages = {184-189}
    }
    
    Tsujii, T., Masuda, S., Akiyama, T. & Watanabe, S. The role of inferior frontal cortex in belief-bias reasoning: An rTMS study {2010} NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA
    Vol. {48}({7}), pp. {2005-2008} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning refers to the tendency for subjects to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with belief about the world. This study examined the role of inferior frontal cortex (IFC) in belief-bias reasoning using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). We used an off-line rTMS method to disrupt IFC activity transiently. Right IFC stimulation significantly impaired incongruent reasoning performance, enhancing the belief-bias effect. Subjects whose right IFC was impaired by rTMS may not be able to inhibit irrelevant semantic processing in incongruent trials. Although left IFC stimulation impaired congruent reasoning, it paradoxically facilitated incongruent reasoning performance, eliminating the belief-bias effect. Subjects whose left IFC was impaired by rTMS may not suffer from interference by irrelevant semantic processing. This `study demonstrates for the first time the roles of left and right IFC in belief-bias reasoning using an rTMS approach. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000279023100014,
      author = {Tsujii, Takeo and Masuda, Sayako and Akiyama, Takekazu and Watanabe, Shigeru},
      title = {The role of inferior frontal cortex in belief-bias reasoning: An rTMS study},
      journal = {NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {48},
      number = {7},
      pages = {2005-2008},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.021}}
    }
    
    Tsujii, T., Okada, M. & Watanabe, S. Effects of aging on hemispheric asymmetry in inferior frontal cortex activity during belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: A near-infrared spectroscopy study {2010} BEHAVIOURAL BRAIN RESEARCH
    Vol. {210}({2}), pp. {178-183} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning refers to the tendency for subjects to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with beliefs about the world. This study examined age-related differences in inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activity associated with belief-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). The subjects were 32 older (mean age, 68.53 years) and 32 young adult volunteers (mean age, 21.50 years). They performed belief-congruent and incongruent reasoning trials while right and left IFC activities were being measured by NIRS. Behavioral analysis found that older adults exhibited a larger belief-bias than young adults. NIRS analysis showed that the right IFC was more activated than the left IFC in young adults, while there was no significant hemispheric difference in older adults. On correlation analysis, there was a significant positive correlation between reasoning accuracy and IFC activation in both hemispheres for older adults, while in young adults, the correlation was significant only in the right hemisphere. These correlation patterns suggest that the right IFC is critical for resolving conflicting reasoning in young adults, but that older adults may further recruit the left IFC to compensate for the age-related decline in the inhibitory control functions. Thus, we demonstrate, for the first time, age-related differences in neural activity associated with belief-bias reasoning. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000278035100005,
      author = {Tsujii, Takeo and Okada, Mitsuhiro and Watanabe, Shigeru},
      title = {Effects of aging on hemispheric asymmetry in inferior frontal cortex activity during belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: A near-infrared spectroscopy study},
      journal = {BEHAVIOURAL BRAIN RESEARCH},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {210},
      number = {2},
      pages = {178-183},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.bbr.2010.02.027}}
    }
    
    Tsujii, T. & Watanabe, S. Neural correlates of belief-bias reasoning under time pressure: A near-infrared spectroscopy study {2010} NEUROIMAGE
    Vol. {50}({3}), pp. {1320-1326} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The dual-process theory of reasoning explained the belief-bias effect, the tendency for human reasoning to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with belief about the world, by proposing a belief-based fast heuristic system and a logic-based slow analytic system. Although the claims were supported by behavioral findings that the belief-bias effect was enhanced when subjects were not given sufficient time for reasoning, the neural correlates were still unknown. The present study therefore examined the relationship between the time-pressure effect and activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) during belief-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Forty-eight subjects performed congruent and incongruent reasoning tasks, involving long-span (20 s) and short-span trials (10 s). Behavioral analysis found that only incongruent reasoning performance was impaired by the time-pressure of short-span trials. NIRS analysis found that the time-pressure decreased right IFC activity during incongruent trials. Correlation analysis showed that subjects with enhanced right IFC activity could perform better in incongruent trials, while subjects for whom the right IFC activity was impaired by the time-pressure could not maintain better reasoning performance. These findings suggest that the right IFC may be responsible for the time-pressure effect in conflicting reasoning processes. When the right IFC activity was impaired in the short-span trials in which subjects were not given sufficient time for reasoning, the subjects may rely on the fast heuristic system, which result in belief-bias responses. We therefore offer the first demonstration of neural correlates of time-pressure effect on the IFC activity in belief-bias reasoning. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000275408200046,
      author = {Tsujii, Takeo and Watanabe, Shigeru},
      title = {Neural correlates of belief-bias reasoning under time pressure: A near-infrared spectroscopy study},
      journal = {NEUROIMAGE},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {50},
      number = {3},
      pages = {1320-1326},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.01.026}}
    }
    
    Tsujii, T. & Watanabe, S. Neural correlates of dual-task effect on belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: A near-infrared spectroscopy study {2009} BRAIN RESEARCH
    Vol. {1287}, pp. {118-125} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: Recent dual-process reasoning theories have explained the belief-bias effect, the tendency for human reasoning to be erroneously biased when logical conclusions are incongruent with beliefs about the world, by proposing a belief-based automatic heuristic system and logic-based demanding analytic system. Although these claims are supported by the behavioral finding that high-load secondary tasks enhance the belief-bias effect, the neural correlates of dual-task reasoning remain unknown. The present study therefore examined the relationship between dual-task effect and activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) during belief-bias reasoning by near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Forty-eight subjects participated in this study (MA=23.46 years). They were required to perform congruent and incongruent reasoning trials while responding to high- and low-load secondary tasks. Behavioral analysis showed that the high-load secondary task impaired only incongruent reasoning performance. NIRS analysis found that the high-load secondary task decreased right IFC activity during incongruent trials. Correlation analysis showed that subjects with enhanced right IFC activity could perform better in the incongruent reasoning trials, though subjects for whom right IFC activity was impaired by the secondary task could not maintain better reasoning performance. These findings suggest that the right IFC may be responsible for the dual-task effect in conflicting reasoning processes. When secondary tasks impair right IFC activity, subjects may rely on the automatic heuristic system, which results in belief-bias responses. We therefore offer the first demonstration of neural correlates of dual-task effect on IFC activity in belief-bias reasoning. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000269460100012,
      author = {Tsujii, Takeo and Watanabe, Shigeru},
      title = {Neural correlates of dual-task effect on belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: A near-infrared spectroscopy study},
      journal = {BRAIN RESEARCH},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {1287},
      pages = {118-125},
      doi = {{10.1016/j.brainres.2009.06.080}}
    }
    
    Vroling, M.S. & de Jong, P.J. Deductive Reasoning and Social Anxiety: Evidence for a Fear-confirming Belief Bias {2009} COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH
    Vol. {33}({6}), pp. {633-644} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between belief bias and fear of negative evaluation. Belief bias refers to a bias in deductive reasoning that acts to confirm rather than falsify prior beliefs. Participants (N = 52) with varying levels of fear of negative evaluation completed a belief bias task by means of linear syllogisms, with stimuli covering both social anxiety convictions and factual neutral statements. A linear relationship was found between fear of negative evaluation and belief bias for the social anxiety conviction category. No differences in reasoning were found for the neutral syllogisms. These results support the view that highly socially anxious individuals do not have a reasoning abnormality, but do have difficulty judging anxiogenic information as false and reassuring convictions-contradicting information as true. Such belief bias logically prevents dysfunctional cognitions from being corrected, thereby sustaining phobic fear.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000271397200008,
      author = {Vroling, Maartje S. and de Jong, Peter J.},
      title = {Deductive Reasoning and Social Anxiety: Evidence for a Fear-confirming Belief Bias},
      journal = {COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {33},
      number = {6},
      pages = {633-644},
      doi = {{10.1007/s10608-008-9220-z}}
    }
    
    WANG, P. FROM INHERITANCE RELATION TO NONAXIOMATIC LOGIC {1994} INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING
    Vol. {11}({4}), pp. {281-319} 
    article  
    Abstract: A nonaxiomatic reasoning system is an adaptive system that works with insufficient knowledge and resources. At the beginning of the paper, three binary term logics are defined. The first is based only on an inheritance relation. The second and the third suggest a novel way to process extension and intension, and they also have interesting relations with Aristotle's syllogistic logic. Based on the three simple systems, a nonaxiomatic logic is defined. It has a term-oriented language and an experience-grounded semantics. It can uniformly represent and process randomness, fuzziness, and ignorance. It can also uniformly carry out deduction, abduction, induction, and revision.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994PM33200002,
      author = {WANG, P},
      title = {FROM INHERITANCE RELATION TO NONAXIOMATIC LOGIC},
      journal = {INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {11},
      number = {4},
      pages = {281-319}
    }
    
    Wang, P. & Hofstadter, D. A logic of categorization {2006} JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
    Vol. {18}({2}), pp. {193-213} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The reasoning system known as NARS constitutes a model of categorization. NARS is designed to be an adaptive system that works under the constraint of insufficient knowledge and resources. It consists of a categorical language, an experience-grounded semantics, a set of syllogistic inference rules, a dynamic memory structure, and a control mechanism that manages asynchronized parallel inference. In the system, reasoning and categorization are two aspects of the same underlying process. As a model of categorization, NARS unifies several existing theories.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000239427300006,
      author = {Wang, Pei and Hofstadter, Douglas},
      title = {A logic of categorization},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {18},
      number = {2},
      pages = {193-213},
      doi = {{10.1080/09528130600557549}}
    }
    
    Watt, C. & Wiseman, R. Experimenter differences in cognitive correlates of paranormal belief and in PSI {2002} JOURNAL OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {66}({4}), pp. {371-385} 
    article  
    Abstract: It has been claimed that experimenter effects may account for inconsistent findings in the study of cognitive correlates of paranormal belief and in psi research. The present study investigates these 2 strands by having 2 experimenters each administer to 30 participants a paranormal belief questionnaire, 2 tests of cognitive ability (a syllogistic reasoning task and Raven's Progressive Matrices), and an ESP task. For all 60 participants, a significant negative correlation was found between paranormal belief and syllogisms performance. This correlation was attributable to just I of the experimenters, and the experimenteres' belief-cognitive ability correlations significantly differed, thus demonstrating an experimenter effect for this measure. Additional post hoe analyses were conducted to clarify the mechanism underlying the belief-cognitive ability con-elation. There was no evidence of an experimenter effect for the ESP task.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000180738700003,
      author = {Watt, C and Wiseman, R},
      title = {Experimenter differences in cognitive correlates of paranormal belief and in PSI},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {66},
      number = {4},
      pages = {371-385}
    }
    
    WATTERS, J. & ENGLISH, L. CHILDRENS APPLICATION OF SIMULTANEOUS AND SUCCESSIVE PROCESSING IN INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING PROBLEMS - IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING SCIENTIFIC REASONING SKILLS {1995} JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING
    Vol. {32}({7}), pp. {699-714} 
    article  
    Abstract: The research reported in this article was undertaken to obtain a better understanding of problem solving and scientific reasoning in 10-year-old children. The study involved measuring children's competence at syllogistic reasoning and in solving a series of problems requiring inductive reasoning. Children were also categorized on the basis of levels of simultaneous and successive synthesis. Simultaneous and successive synthesis represent two dimensions of information processing identified by Luria in a program of neuropsychological research. Simultaneous synthesis involves integration of information in a holistic or spatial fashion, whereas successive synthesis involves processing information sequentially with temporal links between stimuli. Analysis of the data generated in the study indicated that syllogistic reasoning and inductive reasoning were significantly correlated with both simultaneous and successive synthesis. However, the strongest correlation was found between simultaneous synthesis and inductive reasoning. These findings provide a basis for understanding the roles of spatial and verbal-logical ability as defined by Luria's neuropsychological theory in scientific problem solving. The results also highlight the need for teachers to provide experiences which are compatible with individual students' information processing styles.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995RR22300003,
      author = {WATTERS, JJ and ENGLISH, LD},
      title = {CHILDRENS APPLICATION OF SIMULTANEOUS AND SUCCESSIVE PROCESSING IN INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING PROBLEMS - IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING SCIENTIFIC REASONING SKILLS},
      journal = {JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {32},
      number = {7},
      pages = {699-714}
    }
    
    van Wensveen, L. Ecosystem sustainabiliy as a criterion for genuine virtue {2001} ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
    Vol. {23}({3}), pp. {227-241} 
    article  
    Abstract: I propose an ecologically attuned criterion for genuine virtue, namely, the criterion of ecosustainable virtue: a genuine virtue includes the goal of ensuring ecosystem sustainability. I show how this criterion emerges from environmental practice and how it can be supported by syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000170917700001,
      author = {van Wensveen, L},
      title = {Ecosystem sustainabiliy as a criterion for genuine virtue},
      journal = {ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {227-241}
    }
    
    WETHERICK, N. PSYCHOLOGY AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS {1993} PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {6}({4}), pp. {423-440} 
    article  
    Abstract: Following an earlier paper (Wetherick, 1989), the analysis of syllogistic reasoning via the medieval doctrine of `'distribution of terms'' is pursued and completed. The doctrine was not originally presented as an explanation of syllogistic reasoning but turns out to furnish one. It is shown that: 1. It is impossible to assert two propositions having a distributed middle term in common without, at the same time, tacitly asserting the valid conclusion, if any. 2. When the middle term is distributed but no valid conclusion follows, this is a consequence of the distributional status of the subject and predicate terms. 3. When the middle term is not distributed the propositions have nothing but a name in common. The logic of Spencer Brown (1969) is employed to show that logic is implicit in the behaviour of any organism that survives by making distinctions (e.g. between prey/non-prey; predator/non-predator). It is suggested that animal organisms answer this description by definition. Cognitive structures have evolved in the human organism so as to permit the conversion of habitual associations into universal propositions thus allowing formal logic and mathematics. This view appears to require a reversion to psychologism in logic, the consequences are considered and judged acceptable.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1993MM78500005,
      author = {WETHERICK, NE},
      title = {PSYCHOLOGY AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS},
      journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1993},
      volume = {6},
      number = {4},
      pages = {423-440}
    }
    
    WETHERICK, N. & GILHOOLY, K. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - EFFECTS OF PREMISE ORDER {1990}
    Vol. {1}LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING , pp. {99-108} 
    inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1990BT12U00008,
      author = {WETHERICK, NE and GILHOOLY, KJ},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING - EFFECTS OF PREMISE ORDER},
      booktitle = {LINES OF THINKING : REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT, VOL 1 - REPRESENTATION, REASONING, ANALOGY AND DECISION MAKING },
      year = {1990},
      volume = {1},
      pages = {99-108},
      note = {INTERNATIONAL CONF ON THINKING, ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND, AUG, 1988}
    }
    
    Wetherick, N. & Gilhooly, K. `Atmosphere', matching, and logic in syllogistic reasoning {1995} CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {14}({3}), pp. {169-178} 
    article  
    Abstract: The frequency of error in syllogism solving suggests that not all subjects are using logic. The atmosphere and matching hypotheses suggest what they might be doing instead but predict some of the same (correct and incorrect) responses. Reexamination of the data supporting the atmosphere hypothesis (Sells, 1936) shows that the procedure employed was unsatisfactory and that the results obtained support the matching hypothesis as well as they support the atmosphere hypothesis. It is argued on theoretical grounds that the matching hypothesis should be preferred. An experiment is reported in which subjects (N = 71) were required to draw conclusions from syllogistic premises and to construct premises from which given conclusions followed. It is shown that subjects may be divided into three groups: (n = 16) consisting of subjects who used logic and made few errors; (n = 25) of subjects whose correct and incorrect responses were in accordance with the matching hypothesis; and (n = 30) of subjects who were not matching but trying to do logic and not doing it well.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1995TQ15900001,
      author = {Wetherick, NE and Gilhooly, KJ},
      title = {`Atmosphere', matching, and logic in syllogistic reasoning},
      journal = {CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1995},
      volume = {14},
      number = {3},
      pages = {169-178}
    }
    
    Wilhelm, O. & Conrad, W. Development and evaluation of deductive reasoning tests {1998} DIAGNOSTICA
    Vol. {44}({2}), pp. {71-83} 
    article  
    Abstract: The ability to solve deductive reasoning tasks falls in the center of human intelligence in most current theories of intelligence structure, Available tests constructed to capture deductive reasoning have two major flaws: First, they are the result of a test construction that is unrelated to theories of cognitive psychology. Second, the range of deductive reasoning is not appropriately mapped into corresponding tests. To overcome these deficits, new tests are bring developed and evaluated which are based on the mental model theory of deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). A syllogistic and a spatial relational test with 18 items each were constructed. To validate the two new tests; a short form of the reasoning scale of the Berlin test of intelligence structure (BIS-Test; Jager, Suss & Beauducel, 1997) was used. The mental model theory of deductive reasoning allows the formulation of assumptions about item difficulties and correlations with other tests. A total of 855 subjects participated in the evaluation study. For the syllogistic reasoning tests assumptions about the difficulty are correct. However, the correlations satisfy the assumptions only partially. For the spatial relational test one of three difficulty assumptions is false. However. the correlations satisfy all the assumptions.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000073956300002,
      author = {Wilhelm, O and Conrad, W},
      title = {Development and evaluation of deductive reasoning tests},
      journal = {DIAGNOSTICA},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {44},
      number = {2},
      pages = {71-83}
    }
    
    YAGER, R. CONNECTIVES AND QUANTIFIERS IN FUZZY-SETS {1991} FUZZY SETS AND SYSTEMS
    Vol. {40}({1}), pp. {39-75} 
    article  
    Abstract: We discuss some of the issues involved in the selection of appropriate operators for implementing the union and intersection of fuzzy subsets. We discuss the extension principles used in extending operators to fuzzy subsets. We provide a structure for aggregating linguistic variables in the theory of approximate reasoning. We look at mean operators on fuzzy subsets as well as the inclusion of importances in aggregation. We discuss non-monotone set operators. We introduce the concept of linguistic quantifiers and look at some applications of these structures. We are particularly concerned with their application to linguistic summarizers, syllogistic reasoning and multi-criteria decision making.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1991FG57000003,
      author = {YAGER, RR},
      title = {CONNECTIVES AND QUANTIFIERS IN FUZZY-SETS},
      journal = {FUZZY SETS AND SYSTEMS},
      year = {1991},
      volume = {40},
      number = {1},
      pages = {39-75}
    }
    
    YAMA, H. REPRESENTATION CONSTRUCTED IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1994} JAPANESE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {65}({4}), pp. {270-277} 
    article  
    Abstract: Two experiments were performed to clarify the mental processes and the forms of representation constructed in linear syllogistic reasoning. In both experiments, subjects (68 graduates and undergraduates) were asked to decide whether or not three terms were ordered linearly. The first experiment compared two previously known effects; one was the effect facilitating the given-new strategy, and the other was the effect of end-anchoring. Results indicated that the reaction time decreased if the given-term was at the beginning of the second premise, or if the new term was the subject of the second premise. The results of the second experiment, which was designed to elucidate the end-anchoring effect in terms of mental movement, suggested that the mental operation on the new term imitated the actual movement implied by the verb in the premise, providing evidence of spatial representation in linear syllogistic reasoning.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1994PR01400003,
      author = {YAMA, H},
      title = {REPRESENTATION CONSTRUCTED IN LINEAR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      journal = {JAPANESE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {65},
      number = {4},
      pages = {270-277}
    }
    
    Yule, P. Deductive reasoning competence: Are rule-based and model-based methods distinguishable in principle? {1997} PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {826-831}  inproceedings  
    Abstract: Much argument has been generated concerning the problem whether human deductive performance can best be viewed as rule-based (e.g. Rips) or model-based (e.g. Johnson-Laird). This paper argues that the distinction is ill-founded and demonstrates that an ostensibly model-based syllogistic reasoning method can easily be implemented in a natural deduction calculus, which moreover makes fully explicit reference to the different possible interpretations of the premisses. More generally, it is unclear that other model-based methods cannot be given similar natural-deduction treatments, raising doubts about the distinguishability in principle of rule-based and model-based methods.
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:000168551500141,
      author = {Yule, P},
      title = {Deductive reasoning competence: Are rule-based and model-based methods distinguishable in principle?},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1997},
      pages = {826-831},
      note = {19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive-Science-Society, Stanford, CA, AUG 07-10, 1997}
    }
    
    YULE, P. & STENNING, K. THE FIGURAL EFFECT AND A GRAPHICAL ALGORITHM FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING {1992} PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, pp. {1170-1175}  inproceedings  
    BibTeX:
    @inproceedings{ISI:A1992BW42H00198,
      author = {YULE, P and STENNING, K},
      title = {THE FIGURAL EFFECT AND A GRAPHICAL ALGORITHM FOR SYLLOGISTIC REASONING},
      booktitle = {PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY},
      year = {1992},
      pages = {1170-1175},
      note = {14TH ANNUAL CONF OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOC, BLOOMINGTON, IN, JUL 29-AUG 01, 1992}
    }
    
    ZADEH, L. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN FUZZY-LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATION TO USUALITY AND REASONING WITH DISPOSITIONS {1985} IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS
    Vol. {15}({6}), pp. {754-763} 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1985AZF2600008,
      author = {ZADEH, LA},
      title = {SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN FUZZY-LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATION TO USUALITY AND REASONING WITH DISPOSITIONS},
      journal = {IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {15},
      number = {6},
      pages = {754-763}
    }
    
    Ziegler, A. The significance of form and content for the deductive reasoning of children and adolescence {1996} ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE
    Vol. {28}({3}), pp. {257-269} 
    article  
    Abstract: The most popular view of logical competence is the correspondence of inferences and rules specified in logical calculus. However, correct solutions to logical thinking problems are no more acceptable as proofs of logical competence than wrong solutions are as proofs of logical incompetence. In this article we argue for two further criteria for logical competence: The appreciation of the logical form and resistance against contra-factual content. In an empirical study 145 pupils in the classes 5, 7, and 9 showed drops of syllogistic reasoning performances oi hen belief and validity were permuted in the premises. For the first time it was shown for pupils in this age range that belief and validity interact, that is, belief has a greater influence on reasoning with invalid than with valid premises. The data are discussed in reference to three models originally developed to cover the reasoning of adults.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:A1996VF12600004,
      author = {Ziegler, A},
      title = {The significance of form and content for the deductive reasoning of children and adolescence},
      journal = {ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ENTWICKLUNGSPSYCHOLOGIE UND PADAGOGISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {28},
      number = {3},
      pages = {257-269}
    }
    
    Zielinski, T.A., Goodwin, G.P. & Halford, G.S. Complexity of categorical syllogisms: An integration of two metrics {2010} EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
    Vol. {22}({3}), pp. {391-421} 
    article DOI  
    Abstract: The complexity of categorical syllogisms was assessed using the relational complexity metric, which is based on the number of entities that are related in a single cognitive representation. This was compared with number of mental models in an experiment in which adult participants solved all 64 syllogisms. Both metrics accounted for similarly large proportions of the variance, showing that complexity depends on the number of categories that are related in a representation of the combined premises, whether represented in multiple mental models, or by a single model. This obviates the difficulty with mental models theory due to equivocal evidence for construction of more than one mental model. The ono valid conclusiono response was used for complex syllogisms that had valid conclusions. The results are interpreted as showing that the relational complexity metric can be applied to syllogistic reasoning, and can be integrated with mental models theory, which together account for a wide range of cognitive performances.
    BibTeX:
    @article{ISI:000277506700005,
      author = {Zielinski, Tracey A. and Goodwin, Geoffrey P. and Halford, Graeme S.},
      title = {Complexity of categorical syllogisms: An integration of two metrics},
      journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {22},
      number = {3},
      pages = {391-421},
      doi = {{10.1080/09541440902830509}}
    }
    

    Created by JabRef on 18/11/2010.